Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

While employed as an electrical line worker, Waldo was subjected routinely to sexual harassment. Her coworkers displayed sexually explicit materials in the workplace, locked her in a porta-potty, ridiculed her for bringing a purse to work, demanded that she “pee like a man” and clean up her male coworkers’ tobacco spit, ostracized and ignored her on job sites and during trainings, and referred to her using gender-specific demeaning language. Waldo sued, bringing six federal and state-law discrimination claims, and a state-law tort claim. Although a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the employer, the district court granted Waldo a new trial on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, finding that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After a second trial, the jury found in favor of Waldo, and the district court awarded her attorney fees and costs as a prevailing plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the granting a new trial and the award of attorney fees and costs. There was clear testimony that the employer was aware of Waldo’s complaints, but that no formal response or investigation was undertaken, contrary to company policies that “[c]omplaints will be fully investigated.” View "Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co." on Justia Law

Bates, a black firefighter, joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1977 and rose through the ranks. In 2000, Fire Commissioner Joyce appointed Bates to one of seven District Chief positions. A District Chief is a member of the personnel management team and holds an at-will position. Bates’s work was well-regarded. Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and Trotter, also black, became the new Fire Commissioner and chose his own management team; he issued a personnel order that contained eith black and 10 non-black promotions, three black and five non-black demotions, and four lateral reassignments for at-will positions. Bates was demoted to a Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a floating assignment. The district court dismissed Bates’s 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 claims of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. Trotter had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire Department to support his assertion that Bates’s demeanor and level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management style. View "Bates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Aker’s Louisville team consisted of the project manager, Hudson; electrical and instrumentation (E&I) designers Ash, Kirkpatrick, Sharp, and Whitaker; three piping designers; an estimator/scheduler; and a drafter who was being groomed to become an E&I designer. Sharp began as a contract worker in 2003 and became an employee in 2005. In 2008-2009, several Aker employees, including Sharp, were laid off because customers had canceled or postponed projects. Sharp, then 52 years old, claimed that he was fired because of his age, citing Hudson’s decision to train Kirkpatrick, and not Sharp, as E&I design lead and noting Hudson’s alleged comments about the advancing age of the group and the need to bring in younger people. Aker asserted that Hudson and Ash considered Kirkpatrick a superior employee to Sharp. The trial court entered summary judgment for Aker in Sharp’s age-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding adequate evidence that Hudson played a determinative role in the layoff decision to attribute his motivation to the company, that Hudson’s remarks were direct evidence of age discrimination, and that Hudson’s expression of age as a factor in his decision was not merely a proxy for a legitimate business concern. View "Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, was employed at Koppers’ plant from 1995 until her termination in 2008. She had been disciplined for sleeping at her desk in the laboratory, for smoking in the lunch room, for not punching out on the time clock, for fighting with a security guard, and for an altercation with a white male co-worker, O’Connell. Without interviewing Johnson, the plant manager determined that both O’Connell and Johnson were at fault and decided that Johnson should be punished more severely because of her disciplinary history and O’Connell’s allegations of racial harassment. The plant manager warned Johnson that future incidents would lead to termination. O’Connell received a less severe warning letter. The Union filed a grievance on Johnson’s behalf and Johnson’s warning was reduced to a memo that summarized her work obligations and employment status. Johnson was fired after another altercation with O’Connell. A witness indicated that Johnson shoved O’Connell, who filed a police report. Johnson filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Koppers. View "Johnson v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Titles I and V of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., against his employer and various state employees, alleging that defendants retaliated against him in response to a prior discrimination suit that he had filed against them. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims for money damages against defendants. View "Lors v. Dean, et al." on Justia Law

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws. View "Boaz v. FedEx Cust. Info. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law

SVT hired Morgan, an African-American, to work as a security guard at one of its Ultra grocery stores. Morgan had previously worked security for a grocery store that previously occupied the location and at Home Depot. Morgan was working about 40 hours a week at Home Depot and 20 to 30 hours a week at Ultra when he was involved in an incident involving a white manager at Ultra, who had taken a newspaper without paying. Morgan was ultimately fired. He sued, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the circumstances surrounding Morgan’s firing, did not, in themselves, raise a plausible inference of race discrimination. Although Morgan argued that the timing of his firing was “suspicious,” given his documented failure to perform theft stops, prior warnings about the lack of theft stops, and SVT’s stringent enforcement of its anti-shoplifting olicies, the court properly concluded that suspicious timing alone was insufficient to create a genuine dispute over whether Morgan was fired for failing to meet legitimate job expectations or for insidious racial reasons. View "Marcus Morgan v. SVT, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Hill, an African American, began working for the General Services Administration in 2008 through the Federal Career Intern Program. Realizing that his Master’s degree entitled him to a higher pay rate, he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The parties settled. Hill maintains that he acted professionally during his one-year probationary period. His coworkers complained to supervisors about Hill’s temper on three occasions. A supervisor told Hill that his “stomping around” and slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a “pretty big guy,” which Hill took as a coded racial reference. After his probation, Hill was fired, based on those three incidents. Hill sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, for race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to GSA, stating that Hill was not meeting legitimate expectations because he had engaged in a pattern of behavior that led three different coworkers to report him to their supervisors, and that a white female intern was not a suitable comparator because only one coworker had ever complained about her behavior, nor had Hill established pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Anthony Hill v. Martha Johnson" on Justia Law