Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a local delivery driver for Cintas Corporation. That means he picked up items from a Houston warehouse (items shipped from out of state) and delivered them to local customers. Lopez does not want to arbitrate his claims against Cintas. He says that he is exempt from doing so because he belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.   The Fifth Circuit partially affirmed the district court’s ruling finding that Plaintiff is not a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the FAA. However, because Plaintiff's unconscionability challenge to his employment agreement must be decided in arbitration, the court vacated and remanded for that claim to be dismissed without prejudice to be considered in arbitration in the first instance.   The court explained that unlike either seamen or railroad employees, the local delivery drivers here have a more customer-facing role, which further underscores that this class does not fall within Section 1’s ambit. As a result, the transportation-worker exemption does not apply to this class of local delivery drivers. Further, because unconscionability under Texas law is a challenge to the validity, not the existence, of a contract, that challenge must be resolved by an arbitrator. Thus, the court held that the district court erred in resolving the merits of Plaintiff’s unconscionability claim. View "Lopez v. Cintas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to multiple instances of racial harassment and other discrimination during two periods of employment with the defendant Oakland Living Center, Inc. (“OLC”). According to Plaintiff, she was compelled to resign for good in the summer of 2018 after repeatedly being called racial slurs by the six-year-old son of an OLC supervisor and others (collectively “Defendants”).   Plaintiff contests the district court’s award of summary judgment to OLC on her hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the claims against OLC.   The court explained that in considering all of the circumstances, the fact that the three n-word incidents were perpetrated by a six-year-old boy does not preclude a finding that those incidents are sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter Plaintiff’s conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment. Accordingly, the court rejected OLC’s contention that it is entitled to summary judgment for lack of an adequate showing on the third element of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.   Further, here, the record indicates that OLC failed to provide reasonable procedures for complaints of workplace harassment. OLC has produced no evidence that it had any harassment reporting policy in July and August 2018, when the three n-word incidents occurred. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could charge OLC with constructive knowledge of all three n-word incidents. View "Tonya Chapman v. Oakland Living Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant La’Tonya Ford worked at Jackson National Life Insurance (“Jackson”) for about four years. During her time there, Ford allegedly suffered sex- and race-based discrimination; faced retaliation for complaining about her treatment; endured a hostile work environment; and was constructively discharged. After she left Jackson for another job, Ford sued the company for (1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) hostile work environment; and (4) constructive discharge. Jackson moved for summary judgment; the district court granted Jackson’s motion and dismissed all of Ford’s claims. Ford now appeals, urging us to reverse the court on each claim. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her discrimination claim. But it reversed in part the dismissal of her retaliation claim; her hostile-work-environment claim; and her constructive-discharge claim. View "Ford v. Jackson National Life, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding plaintiff Elba I. Falto De Roman only nominal damages against the Municipal Government of Mayguez and against its mayor, Jose Guillermo Rodriguez, on her complaint filed after was terminated from her position without having been afforded a due process hearing, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this action alleging, among other things, that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by terminating her without a hearing. After a trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to damages as a result of not receiving a hearing, the jury found Defendants not liable for damages and awarded nominal damages of $1 in favor of Plaintiff. The district court denied Plaintiff's subsequently-filed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her challenge to the district court's denial of her motion for judgment; and (2) Plaintiff did not meet the high bar for a new trial. View "Falto-de Roman v. Municipal Government of Mayaguez" on Justia Law

Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartman v. Canyon County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from his position as the Chief of Investigation of the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman (Parchman) about three months after he testified at a probable cause hearing on behalf of one of his investigators. Rogers sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), then-MDOC Commissioner, and MDOC’s Corrections Investigations Division Director, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on sovereign and qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.   The court explained that to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that the defendants violated a right that was not just arguable, but “beyond debate.” And he fails to “point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority that either answers the question Lane left open regarding sworn testimony given by a public employee within his ordinary job duties, or clearly establishes that Plaintiff’s testimony was outside his ordinary job duties as a law enforcement officer (or was otherwise protected speech). Nor does Plainitff point to record evidence demonstrating that his testimony was undisputedly outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities, as was his burden to do. View "Rogers v. Hall" on Justia Law

In March 2018, the officers were involved in the fatal shooting of a homeless man. The Oakland Police Department investigated the incident, concluding that the officers’ use of force was reasonable and complied with Police Department policy. The Chief of Police agreed. Separately, the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), the investigative body of the City’s civilian oversight Police Commission, investigated the incident and determined that the use of force was objectively reasonable. The Compliance Director disagreed with the Chief of Police and the CPRA, instead recommending termination of the officers for unreasonable use of force. After their termination, the officers sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief in state court.The Ninth Circuit vacated, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court. The panel held that this was a case arising under state law that properly belonged in the state courts. Recognizing that under Section 1331, a case can “arise under” federal law in two ways, the panel determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both branches of federal question jurisdiction. First, the panel lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal cause of action branch because federal law did not create the causes of action asserted. The panel next held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the substantial federal question branch. View "FRANCISCO NEGRETE V. CITY OF OAKLAND" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) governs collective bargaining by employees of the District of Columbia government. It allows officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, like other D.C. government employees, to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. They have done so and are represented by the plaintiff in this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union (FOP). The police union contends that the statute violates equal protection principles, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit rejected all the challenges concluding that the district court correctly concluded that the FOP’s constitutional claims lack merit. The FOP disputes that police accountability motivated the Council. The court explained that the legislature’s actual motive is “entirely irrelevant”; all that matters is whether there are “plausible reasons” to conclude that the statutory classification furthers a legitimate government interest.   The FOP next contends that section 116 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, the court found that the union makes no serious effort to show that the Council acted beyond its discretion. And the court could discern no express or hidden intent to punish. Further, FOP contends that section 116 violates the Contract Clause. The court explained that retrospective laws violate the Contract Clause only if they “substantially” impair existing contract rights. Here, the union could not have reasonably expected to insulate itself from legal changes after the 2017 Agreement had expired by its terms. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union v. DC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that, as to counts I-IV, Plaintiffs ran afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that count V failed due to a lack of standing.Appellants, approximately fifty members of a class of retired Rhode Island public employees, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations in the changes to Rhode Island's retirement benefits scheme (counts I-IV) and in a class action settlement agreement (count V) reached following litigation in state court, in which each appellant was a party. The district court dismissed the action, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by res judicata, a lack of Article III standing, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellants' due process, takings, and Contracts Clause claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) Appellants' First Amendment claims were nonjusticiable. View "Efreom v. McKee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from his employment as a surgeon with Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) after an internal committee recommended his termination following an investigation into allegations of his misconduct. Plaintiff sued Mayo and his supervisor, alleging discrimination and reprisal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo and the supervisor.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff argues Mayo’s recommendation to terminate his employment was based on his race, religion, and national origin. Because Said does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must create a sufficient inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment.   Here, Plaintiff claims another similarly situated former employee, who also received complaints, from Mayo received preferential treatment. The court concluded that even if Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other employee, the court concluded that Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he received disparate treatment from the other employee. The court further explained that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mayo believed Plaintiff was guilty of making unwelcomed advances toward female coworkers and of other misconduct. Said fails to “create a real issue as to the genuineness of” Mayo’s perceptions. Finally, regarding Mayo’s reporting of Plaintiff’s resignation to the State Board, as already discussed, the record demonstrates Mayo believed it was required to report Plaintiff’s termination to the State Board because Plaintiff resigned during an open investigation into his misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence showing this was a pretext for retaliatory intent. View "Sameh Said v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law