Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Montblanc, and its President and CEO, Jan-Patrick Schmitz. The court concluded that Montblanc demonstrated that plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of store manager by offering her admissions that her disability prevented her from performing any work and plaintiff, in response, offered no submission establishing a triable issue of fact. Therefore, summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12940(a), was proper. Because plaintiff pointed to no evidence that would raise a triable issue of whether Montblanc's true reason for terminating her employment was discriminatory, the court affirmed summary judgment on the retaliation claim under section 12940(h). Further, Schmitz's conduct during a store visit did not constitute harassment under section 12940(j). Finally, plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress failed where Schmitz's conduct could not be characterized as exceeding all bounds of that tolerated in a civilized community and plaintiff's alleged emotional distress was not "severe." Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of all of plaintiff's claims.View "Lawler v. Mountblanc North America, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, the Third Judicial District, and its current and former directors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the employer fired her in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction where qualified immunity was not a defense available to a governmental entity and its current director in his official capacity. Further, the remaining defendant was deceased and was not a proper party on appeal. View "Campbell v. State of Iowa, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for her employer, the UPS, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that plaintiff presented no direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the UPS policy at issue, that did not provide light duty work to pregnant workers but did for certain other employees, treated pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike and therefore complied with the PDA. Plaintiff also failed to offer sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. UPS" on Justia Law

Pro se Appellant Bennie Walters brought employment discrimination claims against his former employer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The parties reached an apparent settlement during a settlement conference, but Appellant later refused to sign the written agreement. The district court granted Wal-Mart's motion to enforce the agreement and denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration. Appellant appealed both rulings. After review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[w]hile we liberally construe Walters' pro se filings, we will not 'assume the role of advocate' and make his arguments for him." View "Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the school district alleging that the district's decision to hire a Caucasian woman in lieu of promoting him amounted to race discrimination in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to the district and ordered plaintiff to pay attorneys' fees. The court found no competent evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that the district's decision to hire the woman in lieu of promoting plaintiff was motivated by impermissible racial considerations. The court held, however, that the district court's fee award constituted an abuse of discretion where the court did not agree that plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. View "Autry v. Fort Bend Independent Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Big Sky Colony, Inc., a signatory to the Hutterian Brethren Church Constitution, organized itself as a religious corporation under Montana law. Plaintiff Daniel Wipf was the Colony's first minister and corporate president. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, claiming that the requirement to provide workers' compensation coverage for the Colony's members engaged in certain commercial activities contained in HB 119 violated the Colony's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and also violated the Colony's right to equal protection. The district court found in favor of the Colony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provisions of HB 119 that incorporated the Colony into the definition of "employer" and the Colony's members into the definition of "employee" under the Workers' Compensation Act did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Colony's right to equal protection of the laws. View "Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

After a labor union began picketing on a supermarket's privately owned walkway in front of the store's customer entrance, the supermarket owner sought a court injunction to prevent the picketing. The owner argued that because the union was using the walkway for expressive activity without complying with the supermarket's regulations, the union was trespassing on its property. The trial court denied relief, concluding that the supermarket owner had failed to satisfy Cal. Lab. Code 1138.1's requirements for obtaining an injunction against labor picketing. The court of appeal reversed, holding (1) the walkway was not a public forum, and therefore, the store owner could regulate speech in that area; and (2) both the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 violate free speech and equal protection because they give speech regarding a labor dispute greater protection that speech on other subjects. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a union's picketing activities in the supermarket's privately owned entrance area do not have state constitutional protection; (2) however, those picketing activities do have statutory protection under the Moscone Act and section 1138.1; and (3) these statutory provisions do not violate the federal constitutional prohibition on content discrimination in speech regulations. View "Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8" on Justia Law