Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Semper worked as a probation officer for the District Court of the Virgin Islands until he was removed from his position on August 6, 2010. The reason given for his termination was that he was negligent in supervision of a convicted defendant who was killed while on release pending sentencing. . Semper filed a complaint in the Claims Court against the United States, the Chief Judge, and the court’s Chief Probation Officer. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. 7501-7543, applied to Semper, regardless of which governmental branch employed him. He was classified as a member of the “excepted service,” not the “competitive service,” and was not among those excepted service employees whom the statute makes eligible for judicial or administrative review of adverse agency action. View "Semper v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216 et seq. Because plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of her position, with or without reasonable accommodation, she failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination under the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued his employer, Trinity, alleging that Trinity discriminated against him on the basis of his son's disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. He also alleged a violation of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court did not err in applying the honest belief rule; plaintiff failed to show that his termination was based on pretext or a discriminatory motive; and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of an FMLA violation. Trinity proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination - it believed that plaintiff violated company policy by encouraging a work slowdown - and plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to show that the explanation was pretextual.

Petitioner Catherine Robert had worked as supervisor of released adult offenders for ten years when she developed sacroiliac joint dysfunction. After a lengthy leave of absence, including a period authorized by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Petitioner remained unable to perform all of her required duties, and she was terminated. She appealed her employer's, the Brown County, Kansas Board of Commissioners, decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner's discharge did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, retaliation in violation of the FMLA, breach of contract, or abridgment of procedural due process.

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim.

As a state employee, Laurel Beard was a member of the Missouri State Employees' Retirement System (MOSERS). Beard filed for retirement but died before her annuity start date. Following Beard's death, Plaintiffs, Beard's assigned heirs, requested MOSERS to distribute Beard's retirement benefits to them as Beard's designated beneficiaries. MOSERS' board of trustees determined Plaintiffs were not entitled to retirement or survivor benefits because Beard died prior to her annuity starting date and did not have a surviving spouse or dependent children. Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking review of the MOSERS decision denying benefits. The trial court entered judgment in favor of MOSERS. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the trial court wrongly interpreted Mo. Rev. Stat. 104.1030 in denying them retirement benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly applied the plain language of section 104.1030; and (2) section 104.1030 is constitutional for vested members of MOSERS who have filed for retirement but die before their annuity start date.

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions.

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment.

Employee was discharged after she filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a lawsuit against Employer alleging employment discrimination. Employee appealed the termination to the Metro Civil Service Commission (Commission) and eventually settled the appeal, receiving backpay and other consideration in exchange for her agreement not to accept future employment with the agency that discharged her. Employee subsequently filed a complaint against Employer alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, reasoning that Employee could not establish her termination constituted an adverse employment action because she had accepted backpay and agreed not to be reinstated as part of the settlement of her Commission appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee's acceptance of the settlement did not preclude her from establishing that her termination constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of her federal retaliatory discharge claims.

The Commonwealth appealed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated without cause from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs in violation of Article III, section 22 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Based on the meaning of Article III, section 22 determined by the final arbiter of Commonwealth law, the court held that plaintiff did not have a protected interest in continued employment beyond the term of the governor who appointed her. Therefore, plaintiff's termination without cause did not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded.