Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed claims against the county and its officials alleging unlawful suspension and discharge, sex discrimination, retaliation, violation of her procedural and substantive due process rights, and civil conspiracy. The court held that plaintiff's claims were not time barred under Tyler v. University of Arkansas Board of Treasurers; plaintiff had suffered tangible job detriments in the form of her suspension and terminations, but plaintiff failed to show that her rejection of her supervisor's advances caused that detriment; plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment because she did not allege sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct; plaintiff's allegations of different treatment were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; plaintiff failed to establish the requisite causal relationship to show a violation of the First Amendment in respect to her EEOC charge and her complaints about her supervisor; and plaintiff did not articulate how the county and its officials violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the county and its officials. View "Butler v. Crittenden County, Arkansas, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the City pursuant to, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., claiming that the City's response to his request for accommodations was insufficient. Plaintiff's severe disability, schizophrenia, required treatment that prevented him from arriving to work at a consistent time each day. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and dismissed plaintiff's claims with prejudice, noting that it could not distinguish between absenteeism and tardiness. The court concluded that the district court did not conduct a sufficiently detailed analysis of the facts that tended to undermine the City's claim that a specific arrival time was an essential function of plaintiff's position before granting summary judgment for the City. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "McMillan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Lindsey Hysjulien appealed a grant of summary judgment which dismissed her claims for employment discrimination and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hill Top Home of Comfort, Inc. and Greg Armitage. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the running of the statutes of limitations for her state and federal employment discrimination claims and regarding her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hysjulien v. Hill Top Home of Comfort" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is visually impaired, filed suit against BNSF, alleging that BNSF retaliated against him for reporting a safety violation and that BNSF discriminated against him based on his disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BNSF on the whistleblower claim, and the jury found in favor of BNSF on the discrimination claims. The court held that plaintiff's whistleblower claim was untimely and summary judgment should have been granted on that ground; the district court did not err in excluding as irrelevant the evidence of plaintiff's safety complaint; sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the locomotive machinist position with or without reasonable accommodation; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the order awarding costs. View "Hohn v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white male employed as captain of the City of Buffalo Police Department, sued the Department and its police chief claiming that their failure to promote him was impermissibly motivated by race. Plaintiff claimed racial discrimination after the results of a civil service examination were replaced by the results of an updated version. The court declined to address the 42 U.S.C. 1983, defamation, and equal protection claims because they were insufficiently argued; the court agreed with the district court that Ricci v. DeStefano did not indicate that defendants' actions were prohibited; plaintiff provided no other evidence of unlawful discrimination and his Title VII claim failed; and plaintiff's remaining claims were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dept." on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Chaney was fired from his position and argued his termination violated the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The employer, Providence Health Care d/b/a Sacred Heart Medical Center & Children's Hospital (Providence), claimed no violation of the FMLA occurred. The trial court denied motions for a directed verdict on the issue by both Chaney and Providence. Based upon undisputed facts, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in failing to grant Chaney's motion for a directed verdict that as a matter of law the hospital violated the FMLA. In 2005, his wife fell ill after giving birth, Chaney himself suffered a back injury, and he relied heavily on FMLA leave over the next two years. By June 2007, Chaney had used up most of his FMLA leave and had been donated leave from other employees. The record indicated that Providence administration and other staff were growing resentful that Chaney had taken so much time off. In 2007, an employee reported that Chaney appeared fatigued and incoherent. Although no claim was made that his work was compromised, Chaney was ordered to report for drug testing. The drug test was positive for methadone. Chaney had a prescription for methadone to treat back pain, but the doctor who gave the drug test noted that Chaney "[m]ay need fitness for duty evaluation or visit to his Dr. to fine tune his medication." A few months later, Chaney indicated he was prepared to return to work. The record reflected that Chaney was erroneously informed he needed Providence's permission to return to work. This violated the FMLA, under which Chaney could only be required to get authorization from his own health care provider. Chaney went to Providence's doctor, and administration told him the hospital would not allow him to return to work unless their doctor changed his recommended restriction. The hospital's doctor refused to change his recommendation. Subsequently, Chaney was fired. Providence claimed the termination was proper because Chaney failed to provide a valid fitness for work certification as required under the FMLA. View "Chaney v. Providence Health Care" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an arbitration award arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration award in this case reinstated Port of Seattle (Port) employee Mark Cann with a 20-day unpaid suspension after he was terminated for hanging a noose in the workplace for nonracial reasons. The reviewing trial court found this punishment so lenient that it violated the public policy against racial harassment in the workplace and imposed a six-month unpaid suspension instead. The arbitrator found that Cann intended the noose as a joke toward an older white co-worker. The arbitrator determined that Cann's impression of a noose was "not racial" and that in this situation, Cann was "more clueless than racist." The arbitrator also noted that the white employee targeted by the "joke" was not offended, and an African-American employee who observed the noose was angry but did not feel harassed. In light of these facts, the arbitrator determined that a 20-day unpaid suspension was the appropriate discipline. Given that Cann's 20-working-day unpaid suspension amounts to a month without pay, and given that so many working families live month to month, the Supreme Court found that to be a substantial penalty. "As we are bound by the arbitrator's findings of fact, we cannot find that a 20-day suspension was insufficient to deter such conduct in the future. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. We also take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court that properly vacates an arbitration award does not have authority to impose its own remedy. Instead, trial courts facing such a situation should remand for further proceedings." View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

Knoll filed suit following her termination from the city Parks Department, alleging gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 951. The district court dismissed the gender discrimination claim; the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims. Following Knoll’s unsuccessful motions for a new trial and for sanctions, the court concluded that the motions were frivolous but declined to order sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was not required to engage in a six-factor analysis before dismissal of a post-trial motion, based on procedural noncompliance. View "Knoll v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed an order and judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Hofstra and dismissing her suit claiming harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681-88; and corresponding provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. Plaintiff claimed that she experienced harassment and retaliation while employed by Hofstra as a team manager for the university's football program. Because defendants took the needed remedial action in this case, the harassment carried out by some players on the football team could not be imputed to the university or its personnel. The district court erred, however, in its analysis of the McDonnell Douglas factors by holding that plaintiff could not prevail on any of her three retaliation claims based on her supposed failure to demonstrate that she had engaged in protected activity and the requisite causation. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a grant of summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claims, but not as to her sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Summa v. Hofstra University" on Justia Law