Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Naficy began working for IDHS in 1996. According to Naficy, her co-worker and eventual supervisor, Bailey, mocked her accent and suggested that Naficy should not have been promoted because she is Iranian. Naficy filed complaints of discrimination, relating to treatment during a layoff and unfavorable performance evaluations. In 2010, in connection with closure of another facility, IDHS followed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Naficy and others received a letter alerting them to the possibility of a layoff and outlining potential bump options. Naficy was reassigned to a part-time position; she returned to her former position with the same schedule and salary two months later. Naficy filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory. She received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that as a state agency, IDHS is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Naficy had no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone involved in her reassignment, of retaliation, or of a similarly situated IDHS employee who received better treatment than Naficy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Naficy v. IL Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed summary judgment in favor of her former employer and against her complaint of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. At issue was whether the employer was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court held that the employer was a state agency immune from plaintiff's complaint of disability discrimination and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination where plaintiff unequivocally answered "no" when she was asked if her termination had anything to do with her race. View "Ross v. Jefferson Co Dept of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that UPS discriminated against him based on his gender, sexual orientation, and disability when it failed to hire him as a part-time package handler. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of UPS, holding that plaintiff could not prove that UPS discriminated against him because of a protected status of which it was unaware and even if a jury could find that there was discrimination, UPS provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff. View "Hunter v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Seaman filed this action to recover maintenance and cure and compensatory and punitive damages from his former employer (Employer), claiming that he suffered PTSD and depression as a result of being gang-raped by uniformed Korean police officers while he was on shore leave from Employer's ship docked in Korea. The jury awarded Seaman $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment precluding Seaman's denial of maintenance and cure, set aside the punitive damages award, and remitted the compensatory damages award to $2,000,000. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues relating to the seaworthiness and Jones Act claims regarding Employer's actions after Seaman returned to the ship, and Seaman's claim for maintenance and cure benefits, holding (1) the circuit court erred by not ordering a new trial after concluding that the maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing the instruction proffered by Employer quoting the circuit court's pre-trial ruling on the Jones Act and seaworthiness claims, and the refusal was not harmless. View "Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against her former employer. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the grievance procedure established in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claim. Because the CBA did not clearly and unmistakably waive a union member's right to bring a Title VII claim in a federal judicial forum, the district court erred when it concluded that the CBA required plaintiff to submit her Title VII claim to the Article 51 grievance process. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ibarra v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against his employer, the City of O'Fallon, alleging, among other things, that the city retaliated against him for exercising his right to free speech guaranteed by the United States and Missouri Constitutions. Plaintiff's free speech claim alleged that the city retaliated against him for the comments made in his report to the Board of Alderman by failing to promote plaintiff, by failing to follow internal procedures while investigating him, and by taking negative personnel actions against him. Defendant's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.055, claims alleged that the city failed to promote plaintiff because of his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the city on plaintiff's free speech claims; plaintiff failed to meet his burden under the MHRA and summary judgment was properly granted on this claim; summary judgment was properly granted on the ADEA claim; and his Missouri Workers' Compensation Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.780 claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Buehrle v. City of O'Fallon, Missouri" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the Americans with Disabilities Act created two separate-but-overlapping causes of action for employment discrimination. Plaintiff-Appellant Judy Elwell worked for Defendant-Appellee University of Oklahoma for years in an administrative role. She began to suffer from a degenerative spinal disc condition which did not prevent her from performing the essential functions of her job. Nevertheless, she sought certain accommodations from her employer. She alleged that the University refused to grant those accommodations and ultimately fired her, allegedly because of her disability. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, holding that Title II did not provide a cause of action for discrimination, and that Oklahoma did not waive its immunity from suit under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[i]n this case, those traditional tools of statutory construction - including a close examination of the text together with a careful review of the larger statutory structure . . . persuade us that Congress has spoken and spoken clearly to the question of employment discrimination claims and placed them exclusively in Title I. . . . Because Title II does not contain an independent cause of action for employment discrimination and because Ms. Elwell [could not] carry her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity that might permit her to proceed with an OADA claim, the judgment of the district court [was] affirmed." View "Elwell v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Okla." on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, the school district superintendent, appealed from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim that she was fired in retaliation for her reports of financial malfeasance. The court concluded that plaintiff, a payroll clerk typist for the school district, was speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee and her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. View "Ross v. Lichtenfeld" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an award of $59,787 in attorney's fees against unsuccessful plaintiffs in a civil rights action against the Municipality of Adjuntas, its mayor, and Plaintiffs' direct supervisors. Plaintiffs argued that their lawsuit was not so frivolous or unreasonable as to justify an award of fees to Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, except for one plaintiff's inferior working conditions claim and another plaintiff's claim against a supervisory defendant, as there was no reasonable basis for those claims. The Court vacated the fee award and remanded for further proceedings relating to any attorney's fees incurred by the Municipality of Adjuntas in relation to those claims only. View "Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas" on Justia Law