Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Myers, a Centerville Police Department detective sergeant, Myers reported to then-Lieutenant Brown and then-Police Chief Robertson, that Lieutenant Lavigne possessed and “possibl[y] disseminat[ed]” sexually explicit photos of minors that he obtained while investigating a “sexting" complaint at Centerville High School. Myers continued to pursue that allegation to no avail. Three years later, Myers sought whistleblower protection and met with City Manager Davis to report new allegations against Robertson, and to repeat the allegation against Lavigne, then met with an outside attorney appointed by Davis. After learning of the investigation, Robertson retired. Myers was interviewed but not hired for the vacant chief post, which went to Brown; the hiring panel included Lavigne. Myers was also passed over for two lieutenant positions. He was admitted to the FBI National Academy but Quantico rescinded that offer after its background investigator spoke to Lavigne. Myers was disciplined for writing a “character letter” for another city employee; the letter was critical of the city. He was later terminated for recording a meeting.Myers sued. alleging First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion claiming qualified immunity. The district court erred by failing to meaningfully analyze the assertions of immunity by Brown and Davis at the pleadings stage, but Myers plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation, and the defendants are not yet entitled to qualified or statutory immunity. View "Myers v. City of Centerville, Ohio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a driver for California Transit. After California Transit terminated his employment, Evenskaas filed this wage and hour class action against California Transit; its owner, and the company that administered California Transit’s payroll, Personnel Staffing Group, LLC (collectively, the California Transit defendants).   Because Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, in which he agreed to arbitrate all claims arising from his employment and waived his right to seek class-wide relief, the California Transit defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The California Transit defendants appealed, contending the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District reversed the order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s class claims. The court explained that because the paratransit services California Transit hired Plaintiff to provide involve interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement and preempts the Gentry rule that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable. View "Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs, sued Denis McDonough, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, for disability discrimination. Plaintiff alleged three violations of the Rehabilitation Act: failure to accommodate; disability discrimination; and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment to Secretary McDonough.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff’s requested accommodation was not required under the Rehabilitation Act because it would impose an undue hardship on the VAPD. The court explained that Plaintiff’s accommodations would have violated the VAPD’s collective bargaining agreement, which requires that “[s]cheduled off-tours shall be rotated fairly and equitably among affected employees, i.e., day/evening, day/night.” Plaintiff’s requested accommodations are therefore presumptively unreasonable.   Plaintiff further argued that his reassignment was not reasonable for two reasons. First, he claimed that day shifts were not the only form of requested relief; they were just one of many possible accommodations the VAPD could have made. But the record undermines his argument. Further, he also suggested that his reassignment constituted an adverse employment action, not a reasonable accommodation. The VAPD provided the only available reasonable accommodation—reassignment. The district court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to Secretary McDonough on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim.   Moreover, Plaintiff claimed the unusual nature of his hiring process proves that the real reason for his non-selection was disability discrimination. However, showing that an interview process is “unusual” is not sufficient to prove that an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual. View "Jesse LeBlanc v. Denis McDonough" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's whistleblower retaliation claim brought under section 1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, holding that Plaintiff could not satisfy his burden of bringing a claim for whistleblower retaliation under section 18 U.S.C. 1514A.Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant, sued Defendant for whistleblower retaliation under section 1514A, but his particular whistleblower claim was based on an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2), (5). Defendant moved for summary judgment following the completion of discovery, arguing that Plaintiff's action did not fall within any of the definitions of protected activity under section 1514A. The district court denied the motion as to the whistleblower retaliation claim. The First Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that Plaintiff's conduct was not "protected activity" under section 1514A. View "Baker v. Smith & Wesson, Inc." on Justia Law

