Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and its members, the chief of police, and certain police officers, alleging constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, reasoning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the exclusive remedy for Appellant's claims and Appellant could not circumvent the Act's procedural requirements by solely pleading constitutional violations under section 1983. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that to the extent that Appellant's complaint asserted the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VII's procedural requirements.

Bassem Youssef, an Egyptian-born American citizen, claimed that his employer, the FBI, (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by not placing him in a substantive position dealing with counterterrorism and instead transferring him to a job for which he was dramatically overqualified; and (2) retaliated against him when he filed a complaint and spoke to his superiors about his predicament. The district court granted summary judgment against Youseef's discrimination claim but allowed his retaliation claim to be tried by a jury. The jury returned a verdict against Youssef, and the district court denied Youssef's motion for a new trial. The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a new trial but reversed its judgment against Youssef's discrimination claim, holding that because the district court did not reach the fact-intensive issue of a possible discriminatory motive for the transfer, and the parties did not fully brief it to the Court, the case was remanded for further examination of the FBI's reason for the transfer.

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself.

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the City of Victoria, Minnesota. Plaintiff bought an action against his former employer, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Eighth District affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA claim was proper; (2) Plaintiff's termination did not violate the ADEA, as Plaintiff was not qualified for the position because of his disability; and (3) Plaintiff was not deprived of property without due process of law by being discharged without a formal hearing.

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was a black male who worked in the United State Department of Agriculture's (Department) Foreign Agricultural Service. Plaintiff's employment was terminated after it was discovered that Plaintiff submitted false receipts for reimbursement, failed to report his required financial interests, and failed to properly submit to the Department a credit issued by a hotel to his government-issued credit card, among other things. Plaintiff filed suit in district court, alleging various claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the Department summary judgment on nine of Plaintiff's ten counts, including his race discrimination claim. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was terminated because of racial discrimination.

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

Dr. Lee Davis, an African-American cardiologist, obtained medical-staff privileges at Jefferson Regional Medical Center (JRMC). Later, JRMC's Board of Directors voted to revoke Davis's medical-staff privileges for poor quality of patient care, improper medical documentation, and unprofessional behavior. Davis filed the instant suit in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), and conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, JRMC, its CEO, and several physicians (Defendants), and dismissed all of Davis's claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Davis failed to provide any evidence giving rise to an inference that Defendants racially discriminated against him, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Davis's race discrimination claims; (2) Davis failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 1981 and ACRA; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing Davis's civil rights conspiracy claim pursuant to section 1985(3), as Davis failed to show any racial animus on the part of Defendants.

Plaintiff, a former trust employee of the Metropolitan Bus Authority of Puerto Rico, sued public officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a decision not to install him in a career attorney position in the MBA was politically motivated and was effected without due process of law, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the due process claim as to all defendants, finding that plaintiff was afforded adequate process, and affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claim as to all defendants, save for defendant Delgado. Plaintiff's allegations of participation in the decision were speculative and inadequate with respect to all of the defendants except Delgado.

Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth A. Bertsch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Overstock.com, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and appealed the denial of leave to amend to add a disparate-treatment claim, all under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-e17. Plaintiff claimed that working next to another employee "notorious" for viewing sexually explicit videos at work and making misogynistic comments made work a hostile work environment. Despite her "clean" record, she and the offending co-worker were reprimanded for contributing to the work environment and instructed to work more cooperatively. Cooperative efforts ultimately failed, and Plaintiff was eventually fired; the employer elected to terminate Plaintiff because the situation between Plaintiff and the co-worker "was not ever going to resolve itself." Overstock viewed Plaintiff as a "difficult, high-maintenance employee who left the company with no choice but to part ways." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing her disparate treatment claim before the Court. Accordingly, the Court held Plaintiff could not bring her Title VII action based on claims that were not part of the timely-filed EEOC charge for which she received a right-to-sue letter. Otherwise, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim (and denial of leave to amend). The Court reversed the district court on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.