Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff a former part-time employee of the City of Cedar Falls, brought an action against the City of Cedar Falls and certain city officials after her 2018 termination, alleging interference with and retaliation for the exercise of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and claims of age discrimination, disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims, and she appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it need not consider the substantive elements of the claim because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she sustained any recoverable damages and it is undisputed that she did not seek any form of equitable relief.   Second, as to the retaliation claim, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of retaliation before the burden shifts back to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Here, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence of the kind that would demonstrate pretext. She offered nothing more than disagreement with the statements contained in the disciplinary reports. In the absence of any factual record demonstrating that these documented performance deficiencies were inaccurate, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating pretext. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that the final three disciplinary reports were part of the same unlawful employment practice—harassment based on her age and disability. View "Michelle Brandt v. City of Cedar Falls" on Justia Law

The California Insurance Commissioner filed an ex parte conservation application to place the California Insurance Company (“CIC I”) in a conservatorship after CIC I’s president attempted to consummate a purchase transaction with Berkshire Hathaway without the Commissioner’s approval, and then attempted to bypass the California insurance regulatory scheme by merging CIC I with the California Insurance Company (“CIC II”), a New Mexico-domesticated shell company formed by the president. The Superior Court granted the Commissioner’s conservatorship application and appointed the Commissioner as Conservator of CIC I. Applied Underwriters, of which the president is the Chief Executive Officer, and CIC II filed separate actions in federal court asserting causes of actions under Section 1983.   The district court dismissed both actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that because important considerations of federalism were at stake, the district court’s reliance on Younger abstention as a ground for dismissal was in error. The court held that an insurance conservatorship is not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution to bring it within the purview of what constitutes a similar, Younger-eligible “civil enforcement proceeding.”   The court held that dismissal of Appellants’ claims was warranted on account of the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. Further, Appellants’ interests were well represented in the conservatorship action; they had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges; they failed to sufficiently allege that the conservatorship action was brought in bad faith; they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury arising from extraordinary circumstances which might justify an exception to the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. View "APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. V. RICARDO LARA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a flight attendant for Delta Air Lines. She alleged that, while working on an airplane, she heard a passenger refer to her using a racist remark and reported the passenger’s remark to the pilot. The pilot responded by demanding that Plaintiff “step out on the jet bridge with the passenger,” and when she refused the pilot had her removed from the plane. Plaintiff reported the pilot’s conduct to her supervisor, and within two months of these events Plaintiff alleged she was subjected to random drug testing, wrongfully suspended, and ultimately fired. She filed a complaint in state court, alleging retaliation and vicarious liability under the New York City Human Rights Law. (“NYCHRL”) Delta removed the case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, holding that Leroy failed adequately to allege that Delta had discriminated against her and that she therefore failed to allege retaliation for a protected activity under the NYCHRL.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s claims finding that her complaint did not allege facts adequate to support a good-faith, reasonable belief that Delta engaged in discrimination against her. The court explained that the NYCHRL prohibits retaliation for “opposing [the] employer’s discrimination.” To succeed on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must at least have a good-faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. On the facts as alleged, Plaintiff could not have reasonably and in good faith believed that the passenger’s comment or the pilot’s conduct was an unlawful employment practice. View "Leroy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Charlton-Perkins, a male research scientist, applied for a professorship at the University of Cincinnati (UC) in late 2017. He alleges that UC determined him the most qualified candidate for the position but refused to hire him on account of his gender, then canceled the job search itself, ensuring that Charlton-Perkins could never fill the position.The district court dismissed his complaint under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681 and 42 U.S.C. 1983, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because nobody ever filled the canceled position, it reasoned, Charlton-Perkins’s claims never ripened into an adverse employment action, and thus he suffered no concrete injury cognizable in federal court. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Charlton-Perkins plausibly alleged a ripe employment discrimination claim, so his suit may proceed. No matter whether somebody else ever got the spot, it has always been the case that Charlton-Perkins was denied the spot. He has always had that de facto injury, no matter whether someone else got the position instead. Charlton-Perkins claims that the defendants not only failed to hire him because of his gender, but they then canceled the search itself as a pretext to conceal the discriminatory reason for the failure to hire. View "Charlton-Perkins v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought numerous transfers to different units in the Office. After these requests were denied, she filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, contending that similarly situated male employees had been granted the transfers they requested. She filed a Title VII suit against the District in 2014 alleging unlawful sex discrimination and retaliation.   The district court, applying Brown, granted summary judgment to the District. On rehearing, Plaintiff contends that Brown is facially inconsistent with Title VII. The DC Circuit explained that without any footing in the text of Title VII or Supreme Court precedent, there is no sound basis for maintaining Brown as circuit law. The court held that an employer that transfers an employee or denies an employee’s transfer request because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, and conditions, or privileges of employment. The court reasoned that Brown is fundamentally flawed because it “elevated policy concerns . . . over the plain statutory text.” The plain text of section 703(a)(1) contains no requirement that an employee alleging discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment make a separate showing of “objectively tangible harm.” View "Mary Chambers v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that his employer, the Alexandria Fire Department, intentionally discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. After Plaintiff saw white colleagues on other Fire Department shifts receive internships before him, he believed that the Fire Department was violating its placement practice and delaying his promotion because he is Black. The Fire Department explained that the first-come, first-served practice is shift-specific. The district court granted Defendant’s summary judgment motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that Plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that the Fire Department’s explanation—which is supported by its practice—is pretextual. The court explained that to establish the fourth element of his prima facia case, an inference of unlawful discrimination, Plaintiff claimed that the Fire Department had a practice of placing applicants with the first available field training officer regardless of shift, but the Department placed three later-certified white firefighters into the program ahead of him. However, the Fire Department’s evidence supports its claim that it places interns with training officers on a first-come, first-served basis within each shift. The court found that Plaintiff’s evidence only shows that he misunderstood the Fire Department’s internship placement practice. View "Micheall Lyons v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

