Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Employees filed a complaint against two employers (Employers), alleging that Employers violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) based on sexual harassment perpetrated by the sole owner of both entities (Owner). Employees also alleged that Owner was individually liable under MHRA's aiding and abetting provision. The district court dismissed Employees' claims. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court's determination that the harassment was not actionable was clearly erroneous, (2) Employees were entitled to judgment on their claims as a matter of law, and (3) Owner could not be individually liable for aiding and abetting Employers' MHRA violations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Owner could not be liable on an aiding and abetting theory; but (2) two separate errors of law infected the district court's determination that Employees did not prove their sexual harassment claims, and therefore, the Court was unable to ascertain exactly how the errors impacted the court's decision to dismiss Employees' claims. Remanded to the district court to reevaluate the evidence using the correct legal standard. View "Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this gender discrimination suit against LSU, alleging that the LSU Police Department violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., as well as Louisiana state employment law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:332(A)(1), 23:967, by failing to promote her to the position of Chief of Police and retaliating against her for filing complaints with the EEOC and LCHR. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of LSU because plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination and there was a genuine disputed issue of fact of whether LSU's alleged non-discriminatory reason for not promoting plaintiff was pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim was improper. Plaintiff had also shown a conflict in substantial evidence regarding retaliation and, therefore, summary judgment was improper on that second claim. View "Haire v. Board of Supervisors of LA State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a police dispatcher with the Town of Camden Police Department for thirty-one years until his department was eliminated and he was laid off. In the year following Plaintiff's termination, at least two positions opened with the police department for which Plaintiff was qualified. The Town did not recall Plaintiff to either position. Plaintiff subsequently brought a procedural due process against the Town under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Town deprived him of a constitutionally protected property interest in his right to be recalled to employment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Plaintiff's complaint alleged a protected property interest in his recall right; but (2) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's potential recourse to state law foreclosed his section 1983 claim, as Plaintiff's injury could not be fully redressed by recourse to a state law breach of contract claim or the grievance procedures in a collective bargaining agreement. Remanded. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law

The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) fired Plaintiff, a bus operator that suffered from a heart condition. MTA terminated Plaintiff's employment for failing to meet the standard adopted by the State establishing that an individual is not qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that individual suffers from certain cardiovascular diseases. The standard had previously been adopted by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). Plaintiff brought this action in the circuit court, alleging that the MTA violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After a jury trial, MTA was found guilty of discrimination. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff's inability, because of his heart condition, to meet the DOT standards rendered him unqualified as a matter of law for an MTA bus operator position. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the MTA's use of the federally-created qualification standard governing drivers suffering from cardiovascular disease satisfied the ADA's requirements of being "job-related" and of "business necessity" and that "performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation"; and (2) because Plaintiff failed to meet this properly imposed qualification standard, he was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA. View "Zei v. Md. Transit Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Defendant, filed claims against Defendant for unlawful employment retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff alleged that she was subject to several adverse employment actions that were taken in retaliation for occasions on which Plaintiff called attention to Defendant's purportedly discriminatory employment practices. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluded that, as to the two aspects of her employment at issue, Plaintiff had neither established a prima facie case of retaliation nor shown that Defendants' stated rationales for their purportedly unlawful actions toward her were pretextual. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no reasonable fact-finder could resolve the issues in Plaintiff's favor. View "Colon v. Tracey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC against his employer, Dollar General, alleging that Dollar General failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. While awaiting the EEOC's notice of his right to sue, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Then plaintiff filed the present suit in district court. Dollar General moved for summary judgment, arguing that the filing of plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition deprived plaintiff of standing to maintain his ADA claim. The court agreed with its sister circuits and concluded that because of the powers vested in the Chapter 13 debtor and trustee, a Chapter 13 debtor could retain standing to bring his pre-bankruptcy petition claims. The court also concluded that because plaintiff was unable to show that he could perform the essential functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Dollar General's favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Wilson v. Dollar General Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that her employer denied her a promotion and a transfer in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The court concluded that plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence that, when taken together, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the Secretary's proffered reason for cancelling the Lead Developmental Disabilities Specialist position plaintiff was seeking was pretext for racial discrimination. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the Executive Assistance detail claim because plaintiff failed to make a showing that the government's proffered explanation was pretext for racial discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Evans v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kevin Koessel was terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff in Sublette County, Wyoming, due to concerns about the lingering effects of a stroke he suffered. In response, petitioner brought suit in district court against the Sheriff and the County alleging they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), breached his employment contract, and violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact for a jury. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, claiming fact disputes existed on all of his claims. Upon review, the Court agreed with the district court that the Defendants' were entitled to summary judgment on all of petitioner's claims. View "Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

The United States brought suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination in the hiring of New York City firefighters. On appeal, the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta challenged the district court's order issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters. Intervenors cross-appealed a partial final judgment dismissing their federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta. The City, inter alia, sought review of an order granting Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim. The court concluded that (1) summary judgment was improperly entered on Intervenors' disparate treatment claims; (2) the federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg were properly dismissed, as were the state law claims against Commissioner Scopetta, but the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta should be reinstated; (3) most portions of the injunction based on the unchallenged disparate impact finding were within the district court's remedial discretion, but other portions, particularly those portions based on the improper discriminatory treatment ruling, exceeded that discretion; and (4) on remand, the bench trial on the liability phase of the disparate treatment claim against the City should be reassigned to a different district judge. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. City of New York" on Justia Law