Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The eight plaintiffs in this action (collectively, “Sharp”) are former employees of apparel manufacturer S&S Activewear (“S&S”). Seven are women, and one is a man. Sharp alleges that S&S permitted its managers and employees to routinely play “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music throughout its 700,000-square-foot warehouse in Reno, Nevada. Sharp eventually filed suit, alleging that the music and related conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted S&S’s motion to dismiss and denied leave to amend the music claim, reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The court countenanced S&S’s argument that the fact that “both men and women were offended by the work environment” doomed Sharp’s Title VII claim.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The panel disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice and without leave to amend, of Plaintiffs’ music-based claim and instructed the district court to reconsider, on remand, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings in light of two key principles: First, harassment, whether aural or visual, need not be directly targeted at a particular plaintiff in order to pollute a workplace and give rise to a Title VII claim. Second, the challenged conduct’s offensiveness to multiple genders is not a certain bar to stating a Title VII claim. View "STEPHANIE SHARP, ET AL V. S&S ACTIVEWEAR, L.L.C." on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zephryn Hammond appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant University of Vermont Medical Center on plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment in April 2019. In October 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant had discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s race and disabilities in violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). The civil division concluded plaintiff had established a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was motivated by racial discrimination. However, it ruled that defendant had articulated a legitimate basis for the termination decision, namely, the performance issues identified in plaintiff’s evaluations and during the disciplinary process, and plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. The court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was the result of disability discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that the fact that plaintiff was terminated shortly after complaining of possible racial and disability discrimination created a prima facie case of retaliation, but that defendant offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and plaintiff had failed to show that the stated reasons were false. It therefore granted summary judgment to defendant on each of plaintiff’s claims. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hammond v. University of Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

Appellants are agricultural workers hired by strawberry growers (“the Growers”) to pick the fruit that was then turned over to the Appellees Red Blossom Sales, Inc. and Better Produce, Inc. (“the Marketers”) for distribution. Appellants sought to hold the Marketers liable for their wages as “client employers.” The Marketers cooled and sold the berries principally to large retail grocery chains. The Marketers conducted their cooling and distribution operations on premises that were close to but separate from the farms. The Growers stopped paying Appellants and later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants sued the Growers and the Marketers as joint employers under California and federal law. Appellants also sued the Marketers as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. The district court ruled for the Marketers on all theories. Appellants appeal only with respect to the Marketers’ liability under Section 2810.3.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Appellants were not performing labor within the Marketers’ “usual course of business” as defined by the statute. That term is defined as “the regular and customary work of a business, performed within or upon the premises or worksite of the client employer.” Given the particular facts of this case, the court concluded that Appellants’ work took place on the farms where the strawberries were grown, not on the premises or worksites of the Marketers. The Marketers are, therefore, not liable as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. View "LUIS MORALES-GARCIA, ET AL V. BETTER PRODUCE, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 2018, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hired Bronson as a treatment center teacher. Bronson was assigned to Lurie Hospital. Bronson and another teacher assigned to Lurie (Cooper), are Black; the third teacher, Lee, is White. Lurie’s family services director, Ruohonen, was the teachers’ “representative supervisor” at Lurie. Ruohonen is White. Bronson alleges that Lurie and Ruohonen treated Bronson and Cooper, the first Black teachers assigned to Lurie, in a discriminatory manner. In a departure from consistent past practice, Lurie denied Bronson and Cooper access to Lurie's electronic medical records system, EPIC, for a year. Identification badges issued to Bronson and Cooper bore a different color than those issued to others: Lee’s badge granted her “regular employee access” to EPIC. In 2019, Ruohonen sent an email to their CPS supervisor, complaining about Bronson and Cooper. Bronson contacted the Chicago Teachers Union, which responded that the complaint was inconsistent with the union contract, Bronson also alleges that she and Cooper were denied adequate office and desk space.In December 2019, Bronson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, then filed suit, asserting violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Because the allegations in Bronson’s complaint establish that Lurie is not her de facto employer, she cannot sue Lurie under Title VII. View "Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a $425,562 jury verdict in his favor on his claim that the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (the Department) retaliated against him for filing an internal complaint with its Equal Opportunity Office (EEO). The Department appealed, contending that four erroneous evidentiary rulings by the trial court deprived it of a fair trial.