Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

O’Brien worked at Forum, a think tank, from 2016-2020. She served as its controller and was responsible for human resources tasks. In 2019, O’Brien sued Forum, its President, and its Director (Roman). She alleged a hostile work environment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Trial testimony indicated that Roman had made sexual advances toward O’Brien and other female employees. In Title VII cases where no tangible adverse employment action was taken, an employer may escape liability by raising an affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided The district court held that O’Brien was not entitled to a jury instruction that this defense is unavailable where the harasser functions as the alter ego or proxy of the employer.The Third Circuit upheld a verdict against O'Brien. Although the affirmative defense is not available in an "alter ego" situation, the district court’s refusal to so instruct the jury here was harmless because the jury found that O’Brien was not subjected to sexual harassment. The existence of an affirmative defense was therefore irrelevant. View "O''Brien v. The Middle East Forum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a construction company, Performance Contractors (Performance). She sued under Title VII alleging sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the construction company. On appeal Plaintiff argued that when Performance prevented her from working at elevation because she was a woman, it effectively demoted her, which amounts to an adverse employment action. Second, Plaintiff argued that her hostile-work environment claim survives summary judgment because Performance knew (or should have known) about the severe or pervasive harassment, and because Performance is not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Third, she argues that a reasonable jury could find that Performance retaliated against her for opposing conduct that she reasonably believed would violate Title VI.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded concluding that Plaintiff raised genuine material fact issues on each claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was suspended and later fired because of her rejection of other employees’ harassment. Further, the court held that Performance was not entitled to summary judgment because reasonable jurors could find that Plaintiff was kept on the ground because she was a woman, and that she otherwise would have been allowed to work at elevation. Moreover, there is a material fact issue about whether Performance effectively implemented its anti-harassment policy. View "Wallace v. Performance Contractors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-time teacher in the Evergreen School District #114 (District) in Vancouver, Washington. Before the 2019–2020 school year began, he attended two days of teacher training and brought with him a MAGA hat. The question, in this case, is whether the First Amendment was violated when a principal told Plaintiff he could not bring his Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat with him to teacher-only trainings on threat of disciplinary action and when the school board affirmed the denial of the teacher’s harassment complaint filed against the principal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The panel first concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment because the undisputed facts demonstrated that his MAGA hat conveyed a message of public concern, and he was acting as a private citizen in expressing that message. The record failed to establish, however, that the school district’s Chief Human Resource Officer, took any adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against that defendant failed as a matter of law.   Further, any violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by the principal was clearly established where longstanding precedent held that concern over the reaction to controversial or disfavored speech itself does not justify restricting such speech. For these reasons, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the principal. View "ERIC DODGE V. EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT #114, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, Marsden Building Maintenance, L.L.C., alleging wage discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Marsden. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her wage discrimination claim. Plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Marsden on her sex discrimination claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that on the record, Marsden has met its burden to prove the pay differential between Plaintiff and her male counterparts was based on a factor other than sex. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff offered no evidence to support her sex discrimination allegation. Plaintiff took issue with how Marsden’s operations manager conducted himself in the role of operations manager. But none of the evidence she presented supports a reasonable inference that his decision to fire her is “more likely than not” explained by an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex. View "Maria Mayorga v. Marsden Building Maintenance" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants - several public school officials, the Town of Chelmsford, and the local school committee - and dismissing the First Amendment retaliation and state law claims brought by Plaintiff - a public school teacher and former president of her local teachers' union - holding that there was no error.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated her First Amendments rights and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H by retaliating against her in reaction to her union advocacy efforts while she was president of the Chelmsford Federation of Teachers, a local chapter of the American Federation of Teachers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the district court's summary judgment ruling or two other rulings from the pleading and discovery stages of this case. View "Salmon v. Lang" on Justia Law

Blount who is Black, worked for Stanley for 21 years, most recently as a forklift operator. Blount was warned multiple times against using his phone on the plant floor, in violation of safety policies. On January 31, 2018, Taylor reported that Blount was driving a forklift toward her with “neither of his hands on the wheel” because he was manipulating his smartwatch. Blount offered no explanation. Stanley credited Taylor’s account and took steps to terminate Blount. Blount’s union interceded and Blount signed a last-chance agreement, which provided that any additional safety violations within two years would result in Blount’s immediate termination. A few months later Taylor reported seeing Blount using his cell phone in his lap while sitting on an idling forklift. Blount denied the conduct. Stanley, after an investigation, fired him. Blount’s union withdrew a grievance when Blount refused to provide his phone records. As a separate matter, Blount had filed an EEOC complaint in 2015 that was dismissed in 2016.Blount sued under Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging that he was fired because of his race and in retaliation for his 2015 EEOC complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment. Stanley offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason—serious safety violations—for firing Blount, which was not a pretext for intentional discrimination. Blount’s proferred comparators, white employees who were not terminated, were not similarly situated. There was no evidence connecting Blount’s protected conduct and his termination. View "Blount v. Stanley Engineering Fastening" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of Drake University (Drake), brought this action against Drake and her former supervisor, (collectively, Appellees), after her 2019 termination. Plaintiff alleged disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), as well as retaliation and discrimination based on the exercise of her rights under the Family Medical Leave  Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claims under the FMLA, ICRA, and ADA, as well as her discrimination claim under the FMLA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellees have established a robust, well-documented set of legitimate reasons for Plaintiff’s termination—and Plaintiff does not dispute them. These reasons include a plethora of performance deficiencies, such as failing to pay staff members the appropriate amounts and missing deadlines, as well as non-FMLA tardiness and attendance problems. Here, the only evidence of pretext Plaintiff provides is: (1) a tenuous temporal connection between her harassment complaints and negative performance reviews; (2) a one-month temporal connection between her filing an NLRB complaint and her termination; and (3) Drake’s failure to follow its harassment-complaint policies. Therefore, the court held that Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail as a matter of law because she has presented insufficient evidence of pretext. View "Margaret Corkrean v. Drake University" on Justia Law