Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist faith, appealed from the district court's ruling on summary judgment that plaintiff's employer, First Student, reasonably accommodated his religion. Seventh-day Adventists observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, and they emphasize the importance of refraining from secular work during this time. First Student terminated plaintiff for excessive absenteeism when he did not show up to work on Fridays. The court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate at this stage of the litigation because there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether First Student reasonably accommodated plaintiff and whether accommodating plaintiff constituted an undue hardship on First Student. View "Antoine v. First Student, Inc." on Justia Law

After Employee failed to ask a shopper for a loyalty card per Employer's policy, Employee was fired. Employee brought a wrongful discharge claim against Employer under Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA). Employee accepted Employer's offer to arbitrate the dispute because she said Mont. Code Ann. 39-915 would force her to pay Employer's attorney fees if she declined the offer and later lost at trial. Employee then successfully moved to amend her complaint to add destruction of evidence and declaratory judgment claims, alleging, inter alia, that section 39-2-915 was unconstitutional. The district court subsequently dismissed Employee's amended complaint, concluding that it had lost jurisdiction over Employee's claim once she accepted the offer to arbitrate. The court also ruled that 39-2-915 was constitutional. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Employee's amended complaint, as the court lost its ability to consider Employee's claim once she agreed to arbitration; and (2) set aside the district court's determination of Employee's constitutional claim, as the court lost its authority to act further once Employee agreed to arbitrate. View "Ensey v. Mini Mart, Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting her administrative remedies, Plaintiff, together with her husband and their conjugal partnership, sued Employer under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination in the form of hostile-work-environment harassment, and retaliation for challenging the harassment. A magistrate judge entered summary judgment for Employer on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ultimately, Plaintiff had no sex discrimination claim against Employer and so summary judgment was appropriate on that claim; (2) the evidence did not show that Employer infracted Title VII by retaliating against Employee for alleging that Employer discriminated against her on the basis of sex; and (3) Plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the federal court judge was "bound" by Puerto Rico's summary-judgment policy. View "Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee was terminated from her employment after her driver's license was suspended due to her epilepsy. Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Employee in the amount of $11,250 for compensatory damages. Employee filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The circuit court sustained Employee's motion and gave the parties thirty days to accept a higher amount of compensatory damages or elect a new trial on these damages only. Employer would not agree to an enhanced compensatory damage award, and the circuit court ordered a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Employee's motion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. View "Badahman v. Catering St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint that her former employer discriminated against her after she became pregnant. At issue was whether direct estoppel barred a claim of pregnancy discrimination under state law when a jury found at trial that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action regarding her claim of retaliation for exercising her right to maternity leave under federal law. The court concluded that the jury verdict against plaintiff's claim of retaliation estopped plaintiff from relitigating the common issue of whether she suffered an adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination. View "DuChateau v. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc." on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer, Fannie Mae, alleging violations of federal anti-discrimination laws by denying him a salary increase for discriminatory reasons; maintaining a racially hostile work environment; and retaliating against him for filing a discrimination complaint. The district court granted Fannie Mae summary judgment. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Fannie Mae unlawfully discriminated against, harassed, and retaliated against plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to a trial on those claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all of plaintiff's anti-discrimination claims. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's D.C. law defamation claim because the statements at issue were not false. View "Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Luminant, his employer, alleging several unlawful employment practices. The jury agreed with plaintiff that plaintiff's complaints motivated Luminant's decision to discipline him. The jury also found, however, that Luminant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the "same decision" irrespective of his complaints. The district court entered judgment in Luminant's favor and taxed all costs against plaintiff. Plaintiff moved to retax costs and sought an award of attorney's fees. The court held that 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) authorized cost-and-fee-shifting only for violations of section 2000e-2(m). Retaliation did not violate section 2000e-2(m). Consequently, the district court correctly decided that section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) did not authorize cost-and-fee-shifting. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Carter v. Luminant Power Services Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff argued on appeal that Home Service terminated him contrary to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and that Home Service breached his contract. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Home Service, because plaintiff was not qualified to perform an essential function of his job - being DOT qualified to drive a delivery truck - because of his eye injury. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's mileage reimbursement claim and on his bonus claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Knutson v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, who are supervisors or officials at the Ulster County, New York Sheriff's Office and the county jail, took adverse employment actions against them in retaliation for a parody created by one of the plaintiffs that suggested corruption among jail officials, and subsequently filing a lawsuit based upon this alleged retaliation. The court held that the district court correctly determined that none of the conduct for which plaintiffs alleged they suffered retaliation touched on a matter of public concern, and that plaintiffs as public employees, could therefore not sustain First Amendment claims under section 1983 against defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Singer v. Ferro" on Justia Law