After being terminated from a position with Sacramento County (the County), plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Vatalaro sued the County for unlawful retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Vatalaro alleged that, in violation of this statute, the County retaliated against her after she reported that she was working below her service classification. The County moved for summary judgment, contending Vatalaro could not show that she had a reasonable belief, or any belief at all, that the information she disclosed evidenced a violation of any law. The County added that, regardless, Vatalaro’s claim still failed because the County had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating her. The trial court, agreeing with the County on both these points, granted summary judgment in the County’s favor. On appeal, Vatalaro alleges that the trial court was wrong on both these issues. The Court of Appeal affirmed, though on a ground somewhat different than those raised at the trial level: "the relevant standard is not whether the County demonstrated it had such a [non-discriminatory] reason; it is instead whether the County 'demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.'" View "Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law

In 2014, Abebe, a Black woman of Ethiopian origin, began working for Eskenazi Health’s Dental Clinic as a dental assistant. Abebe has had a record of behavior issues throughout her employment; one annual review suggested that she “work on her personal issues that are affecting her interaction with co-workers.” Another review noted that “when she gets upset, her attitude turns to shocking.” Abebe’s 2018 performance review led to Abebe not receiving a merit-based raise, noting three incidents during which Abebe made accusations against co-workers. Abebe contacted the EEOC and alleged for the first time that she had experienced race- and national origin-based discrimination. Abebe claims Eskenazi Health placed her on a Performance Improvement Plan after she spoke to the EEOC. The parties dispute whether the Plan was actually issued or merely discussed. Eskenazi Health decided, a month later, not to impose the Plan.Abebe sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Eskenazi. Abebe cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, nor can she demonstrate that Eskenazi’s reason for the low scores on her performance review was pretextual. Abebe fails to establish a causal connection between her contact with the EEOC and the issuance of the Performance Improvement Plan, nor that issuing the Plan was an adverse employment action. View "Abebe v. Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), claiming that Defendant engaged in unlawful age discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff filed a motion with the district court requesting additional time so that Defendant could respond to her requests for production. The court denied the motion and Plaintiff later filed a supplement to her Rule 56(d) motion, again asking the court to defer consideration of Defendant’s summary-judgment motion and allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery, or alternatively, deny Defendant’s motion. The district court granted Defendant’s motion and entered final judgment in their favor.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and held that a district court cannot deny discovery rights protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court explained that a Rule 56(d) movant first must demonstrate that additional discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact. Here, Plaintiff identified such evidence for (1) her age-discrimination claim, and (2) her retaliation claim. The court reasoned it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery on the relevant issues in question and then fault her for having “no evidence of a causal connection” between her protected activity and the adverse employment actions. Further, the fact that Plaintiffs requests for discovery were repeatedly denied does not reveal a lack of diligence on her part. View "Bailey v. KS Mgmt Services" on Justia Law

Groff, whose religious beliefs prohibit working on Sunday, began working for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) in 2012. In 2013, USPS contracted with Amazon to deliver packages, including on Sundays. The Quarryville Postmaster initially exempted Groff from Sunday work. After a union agreement went into effect, Groff was required to work Sundays during the peak season. Groff transferred to Holtwood, a smaller station. Holtwood then began Amazon Sunday deliveries. The Holtwood Postmaster offered to adjust Groff’s schedule to permit him to attend religious services on Sunday morning and report to work afterward and later sought others to cover Groff’s Sunday shifts. Because Groff did not work when scheduled on Sundays, he faced progressive discipline. Groff requested a transfer to a position that did not require Sunday work. No such position was available. The Holtwood Postmaster continued attempting to find coverage and was, himself, forced to make Sunday deliveries. Groff’s refusal to report on Sundays created a “tense atmosphere” and resentment; another employee filed a grievance. Groff received additional discipline and submitted EEO complaints, then resigned,Groff sued, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII, disparate treatment, and failure to accommodate. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for USPS. Because the shift swaps USPS offered to Groff did not eliminate the conflict between his religious practice and his work obligations, USPS did not provide Groff with a reasonable accommodation but the accommodation Groff sought would cause an undue hardship on USPS. View "Groff v. DeJoy" on Justia Law