Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a police officer with the Parks Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging workplace discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment against him on his claim that workplace supervisors unlawfully denied him time-off awards in retaliation for his pursuit of a protected activity. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the entitlement to an award and, as such, he could not demonstrate that the failure of his employer to nominate him for time-off awards materially affected the terms of his employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bridgeforth v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cynthia Pfeifer filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Federal Express Corporation in the District of Kansas, alleging that the company fired her in retaliation for receiving workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed suit fifteen months following the termination within the applicable state statute of limitations, but outside the limit of six months enumerated in her employment agreement. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract clause was reasonable and was not a violation of public policy. Because no Kansas law appeared to control the outcome of the case, the Tenth Circuit certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the ability of parties to shorten the applicable statute of limitations by contract, and if not, then was the six-month limitation unreasonable in this case? The Kansas Court responded that the contract clause in question here did violate public policy. Because of that answer, the Court did not respond to the Tenth Circuit's second question. In light of these answers, the federal district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, the Chief Administrative Officer (OCAO), of the United States House of Representatives, for alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA), 2 U.S.C. 1301-1438. The court concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require the dismissal of this action; plaintiff could proceed with all of her claims under the CAA, subject to the applicable strictures of the Speech or Debate Clause; and, accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S." on Justia Law

The Texas university medical center has an agreement with Parkland Memorial Hospital, requiring the Hospital to offer vacant staff physician posts to University faculty members. A physician of Middle Eastern descent, both a University faculty member and a Hospital staff physician, claimed that Levine, one of his University supervisors, was biased against him because of his religion and ethnic heritage. He complained to Fitz, Levine’s super¬visor. He wanted to continue working at the Hospital without also being on the University faculty. He resigned his teaching post and sent a letter to Fitz and others, stating that he was leaving because of Levine’s harassment. Fitz, wanting public exoneration for Levine, objected to the Hospital’s job offer, which was then withdrawn. The doctor sued, claiming that Levine’s harassment resulted in his constructive discharge from the University, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and that Fitz’s efforts to prevent his hiring were in retaliation for complaining about that harassment, in violation of section 2000e–3(a). A jury agreed on both claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated as to the constructive-discharge claim, but affirmed with respect to retaliation, reasoning that retaliation claims under 2000e–3(a) require only a showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action, not its but-for cause. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in section 2000e–2(m). Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision appears in a different section from its status-based discrimination ban and uses the term “because,” indicating that retaliation claims require proof that desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. The Court noted that retaliation claims are made with “ever¬increasing frequency” and that lessening the standard could contribute to the filing of frivolous claims. View "Univ. of TX. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar" on Justia Law

Under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1)), an employer’s liability for workplace harassment may depend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. If the harasser is a “supervisor,” however, and the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer is strictly liable. If there was no tangible employment action, the employer may escape liability by establishing that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. Vance, an African-American woman, sued her employer, BSU, alleging that a fellow employee, Davis, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that BSU was not vicariously liable for Davis’ alleged actions because Davis, who could not take tangible employment actions against Vance, was not a supervisor. The Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. An employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. A definition that draws a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors, with the authority to take tangible employment actions as the defining characteristic of a supervisor, can be readily applied. Supervisor status will often be discerned before or soon after litigation commences and is likely to be resolved as a matter of law before trial. This definition will not leave employees unprotected against harassment by co-workers who possess some authority to assign daily tasks and accounts for the fact that many modern organizations have abandoned a hierarchical management structure in favor of giving employees overlapping authority with respect to assignments. View "Vance v. Ball State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of limited liability corporations located in Iowa. Plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the businesses and certain individuals affiliated with the businesses, alleging that Defendants violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) by engaging in sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The lawsuits demanded punitive damages. Defendants moved to strike the claim for punitive damages. The district court granted the motion, concluding that punitive damages were not available under the ICRA. Plaintiffs sought, and the Supreme Court granted, interlocutory appeal. The Court then affirmed the district court, holding that an award of punitive damages is not permitted under the ICRA. View "Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in Adams v. United States challenged the nonretroactivity and protection-for-compliance provisions of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007 (FTEPA), Pub. L. No. 110-135, 121 Stat. 1450, as well as the FAA's implementation of these provisions. These provisions repealed the "Age 60 Rule" and extended the maximum age for piloting commercial flights by five years. Plaintiffs in Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., supplemented their constitutional objections with state and federal claims against their employer, United, and their union, ALPA, for advancing allegedly discriminatory interpretations of the nonretroactivity provision they knew to be incorrect. The court concluded that the FTEPA passed constitutional muster and should be interpreted as the Emory defendants have done. Therefore, the court affirmed the district courts' judgments as to all claims not dismissed as moot. View "Emory v. United Airlines, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American woman, sued the District and the Chief of Police, alleging race and sex discrimination. When plaintiff opted to retire instead of accepting a demotion, the Chief hired a white man to serve in her position at one rank higher than the rank the Chief had offered plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of race and sex discrimination to get to a jury and that the district court failed to state its reasons for keeping certain records designated "confidential" sealed. View "Primas v. District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after she was sexually assaulted by a City policy officer. The officer was charged with first degree sexual assault and subsequently terminated from the police force. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer, based on the evidence, that the City's custom of ignoring violent misconduct and failing to supervise or discipline officers was a moving force behind the officer's assault on plaintiff. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. City of Marianna, AR" on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by Petitioner. After Respondent was terminated, she filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission alleging that she was unlawfully discriminated against. The director of operations for the Commission issued a finding that no probable cause was found in Respondent's complaint and ordered it dismissed. After the assistant attorney general (Sheridan) conducted an administrative review hearing, the Commission found probable cause was alleged in the complaint. Sheridan then filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Sheridan, arguing that he was conflicted from representing Respondent because he had acted in a judicial capacity while conducting the administrative review. The administrative law judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court (1) declined to issue the writ insofar as it requested that Respondent's claims be dismissed; (2) declined to order that a subpoena be issued to allow Petitioner to access documents reviewed during the administrative review; but (3) issued the writ to state that Sheridan could not represent Respondent in proceedings before the Commission. View "State ex rel. Ten S. Mgmt. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n" on Justia Law