Lesiv works for the Illinois Central Railroad. His brother, Lyubomir, had also worked there but left shortly after he filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against Illinois Central. Lyubomir later filed a discrimination suit in state court; Lesiv testified in a 2018 deposition. Almost three months later, his supervisors gave Lesiv a dangerous work assignment and suspended him after he refused to complete it. Lesiv asserts that Illinois Central violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by direct individual retaliation because he testified in his brother’s lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and by third-party retaliation, to harm his brother in retaliation for his brother’s charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Illinois Central on both claims. A retaliation claim requires proof that the employer took a “materially adverse” action against an employee because he engaged in protected activity or because another person close to him did so. A jury could find here that the dangerous work assignment and the suspension amounted to materially adverse actions but could not find retaliatory motives. Lesiv had no evidence that his supervisors took these actions against him because of his or his brother’s protected activities. None of the relevant supervisors knew that Lesiv had engaged in protected activity by testifying in his brother’s lawsuit. View "Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Kingman, Rhinelander Wisconsin’s Director of Public Works, spoke at a City Council meeting with a declaration of no confidence in a colleague. Rhinelander investigated Kingman’s contentions and found them without merit. In the process, however, third-party investigators discovered that Kingman himself had not only mistreated his employees but also had gone so far as to retaliate against those who had complained about the toxic work environment he created in his department.Kingman was fired and filed a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination reflected retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights at the City Council meeting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rhinelander and individual defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Council’s vote to fire Kingman reflected unlawful retaliation. Regardless of whether Kingman spoke to the council as a private citizen or in connection with his employment, Kingman’s behavior toward his subordinates is just the type of “significant intervening event” and seriously “inappropriate workplace behavior” that separates an employee’s protected activity “from the adverse employment action he receives.” View "Kingman v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

In 2017 Nigro, a certified nurse anesthetist, began working at Riley Hospital. Division Director, Dr. Sadhasivam, recruited her and started implementing a new team-based care model. Within a year, an internal investigation revealed department-wide concern over the model’s efficacy and impact on team dynamics. Some employees believed that Sadhasivam’s leadership style resulted in a tense workplace. In 2017-2019, Nigro was the subject of multiple complaints, mostly concerning her attitude and ability to work on a team. Coworkers described her as “rude, snappy and belittling,” with management expressing concern that her behavior undermined the department’s already delicate atmosphere of collegiality. After investigating the complaints, hospital decision-makers issued a “coaching memorandum” to Nigro. A month later, it was determined that Nigro had engaged in timekeeping fraud by not working at times when she had been clocked in, Sadhasivam and three female administrators, agreed to terminate her for misconduct.Nigro filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), alleging sex-based discrimination and retaliation because of a supportive affidavit she had signed in another employee’s discrimination case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence to support Nigro’s Title VII claim. View "Nigro v. Indiana University Health Care" on Justia Law

Appellant, a black male who was 60 years old at the time his employment was terminated, brought race, sex, and age discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") after the Minnesota Guardian ad Litem Board (“GALB”) terminated his employment following internal and external investigations into allegations of his misconduct. The district court granted GALB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if he had done so, he failed to demonstrate GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.   Appellant appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant failed to point to any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. The court concluded that GALB has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Appellant in March 2018: the internal and external investigations into Appellant’s alleged misconduct uncovered evidence that Appellant had engaged in gross misconduct. As such, because Appellant failed to show that GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to GALB on his race, sex, and age discrimination claims and his retaliation claim. View "Gregory King v. MN Guardian ad Litem Board" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of Paul Reina on his claim that Walmart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b) and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Reina, who was deaf and legally blind, worked as a cart attendant for Walmart for almost twenty years. After providing Reina with a job coach, Walmart eventually ended Reina's employment. Reina filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which sued Walmart for violating the ADA. The jury concluded that Walmart violated the ADA by refusing Reina a reasonable accommodation in the form of a full-time job coach and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights. The jury awarded Reina $200,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Walmart's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue an injunction against Walmart as proposed by the EEOC. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Port Authority, a municipal bus and light-rail operator, required its uniformed employees to wear face masks. Initially, Port Authority was unable to procure masks for all its employees, so they were required to provide their own. Some employees wore masks bearing political or social-protest messages. Port Authority has long prohibited its uniformed employees from wearing buttons “of a political or social protest nature.” Concerned that such masks would disrupt its workplace, Port Authority prohibited them in July 2020. When several employees wore masks expressing support for Black Lives Matter, Port Authority disciplined them. In September 2020, Port Authority imposed additional restrictions, confining employees to a narrow range of masks. The employees sued, alleging that Port Authority had violated their First Amendment rights.The district court entered a preliminary injunction rescinding discipline imposed under the July policy and preventing Port Authority from enforcing its policy against “Black Lives Matter” masks. The Third Circuit affirmed. The government may limit the speech of its employees more than it may limit the speech of the public, but those limits must still comport with the protections of the First Amendment. Port Authority bears the burden of showing that its policy is constitutional. It has not made that showing. View "Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 v. Port Authority of Allegheny County" on Justia Law