Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and, as a condition of employment, was required to get a flu vaccine. Plaintiff sought an exemption based on a medically recognized contraindication, presenting a doctor's note that recommended she avoid the vaccine based on her history of cancer and general allergies. However, neither of these was a medically recognized contraindication, and Defendant terminated her employment.Plaintiff filed suit under the FEHA for disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendnat's favor, plaintiff appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that Defendant did not engage in disability discrimination and that Defendant's reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment was legitimate and lacked pretext. Further, the court rejected Plaintifff's retaliation claim. View "Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then a conductor and now an engineer for Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Union Pacific refused Plaintiff’s requests that he be allowed to bring his Rottweiler service dog on board moving Union Pacific freight trains as a reasonable accommodation to ameliorate the effects of Plaintiff’s undisputed disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and migraine headaches resulting from his prior service in the military. At the end of a week-long trial, the district court denied Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff, awarding compensatory but not punitive damages. The district court granted Union Pacific’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that “benefits and privileges of employment” (1) refer only to employer-provided services; (2) must be offered to non-disabled individuals in addition to disabled ones; and (3) does not include freedom from mental or psychological pain. Further, the court noted that mitigating pain is not an employer-sponsored program or service. As such, providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. View "Perry Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a security guard, alleged that his employer set two different “regular rates” and that one of those rates was an artificial one that his employer designed to avoid complying with the FLSA’s overtime-compensation requirement. When Plaintiff became a security guard for Defendant Regional Security Services, Inc., his established regular rate was $13.00, and he typically worked a forty-hour week. But seven months after Regional Security first started scheduling Plaintiff to work overtime, it reduced his rate to $11.15 per hour. Regional Security then stopped scheduling Plaintiff to work overtime hours and, at the same time, restored his non-overtime pay rate to $13.00 per hour. At issue is whether Plaintiff’s “regular rate” was $13.00 per hour or $11.15 per hour during the year or so that he worked overtime hours and earned $11.15 per hour.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff’s allegations support his theory that Regional Security set an artificial $11.15 rate during the year that it scheduled him to work significant overtime hours so that it could avoid paying him $19.50 for his overtime hours. During the year that Plaintiff worked significant overtime hours, his reduced $11.15 rate caused him to earn on average $13.00 per hour for all sixty hours in a sixty-hour workweek. Plus, Regional Security immediately reverted to paying Plaintiff’s $13.00 rate when it stopped scheduling him to work overtime hours. Accordingly, the court held that these allegations plausibly support Plaintiff’s claims. View "David Thompson v. Regions Security Services, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

On January 6, 2014, Defendant Genting New York LLC, d/b/a Resorts World Casino New York City ("Genting"), closed the Aqueduct Buffet (the "Buffet"), a restaurant located inside the Resorts World Casino (the "Casino") where Plaintiffs worked. Genting gave Plaintiffs no notice of the closure, which took effect the same day and resulted in 177 employees being laid off. The next week, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Genting, alleging that its failure to provide notice violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the "WARN Act"), and New York Labor Law Section 860 et seq. (the "New York WARN Act"). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion and granted Genting's. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Genting because, they claim, a reasonable jury could only conclude that the Buffet was either an operating unit or a single site of employment under the WARN Acts.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court explained that Genting is not entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the Buffet was an operating unit. Likewise, there is also evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Buffet was not an operating unit. It will be for the finder of fact at trial to weigh the evidence comprising the "somewhat mixed" record in this case to answer the question. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Genting and in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims under the WARN Acts. View "Roberts v. Genting" on Justia Law

Plaintiff previously worked for the Springfield Utility Board (SUB). As part of an internal investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct, SUB restricted Plaintiff from speaking with potential witnesses and other SUB employees regarding the subject of the investigation while it was underway. Plaintiff sued SUB, certain SUB employees, and SUB’s retained counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the investigation-related speech restrictions violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel held that the communication restriction complained of by Plaintiff did not violate the First Amendment because it did not limit Plaintiff’s ability to speak about matters of public concern. Nothing in Defendants’ instructions barred him from speaking about any alleged mismanagement at the Springfield Utility Board or other topics that would potentially relate to a matter of public concern. Rather, the restrictions merely barred him from personally discussing his own alleged violation of Springfield Utility Board policies—a matter of private, personal concern—with potential witnesses or fellow Springfield Utility Board employees. View "TODD ROBERTS V. SPRINGFIELD UTILITY BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of VMSB’s restaurant. They argue that VMSB failed to meet its minimum wage and overtime pay obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and comparable Florida laws. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged three counts, and both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved the district court to approve the settlement and to “direct the clerk to dismiss Count III” with prejudice. The district court ultimately adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and entered judgment for VMSB on Counts I and II. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal regarding Counts I and II.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides only for the dismissal of an entire action. Any attempt to use this rule to dismiss a single claim, or anything less than the entire action, will be invalid—just like it would be under Rule 41(a)(1). Because the parties here attempted to use Rule 41(a) to dismiss a single count and not an entire lawsuit, a final judgment was never rendered. Accordingly, the court found that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "Israel Rosell, et al. v. VMSB, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, Susan Christie filed suit against Wayne State University, asserting age and disability discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (the ELCRA); and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (the PWDCRA). Christie took a medical leave of absence in February 2017 and returned to work on May 1, 2017. Plaintiff alleged that after her return to work, her supervisors questioned her about her age, asked her when she intended to retire, and had conversations with others in her presence regarding the ages of employees. Plaintiff received a negative job-performance review on September 22, 2017, allegedly the first negative review she had ever received, and defendant terminated her from her job on November 27, 2017. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that MCL 600.6431(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA), required plaintiff to file either a verified complaint with the Court of Claims or notice of intent to file suit with the Court of Claims within one year of the accrual of her claim; defendant maintained plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity because she failed to do either. The court denied the motion, concluding that MCL 600.6431(1) did not preclude plaintiff from filing her claim in the circuit court because the COCA notice requirements only applied to claims litigated in the Court of Claims. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal as a matter of right, it treated the appeal as though leave had been granted and affirmed the trial court’s order in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment. View "Christie v. Wayne State University" on Justia Law

Defendants hired Plaintiff as a nanny. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. They hoped Plaintiff would release potential claims against them in exchange for a severance payment. Defendants asked a friend (who ran a nanny placement service and had helped hire Plaintiff) to propose this to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not sign the proposed severance agreement. Instead, she brought wage-and-hour claims against Defendants. Following discovery, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add a claim for defamation. She based her defamation claim on statements Defendants made to the intermediary during the negotiations over severance. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. They argued that the allegedly defamatory statements were made in anticipation of litigation. They moved to strike not only the new defamation allegations but also the entire complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and required the Defendants to pay some of Plaintiff’s attorney fees.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Defendants did not show that Plaintiff’s defamation claim was based on activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The court explained that Defendants appealed to the entire SAC. They did so even after the trial court correctly found the motion frivolous as to most of Plaintiff’s SAC. Defendants informed the trial court that “the appeal is going to be of every cause of action.” Defendants were thereby able to obtain a full stay of the action in the trial court, even though the appeal was frivolous as to most of the action. If Defendants had appealed as to only the defamation cause of action, Plaintiff might have had the opportunity to argue for permission to continue discovery. View "Nirschl v. Schiller" on Justia Law

Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), is a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country. An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), listing only the Northport facility in the written charge. The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the nation. ENA objected to the scope of those requests. The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama, facility but refused to enforce the subpoena as to information from other facilities. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility, nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena. The court explained the EEOC’s investigatory process is a multi-step process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. The court held that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility— which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to that charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eberspaecher North America Inc." on Justia Law