Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought suit against officials of the Administrative Office, solely in their official capacities, alleging that they rejected her job application in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed appellant's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Administrative Office had sovereign immunity from suit. The court reversed the judgment and held that appellant's claim fell within the Larson-Dugan exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity. Since the district court did not address appellees' alternative jurisdiction arguments, the court left all of these arguments for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollack v. Duff, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges of sexual harassment brought by a former employee (Employee) against the one-time president (President) of Jasmine Company, Inc. After President filed an action against Jasmine's liability insurance provider (Insurer), seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges, Insurer filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself, requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not duty to defend or indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine, holding that Insurer had to defend and indemnify Jasmine. At issue on appeal was whether a finder of fact must conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges did or did not begin before Jasmine's insurance policy took effect. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of when the harassing conduct that gave rise to Employee's claims began was a quintessential question for a factfinder. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the DEP, claimed that he failed to prevail in a prior employment-related suit because of false statements and deliberate omissions in an investigative report issued by defendant. The court held that "backward-looking" access-to-court claims were not cognizable when plaintiff had knowledge of the crucial facts and an opportunity to rebut opposing evidence, because such a plaintiff necessarily had adequate access to a judicial remedy. The court also held that the district court's opinion in the prior suit demonstrated that it did not rely on statements or omissions in defendant's report, and therefore no reasonable factfinder could find that defendant's actions denied him a right of access to the courts in violation of his federal constitutional rights. View "Sousa v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Employee filed this action against Employer and her four individual supervisors (Supervisors), claiming whistleblower discrimination pursuant to the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and sex discrimination pursuant to the MHRA. The superior court granted Supervisors' motion to dismiss, finding they could not be held individually liable pursuant to the WPA and the MHRA. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Employer on all claims. Employee appealed, contending (1) summary judgment for Employer was improper because she presented a prima facie case of whistleblower discrimination and there remained material facts in dispute, and (2) the dismissal of her claims against Supervisors was improper. The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the sex discrimination claim and the dismissal of Supervisors but vacated the judgment with respect to the whistleblower discrimination claim against Employer, holding (1) material facts remained in dispute regarding Employee's whistleblower claim; but (2) the WPA and MHRA do not provide for individual supervisor liability. View "Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Regina Daniels, a former United Parcel Service (UPS) dispatcher who worked in UPS's Kansas City, Kansas facility, brought suit against the company alleging discrimination based on her sex and age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, and Plaintiff appealed. Upon review of the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in finding: (1) most of Plaintiff's discrimination claims were untimely; and (2) the claims of discrimination and retaliation that remained failed as a matter of law. View "Daniels v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of appellees. The district court held that appellant failed to submit sufficient evidence to meet his burden with regard to various Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, claims. Appellees cross-appealed on the ancillary issue of whether the number of employees of the National Red Cross and the Greenbrier Valley Chapter could be aggregated for purposes of determining "employer" status. The court held that appellant did not meet the ADA's definitions of disability and affirmed the district court with regard to appellant's primary ADA claim; appellant's retaliation claim based on appellant's lifting restriction and on his workers' compensation request both failed; and appellant did not have sufficient evidence to support his confidentiality claim. The court also held that Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. dictated that the ADA's employee threshold was not a limit on jurisdiction but, rather, an element of the claim itself; the cross-appeal was not properly taken; and the court vacated the district court's ruling on the employee aggregation issue. View "Reynolds v. American National Red Cross" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination suit against his employer, the Department of Homeland Security. At issue on appeal was whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiff was bound by the terms of his attorney's settlement offer. Further, the court never held that the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee was implicated by defective representation in Title VII proceedings and plaintiff had introduced no evidence to suggest that his attorney's representation was less than competent. View "Quesada v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Frank Brown filed this action against his former employer Defendant-Appellee ScriptPro, LLC, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on his termination in November 2008. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ScriptPro, and Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court found that Mr. Brown did not produce sufficient evidence proving a genuine issue of fact existed to survive summary judgment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the trial and appellate courts' decisions. View "Brown v. ScriptPro, LLC" on Justia Law