Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers stopped and frisked men they believed to be engaged in an illegal drug transaction. One of the men, Artis, accused the officers of stealing money. When the officers returned to headquarters, they learned that a complaint had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, and were taken to an office. They did not feel free to leave.They were joined by other superior officers and instructed to stay in the office and not use their cell phones. The officers obeyed instructions to remove their jackets and to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs and pull down their socks, and open their wallets, because they feared discipline and possible loss of employment. Internal Affairs officers questioned them for 15-20 minutes, then spoke to Artis, then stated that they believed Artis and told the officers that they were not needed for anything further. When they opened their lockers, it appeared that they had been searched. About 14 months later, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed. When police administrators undertake employment-related, non-criminal detentions, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure; the searches were reasonable. View "Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Defendant filed this action against the Massachusetts Trial Court, alleging that it violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B by not selecting Defendant for two different promotions based on her age. A jury found in Defendant's favor with respect to one of the two positions. The trial judge then denied Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granted its motion for a new trial. Both parties appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and vacated the order allowing the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court, holding that because the judge granted the motion for a new trial, the appeal was premature, and the case should not have proceeded to an appellate court. View "Zaniboni v. Mass. Trial Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer and others after she was terminated, alleging federal claims of discrimination based on her gender, religion, and disability, as well as defamation under state law. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims that were not dismissed. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claims to Trumann Health where, under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Trumann Health articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her and plaintiff did not show other similarly situated employees were more favorably treated; the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's libel claims against her co-workers; and Trumann Health could not be liable for defamation because plaintiff premised Trumann Health's liability upon the individual defendants' liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Evance v. Trumann Health Services, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the University and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after her employment was terminated for gross misconduct. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on her due process violation and gender discrimination claims. The court concluded that, assuming plaintiff had a property interest in her continued employment, her due process claim failed because she received all of the process that she was due; regardless of whether defendants deprived plaintiff of a liberty interest in her reputation, she could not establish a due process violation because she did not sufficiently, if at all, request a name-clearing hearing; the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to show direct evidence of discrimination or that defendants' explanation for terminating her was a pretext for gender discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Floyd-Gimon v. University of Arkansas, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code 216.6, alleging that he was discharged from his employment due to his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court concluded that, taken together, plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to allow a rational factfinder to find that the employer's proffered reasons for terminating him were pretextual. Plaintiff's evidence was not inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination and, therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on her claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq. The court concluded that summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on plaintiff's discrimination claim was proper where the bank had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for issuing a written warning and where plaintiff had not met her burden of demonstrating pretext. The court also concluded that summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank was proper where plaintiff failed to show a causal connection between her protected activity and the bank's alleged adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Muor v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer, the USPS, for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order refusing to award him any compensation for delayed payment of attorney's fees after his successful suit. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district court had discretion to compensate for delay, but it applied the wrong legal standard in exercising its discretion. On remand, the district court must determine, under the correct legal standards, whether compensation for delay was appropriate and, if so, by what means. View "West v. Potter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by New Dimensions, Inc. (NDI) as a design and sales consultant. Plaintiff was paid a commission of 2.12 percent of her total sales, but other design and sales consultants, both male and female, previously hired by NDI were paid commissions of 2.25 percent. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated by NDI and was not paid commissions for certain sales she had secured. Plaintiff filed this amended complaint against NDI alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, and violation of the federal Equal Pay Act (EPA). In its answer, NDI did not affirmatively plead the four defenses articulated in the statute. The circuit court determined that NDI was prohibited from presenting evidence in defense of the EPA claim and precluded the introduction of evidence related to those defenses. The circuit court ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the EPA claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the defenses set forth in the EPA are affirmative but were not waived under the facts presented in this case; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in preventing NDI from presenting evidence of its gender-neutral compensation system at trial. Remanded. View "New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini" on Justia Law

Lockheed Martin Corp. sought to set aside a decision of the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (the "ARB" or the "Board") that concluded Lockheed violated Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who concluded Lockheed violated the Act by constructively discharging employee Andrea Brown after she had engaged in protected activity. Brown worked as Communications Director for Lockheed from June 2000 to February 2008. In 2003, she became the Director of Communications in Colorado Springs, Colorado. In May 2006, Brown began having difficulty getting responses from one of her supervisors on work-related matters. She discussed the problem with Tina Colditz, a coworker and personal friend. Colditz ran a pen pals program for the company, through which Lockheed employees could correspond with members of the U.S. military deployed in Iraq. Colditz told Brown that the supervisor had developed sexual relationships with several of the soldiers in the program, had purchased a laptop computer for one soldier, sent inappropriate emails and sex toys to soldiers stationed in Iraq, and traveled to welcome-home ceremonies for soldiers on the pretext of business while actually taking soldiers to expensive hotels in limousines for intimate relations. Colditz told Brown she was concerned the supervisor was using company funds for these activities. Brown thus became concerned Owen’s actions were fraudulent and illegal and that there could be media exposure which could lead to government audits and affect the company’s future contracts and stock price. Brown brought her concerns to Jan Moncallo, Lockheed’s Vice President of Human Resources. Moncallo told Brown she would submit an anonymous ethics complaint on Brown’s behalf, and that she would be protected from retaliation because no one would know her identity. Moncallo sent an Prior to 2006, Brown received a "high contributor" or "exceptional contributor" rating in her performance evaluations. In late 2006, and thereafter, however, Brown received a lower rating of "successful contributor." In 2007, Lockheed announced to all employees it was undergoing a corporate-structure reorganization. Brown began reporting to a new supervisor, who according to Brown, had a negative attitude toward her from the beginning of their professional relationship. Shortly thereafter, Brown received a phone call from the former supervisor telling her that Brown’s job had been posted on the internet and that she should get her resume together. Brown would suffer from an emotional breakdown, fall into a deep depression, and take medical leave over the changes. Brown brought a complaint alleging violations of Sarbanes-Oxley. In his Recommended Decision and Order, the ALJ found that Brown had engaged in protected activity; she suffered materially adverse employment actions, including constructive discharge; and her engagement in protected activity was a contributing factor in the constructive discharge. The ALJ awarded reinstatement, back pay, medical expenses, and non-economic compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000. Lockheed timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor, which affirmed. Finding no error in the Board's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Lockheed Martin v. DOL" on Justia Law