Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, aged 76, filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq, and state law, contending that Securitas fired him because of his age. Plaintiff cited evidence that prior to his termination, Securitas supervisors showed age animus through negative comments regarding plaintiff's age. Plaintiff adduced enough evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of Securitas's motive, even if that evidence did not directly contradict or disprove Securitas's articulated reasons for its actions. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Securitas, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext. View "Johnson v. Securitas Security Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as dean of students and vice president of student services at the University of Iowa by the University's president, Sally Mason, after a report from the Stolar Partnership (Stolar), a law firm retained by the Board of Regents (Regents) to investigate the University's response to a sexual assault of a student athlete by other student athletes, came out highly critical of Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the University, Mason, the Regents, and Stolar for wrongful termination and related causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in denying Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of written communications between Stolar and the Regents based on its finding that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications from disclosure; and (2) in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's various claims. View "Jones v. Univ. of Iowa" on Justia Law

Officer Dennis Nelson, a police officer with the Orem City Police Department (OCPD), was terminated from his position for using excessive force during a booking at the Orem City Jail. The Orem City Employee Appeals Board (Board) upheld the termination. The court of appeals upheld the Board's decision, concluding (1) the OCPD's decision to terminate Nelson was not inconsistent with prior instances of discipline under OCPD's excessive force policy; (2) alternatively, the Board justified any disparate application of OCPD's policy; and (3) the Board did not violate Nelson's procedural due process rights at his hearing before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review; and (2) the court of appeals correctly found that any procedural due process violations at the hearing were harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Orem" on Justia Law

Two former police officers brought claims against the Municipality of Anchorage for racial discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment in violation of state law. The officers claimed damages for mental anguish, and the Municipality sought discovery concerning the nature of their mental anguish claims. But the officers refused to comply with these discovery requests, invoking the physician and psychotherapist privilege. The Municipality moved for an order to compel the officers to sign releases authorizing the disclosure of medical, pharmacy, and psychological counseling records, which the superior court granted. The officers then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the assertion of "garden-variety" mental anguish claims in an employment discrimination case does not automatically waive the physician and psychotherapist privilege. View "Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Based on misconduct that he allegedly committed in his previous positions as a police officer and deputy sheriff, the Transportation Security Administration suspended and ultimately revoked Gargiulo’s security clearance, which was necessary for his job as a Federal Air Marshall. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. On appeal, Gargiulo argued that the agency deprived him of constitutional due process by not timely providing him with documentary materials relied upon in deciding to suspend his security clearance. Although he was given notice of the reasons for the suspension of his security clearance as early as August 2008, he was not provided with copies of the documentary materials until May 2009, three months after he was suspended from his job. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that security clearance decisions do not implicate any due process rights. View "Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Appellant worked at Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility as a correctional officer for approximately three years. Appellant worked in the sex offender unit during the majority of her employment with Pine Hills. After quitting her job, Appellant filed an action against Pine Hills for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Pine Hills on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial credible evidence supported the district court's determination that Pine Hills held open an offer for Appellant to transfer units for one year until Appellant quit; (2) the district court correctly determined that Pine Hills reasonably and promptly offered a solution to end one inmate's harassment of Appellant; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Appellant's retaliation claim against Pine Hills. View "Puskas v. Pine Hills Youth Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, W-G, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., after W-G terminated his employment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for W-G on the ADA claim, concluding that plaintiff was "currently engaging" in illegal drug use and was fired "on the basis of such use," and that plaintiff did not qualify for the safe harbor under section 12114(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of W-G on plaintiff's FMLA claim where no reasonable jury could find that he was denied reinstatement for any reason other than his refusal to continue his FMLA leave period for the express purpose for which it was taken, which was completing his drug dependency treatment. View "Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Adamov immigrated to the U.S. in 1992 and began working at the bank in 1998. He became a district manager in Louisville, with an excellent employment record. In 2005, the bank hired Hartnack as Vice-Chairman, three levels up from Adamov. During the few times Hartnack and Adamov interacted, Hartnack made statements that Adamov found offensive, concerning his accent and being an immigrant. While giving a speech, Hartnack made the comment “I was talking to my managers and they looked at me like I was speaking Russian.” Adamov believed that he had not been promoted because Hartnack harbored animus based on Adamov’s national origin. Adamov spoke to his direct supervisor, who spoke with Hartnack and assured Adamov that Hartnack was not prejudiced against him. The bank subsequently investigated Adamov, concluded that his loans violated its ethics policy, and terminated his employment. The ethics policy went into effect after the date of the loan and no prior policy was introduced at trial. The district court dismissed Adamov’s retaliation claim, based on failure to exhaust remedies and entered summary judgment that Adamov’s discrimination claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the discrimination claim. The retaliation claim should not have been dismissed because the administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. View " Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Employee, an African-American, was employed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for several years. Employee filed suit against the State and individual defendants in their official capacities, alleging she was denied the opportunity to enroll with the health insurance carrier that had insured her prior to 2007 due to a ZIP code exclusion plan. Specifically, Employee alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because most African-American employees resided in three excluded ZIP codes and were offered substandard health insurance based on the ZIP codes associated with their residential addresses. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Employee's claim of disparate impact arising under Title VII, as the evidence presented by Defendants established that the plans offered in the excluded ZIP codes were equivalent to the plans offered statewide. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law