Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Adeyeye, a native of Nigeria, moved to the U.S. in 2008. He requested several weeks of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father’s burial rites. He explained that his participation in the funeral ceremonies was “compulsory” and that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members would suffer at least spiritual death. The employer denied the request, but he traveled to Nigeria for the ceremonies anyway and was fired when he returned to work. Adeyeye filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failure to accommodate his religion. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Adeyeye’s two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had provided notice of the religious character of his request. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether or not Adeyeye’s letters might have justified holding as a matter of law that they provided sufficient notice of the religious nature of his request, they certainly were sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the employer had notice of the religious nature of the request. View "Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment. Employee's union filed a grievance against Employer, and the parties submitted the controversy to arbitration. The arbitrator reduced the dismissal to a one year suspension without pay, finding the dismissal was without just cause. Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitral award, claiming that enforcement of the award violated public policy. The trial court granted the application and vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the award violated the public policy against workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required nothing less than Employee's termination. View "State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391" on Justia Law

After working at the company for four months, Benes charged his employer with sex discrimination. The EEOC arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated and a go-between relayed offers. Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, Benes stormed into the room used by his employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.” The firm fired him. He filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), abandoning his claim of sex discrimination. A magistrate judge granted the employer summary judgment, finding that Benes had been fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that section 2000e–3(a) does not establish a privilege to misbehave in mediation, but only bans retaliation “because [a person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” View "Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd." on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based upon her sex. While pursuing the discrimination action, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, failing to list the bankruptcy action in her bankruptcy schedules. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the discrimination action on the ground that judicial estoppel prohibited plaintiff from proceeding. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether plaintiff's bankruptcy omission was "mistaken" or "inadvertent." View "Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Lambert, an African-American was hired as a laborer at a Peri distribution yard in 2003. Lambert claims that co-workers and supervisors often made sexually and racially offensive comments. He complained regularly, but supervisors took no action. Nonetheless, Lambert was promoted to a lead position. One day, Lambert’s supervisors observed him behaving in an unusually aggressive manner and ordered him to take a drug and alcohol test. The test revealed that he was intoxicated. He was immediately fired under Peri’s “no tolerance” policy toward consuming alcohol on the job, an important policy for safety in a yard where workers operate heavy machinery and maneuver large concrete objects. Lambert attributed Peri’s decision to terminate his employment to racial discrimination and retaliation for his complaints. The district court rejected his claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. There was insufficient evidence that Lambert’s race motivated Peri’s decision to test for intoxication or to fire him, but the court acted prematurely in dismissing claims of sexual and racial harassment. A jury could find that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of race or sex, and that he took all necessary steps to call his treatment to the company’s attention. View "Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer, the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, originally alleging federal civil rights and state age discrimination claims. The Board then removed the case to federal court, invoking the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. After removal, plaintiff amended her complaint alleging various federal and state law claims. The district court dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims other than the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621-634, claim for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the Board waived its defense of immunity from litigation in federal court when it removed to federal court, but the Board did not waive its immunity from ADEA liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Stroud v. McIntosh, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michael Battaglia worked for defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) since 1985. He alleged he received a demotion in retaliation for making certain workplace complaints and comments. In suing UPS, he alleged that his demotion violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Plaintiff also alleged breach of contract, relying on employee manuals stating that employees would not be disciplined for complaints. The trial court dismissed the contract claim for lack of evidence. Following numerous arguments over jury instructions, the court directed the jury that it could consider evidence involving credit cards, meal practices “and other things” on the CEPA claim. The jury found UPS liable on the CEPA and LAD claims, and awarded plaintiff $500,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in emotional distress damages. UPS made numerous post-trial motions, and the court granted its request for remittitur of the emotional distress award, reducing it to $205,000. The parties cross-appealed. The appellate panel affirmed the CEPA claim and dismissal of plaintiff's contract claim, but reversed the LAD verdict for lack of evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to the extent that it dismissed the LAD claim and affirmed the CEPA verdict. Under the LAD, an employee who voices complaints and allegedly suffers a retaliatory employment action need only demonstrate a good-faith belief that the complained-of conduct violates the LAD. An identifiable victim of actual discrimination is not required. An LAD plaintiff may only recover an award for future emotional distress if evidence of permanency is offered in the form of an expert opinion. In order to succeed on a fraud-based CEPA claim, a plaintiff must reasonably believe that the complained-of activity was occurring and was fraudulent. View "Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the human resources director of two Puerto Rico governmental agencies. Plaintiff resigned one position and was terminated from the other. Plaintiff sued her former supervisors under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Puerto Rico law, alleging that she was retaliated against due to her allegiance with a certain political faction disfavored by Defendants and because she refused to follow personnel-related orders that she considered illegal and politically motivated. The district court dismissed some of Plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment on the remainder. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects, holding that the district court did not err (1) in dismissing Plaintiff's First Amendment free speech claim, as Plaintiff's "speech" exclusively revolved around her professional duties as human resource director; (2) in dismissing a claim Plaintiff made under the Puerto Rico Whistleblowers Protection Act, as Plaintiff failed to raise her meritorious arguments regarding this claim in district court; and (3) in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's freedom of association claim, as the First Amendment was inapplicable to Plaintiff's position as human resources director. View "O'Connell v. Marrero-Recio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the OHA after she was terminated. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed for failure to order the necessary portions of a trial transcript. Plaintiff ordered the portion of the trial transcript that contained her testimony and the remaining portions of the transcript were not transcribed and were not available. The court could not properly review the issues in the case based on the record plaintiff provided and, therefore, the court did not address the merits of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court granted the OHA's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b). View "Kelly v. Omaha Housing Authority, et al." on Justia Law