Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
Feeback v. Swift Pork Co.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendants for wrongful termination, workplace harassment, and age discrimination, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on all claims.Plaintiff, an at-will employee, was promptly fired after he texted his plant manager "FUCK You!" and "Believe who and what you want" following the manager's criticism of his job performance. In response to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff was lawfully fired for insubordination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court modified the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework for summary judgment on discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act to align with the causation standard at trial and adopted and applied the good-faith "honest believe rule" to affirm Defendant's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment for insubordination. View "Feeback v. Swift Pork Co." on Justia Law
Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services
After the EEOC closed its investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, the agency issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. This notice, however, only reached Plaintiff’s attorney and not Plaintiff himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the first had not reached Plaintiff and advising him that his 90-day window in which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt. Plaintiff filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have received the first notice and 89 days after Plaintiff and his attorney received the second. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit as untimely and held that equitable tolling was unavailable.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that Plaintiff’s case did not present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling; the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. The court wrote that this was an abuse of discretion. Further, the court found that the district court did not proceed beyond this first prong of the tolling analysis the record at this motion to dismiss stage does not disclose whether Plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. View "Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services" on Justia Law
Lopez-Hernandez v. Terumo Puerto Rico LLC
The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's action alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. and other claims under Puerto Rico law, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her assignments of error.Plaintiff sued Defendant after she was not selected for promotion and her employment was terminated. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims on summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant's decisions relating to Plaintiff's employment were motivated by discriminatory animus. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper as to all of Plaintiff's claims. View "Lopez-Hernandez v. Terumo Puerto Rico LLC" on Justia Law
Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal
Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff alleging, inter alia, discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. According to the court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required Plaintiff to exhaust both the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and an additional remedy, particular to prison discrimination claims, administered by the Department of Justice’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was only required to exhaust the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff asserted in the alternative that the Department of Justice remedies were not “available” to him.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PLRA’s exhaustion provision is plain. It requires prisoners to utilize all “available” administrative remedies. For Rehabilitation Act claimants, these remedies include both the BOP’s ARP and a separate EEO process administered by the DOJ. Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies despite them being “available” to him under the PLRA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice to his ability to exhaust the EEO remedies “available” to him within the meaning of the PLRA. View "Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal" on Justia Law
Jeff Bonomo v. The Boeing Company
Plaintiff began working for McDonnell Douglas in 1985. He stayed there until it merged with The Boeing Company (Boeing) in 1997. In 2017 and 2018, Plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for promotions within Boeing. Both times, the promotion was given to younger candidates who scored better in the interview. In 2017, the promotion went to an employee aged 33; in 2018, to one aged 34. Plaintiff alleged that Boeing discriminated against him on the basis of age, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff brought two separate lawsuits, now consolidated, alleging age discrimination in relation to the 2018 opening and a claim for constructive discharge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Boeing on both claims, holding that Plaintiff (1) failed to demonstrate a material dispute as to whether Boeing’s stated rationale for the hiring decision was a mere pretext for age discrimination and (2) failed to timely file a complaint with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights within six months of when his constructive-discharge claim accrued.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to rebut the non-age-based, legitimate reasons offered by Boeing for its choice to hire the other applicant instead of him. Further, Plaintiff alleged that his termination paperwork started the clock, not his email. The court explained that Plaintiff gave his employer a little more than five weeks’ notice. But his claim still accrued then—on the day he gave notice, not the day he filed the paperwork. Because May 28, 2020, falls 185 days after November 25, 2019, Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely and thus barred. View "Jeff Bonomo v. The Boeing Company" on Justia Law
Tamara O’Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc.
Plaintiff appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claim under the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Daugherty Systems, Inc. (“Daugherty”) on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because almost all her alleged comparators were either paid less than she was or did not perform equal work.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the pay disparity was justified by a legitimate factor other than sex. The court explained that Daugherty’s explanation for the pay differential—the differences in skillsets and experience and the desire to incentivize Plaintiff to grow in the position—is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The court wrote that because “no reasonable jury” could find other than in Daugherty’s favor on the affirmative defense, Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute for trial, and Daugherty has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Tamara O'Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc." on Justia Law
Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.
Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law
Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers
Plaintiff opposed a new collective-bargaining agreement that passed by a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff sued the union for breach of its duty of fair representation and a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. At their core, these claims are about whether the union hoodwinked members into ratifying the new collective-bargaining agreement by concealing what would happen to the 30-and-out benefit. The district court dismissed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act claim, denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment to the union on the fair-representation claim. On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the union concealed key information, but only nine members said it would have made a difference.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide other evidence that the outcome of the vote would have changed. The court reasoned that the ratification vote was overwhelmingly in favor: 228 to 109, a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff offers only nine members who would have voted “no” if they had known about the elimination of the 30-and-out benefit. Even assuming each would have voted the way he thinks, the agreement still would have passed by a wide margin. The court wrote that no reasonable jury could conclude that the union’s alleged bad-faith conduct was the but-for cause of the union’s ratification of the collective-bargaining agreement. View "Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers" on Justia Law
Michael Winters v. Deere & Company
Plaintiff was fired by John Deere & Co.; he sued Deere for failing to accommodate his disability and discriminating against him in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment to Deere. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment on his disability and failure to accommodate claims.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case for failure to accommodate because he never requested an accommodation at the relevant time. In fact, Deere encouraged Plaintiff to request accommodations and accommodated him before when he asked. And when Plaintiff returned to work in September 2019, he had been cleared of all restrictions. Because Plaintiff has not shown that Deere knew he needed an accommodation on his return to work, his claim fails. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff has not provided any direct evidence of discrimination that “shows a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s suggestion that his actions weren’t serious enough to merit his termination “merely questions the soundness of [Deere’s] judgment, and does not demonstrate pretext for discrimination.” View "Michael Winters v. Deere & Company" on Justia Law
Inge Smothers v. Rowley Mem. Masonic Home
Plaintiff sued her former employers, Rowley Memorial Masonic Home and Rowley Masonic Assisted Living Community, LLC (collectively, Rowley), as well as the Administrator, and Director of Nursing, for age discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by denying her motion to compel and granting summary judgment to Defendants. She also moved to certify a question of law to the Iowa Supreme Court and to supplement the record under seal.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, denied the motion to certify, and granted the motion to supplement. The court held that Plaintiff provided no basis for her speculation that Lemke’s additional answers would yield evidence of age discrimination. In light of the likely minimal relevance of the investigator’s additional answers and the fact that at least some of the information Plaintiff seeks was discoverable from other sources, the court wrote it perceives no abuse of the district court’s discretion and cannot say that its denial of the motion resulted in fundamental unfairness to her. Further, the court held that because Plaintiff cannot create an inference that Defendants’ decisions were motivated by her age, she has failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination View "Inge Smothers v. Rowley Mem. Masonic Home" on Justia Law