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court agreed that the trial court erred in admitting evidence about activity that occurred before the filing of his EEO complaints. The court also concluded that admission of the first EEO complaint and supplement was prejudicial and prevented the Department from receiving a fair trial. The court explained that there is no doubt that the fact that Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint for age and race discrimination is highly relevant. It is the protected activity needed for his claim; more colloquially, it provides a motive for the retaliation. The details of the discrimination are not relevant. This was not a trial about whether Plaintiff’s co-worker engaged in race or age discrimination; Plaintiff waived those claims in the prior settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that it need not and does not reach the Department’s other claims of error. View "Kourounian v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a deaf man who can understand only about 30% of verbal communication through lipreading. He communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL). Plaintiff worked for O’Reilly Auto Parts (O’Reilly) as an inbound materials handler. He claims that the company discriminated against him in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because it did not provide him with the reasonable accommodations that he requested for his disability. He alleged that he requested but did not receive an ASL interpreter for various meetings, training, and a company picnic. He also alleged that he asked for text messages summarizing nightly pre-shift meetings but did not receive them either. The district court, acting by consent through a magistrate judge, granted O’Reilly’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of O’Reilly. The court remanded for further proceedings involving Plaintiff’s claim that O’Reilly violated the ADA by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations regarding the nightly pre-shift safety meetings and regarding his disciplinary proceedings involving attendance issues. The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact do exist about whether two of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations relate to his essential job functions and whether the failure to provide those two accommodations led to an “adverse employment decision.” If Plaintiff’s allegations turn out to be the actual facts, there was a violation of Title I of the ADA, and that means summary judgment against him was inappropriate. View "Teddy Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit against Defendants—each present or former employees of the California Department of Public Health—on the grounds that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs of certain rights secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged a “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983 on the grounds that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before publishing a purportedly erroneous investigative report on an unsuccessful cardiac surgery. They contend that the publication of this report caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of protected employment-related interests. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish several necessary elements of their claim and, thus, dismissed the action in its entirety; Plaintiffs challenged each of the district court’s negative elemental findings.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court’s negative causation finding was plausible in light of record evidence establishing; the timing and conclusions of the hospital’s internal investigations, the independent actions of a hospital employee to alert the family to potential malfeasance by Plaintiff, the family and estate’s pursuit of legal action; the accounts of key percipient witnesses to the surgery as part of the malpractice case; and the sizable malpractice judgment awarded against Plaintiff. The panel thus sustained the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants’ conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury and concluded that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causation element of their “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983. View "PERVAIZ CHAUDHRY, ET AL V. TOMAS ARAGON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Vice President of Program and Community of the Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation. She received largely positive feedback during her tenure, but less than two years after she was hired, the CEO of the Foundation fired her for purported interpersonal and communication-related issues. Plaintiff, who is African-American, believes these stated reasons were pretext to mask discriminatory animus. Plaintiff and the Foundation signed a severance agreement, under which Plaintiff agreed to release employment-related claims against the Foundation and its employees, and which contained a mutual non-disparagement clause. But roughly a month after Plaintiff was fired, the CEO told another leader in the non-profit space that Plaintiff was let go because she was “toxic,” created a “negative environment.” Plaintiff sued the Foundation and its CEO for breaching the severance agreement, for doing so in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and for defaming her. The district court dismissed all three claims.   The DC Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing all three claims. As to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the non-disparagement clause could reasonably be interpreted to preclude the Foundation from disparaging Plaintiff, and dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is therefore inappropriate. As to her Section 1981 claim, the court found that she has plausibly alleged a prima facie case that the Foundation, through the CEO, breached the severance agreement due to racial animus. And lastly, the CEO’s statements are not protected by the common interest privilege, which requires a showing of good faith on the part of the speaker. View "Terri Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation" on Justia Law