Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher who worked for Defendant, the Memphis City Schools Board of Education. After Plaintiff requested and was granted a substantial amount of sick leave but failed to return from that sick leave, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her dismissal violated the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff's reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages for the actual harm she suffered, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although a tenured teacher's failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure; and (2) accordingly, Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. View "Thompson v. Memphis City Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for over ten years for Dentist. When Dentist's wife found out that her husband and Plaintiff often texted each other, she demanded that he terminate Plaintiff's employment. Dentist subsequently terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff brought this action against Dentist, alleging that Dentist discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for Dentist, finding that Plaintiff was not fired because of her gender but because she was a threat to Dentist's marriage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dentist's conduct here did not amount to unlawful sex discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. View "Nelson v. Knight" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Enio Rivera and Michael Talton, employees of Lift Line, a subsidiary of RGRTA, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of RGRTA and a supervisor and dismissing plaintiffs' claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1981, and New York state law. Considering the evidence, together with the evidence of a racially hostile work environment for Talton, his co-worker, in the light most favorable to Rivera, and resolving all ambiguities in his favor, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Rivera's hostile work environment claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Talton and accepting his version of the events as true, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Talton's hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII and section 1981. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Rivera's retaliation claims but vacated the grant of summary judgment on Talton's retaliation claim against RGRTA and vacated its grant of summary judgment dismissing Talton's retaliation claim against the supervisor under section 1981. The court also vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Talton's state law claims. View "Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Building Official for the Town of Marlborough from 1994-2010, sued the Town, as well as its Board of Selectmen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his procedural due process and free speech rights when his position was reduced from full to part time after he made certain statements regarding the use of wood-burning stoves. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Selectmen Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that the Selectmen defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, as plaintiff did not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Looney v. Marlborough et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., after she was terminated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the termination - that plaintiff violated (or appeared to violate) the company's conduct policies - was pretextual. In this case, the corporate executive who terminated plaintiff later said that she was an exceptional employee who had done nothing wrong, had done everything right, and should not have been fired. The court held that such evidence, when combined with a prima facie case, created a jury question as to discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America" on Justia Law

The Office of the Racing Commissioner regulates the Michigan horse-racing industry. The ORC hires racing stewards as independent contractors to perform regulatory, judging, and enforcement functions in conjunction with three types of horse races. The plaintiffs were appointed as racing stewards in the 1980s and 1990s. Hall currently works as a state steward for the Michigan Gaming Board. Dye was appointed in 1988 and was promoted to Administrative Liaison Steward in 1998, but was demoted to State Steward in 2006 and was terminated in 2009. Perttunen was appointed in 1994, and remains employed as a racing steward for the Gaming Board. Erskine was appointed in 1999, and was terminated in 2009. The four claim that their Democratic supervisors retaliated against them for voicing support for or being perceived as affiliated with the Republican candidate in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although certain stewards openly endorsed the candidate in the workplace, others remained silent. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Dye’s protected-speech, holding that retaliation based on perceived political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doctrine. View "Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, eight operators and a supervisor at the City of Albuquerque's 311 Citizen Contact Center (CCC), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees City of Albuquerque, Ed Adams, and Esther Tenenbaum, on claims arising from their termination. The City's Merit System governed Plaintiffs' employment; section 3-1-6 of the Merit System Ordinance (MSO) divides employees into classified and unclassified service, and defines unclassified employees as "employees at will." When the City created the 311 CCC, it designated all positions as unclassified. Upon joining the 311 CCC, each Plaintiff signed a form that listed their Employment or Position Status as "Unclassified." Between 2005 and 2009, Plaintiffs were terminated from the 311 CCC. Some Plaintiffs were subject to Progressive Disciplinary Action, while others faced Immediate Termination. In April 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in New Mexico state court for (1) breach of employment contract, (2) denial of due process and equal protection, (3) wrongful termination, (4) violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (5) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Plaintiffs, as unclassified employees, were employed at will, and (1) had no protected property interest in continued employment; (2) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they had an implied employment contract; and (3) had not raised a genuine issue of material fact whether they were terminated in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. With respect to the FMLA claim, the court found that whether treated as a claim for retaliation or interference, Plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the City's reason for termination was pretextual or that the City had interfered with Plaintiffs' right to FMLA leave. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the court weighed the evidence and failed to construe the facts in Plaintiffs' favor when determining that they were at will employees and thus rightly terminated. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' arguments lacked merit and affirmed the district court decision. View "Gonzales v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In 1995 Chicago administered a civil-service examination for the fire department and initially hired those with scores of 89 to 100. From 2002-2006 it hired from the group who had scored 65 to 88. Plaintiffs contend that drawing a line at 89 had an unjustified disparate effect on black applicants, violating Title VII. Following a 2000 remand, in 2006 the district court held that the city had not proved justification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the charge had been filed after the limitations period expired. In 2010, the Supreme Court, reversed, holding that a new claim accrued with each use of the list to hire. The district court held that 111 class members must be hired; others receive damages. Prospective intervenors have worked as firefighters since 2005. Each contends that he thought that he would receive extra seniority, pension credits, or back pay in this litigation and that he is entitled to intervene, after judgment, because he did not know that class counsel had decided not to seek relief for persons hired from the 65-88 pool. The district judge found their motion untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Lewis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law