Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and other statutes. The court concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the first special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" - where the jury-instruction definitions of "disability" and "qualified individual" properly conformed to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the third special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in either jury interrogatory, there was no need to consider whether an error required reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Neely v. PSEG Texas LP, et al." on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

George Roberts said IBM fired him because of his age. He argued an instant message exchange between two of the company’s human resources managers referencing his "shelf life" played a direct role in his eventual discharge. The Tenth Circuit concluded that after its review of the evidence presented at trial, the term "shelf life" had nothing to do with Roberts’s age and everything to do with his workload. "Once its euphemisms and acronyms are translated into English, the instant message conversation unmistakably suggests that 'shelf life' was nothing worse than an inartful reference to Mr. Roberts’s queue of billable work. And that is more than enough to preclude it from amounting to direct evidence of discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act." View "Roberts v. IBM" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the police chief, filed suit against defendant, the mayor, alleging unconstitutional retaliation as well as state tort law claims. On interlocutory appeal, defendant challenged the district court's order denying qualified immunity and plaintiff cross-appealed the district court's dismissal of one of his tort claims. Because the court concluded that plaintiff acted pursuant to his official job duties, the court need not consider the remaining prongs of the First Amendment retaliation test since he could not show that defendant violated his First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court remanded, concluding that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cross appeal, declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a state law tort claim in an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying qualified immunity. View "Gibson v. Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Lavalais is the only black police officer employed by the Village of Melrose Park, which has about 75 officers. He has been a Melrose Park officer for more than 20 years. In 2010, Lavalais filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race discrimination. He filed a second charge in January 2011, alleging that he was disciplined for filing the first charge. In early February 2011, Lavalais was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift. More than a year later, he was denied a requested a change of assignment from the midnight shift, and again filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter. The district court dismissed his claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of the discrimination claims, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claims. View "Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Johnson was rejected for four promotions and was terminated in 2004, when her employer, General Board learned that Johnson had been recording conversations with co-workers without their consent. Johnson had filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2001 and in 2003 and, after her termination, filed a charge, claiming sexual harassment, based on a video shown by a team leader, featuring male nudity. Johnson sued General Board, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 981, and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Johnson testified that a hiring official told her that her tendency to complain about discrimination might have contributed to the decision not to promote her. Most of Johnson’s claims were dismissed. Two remaining claims for retaliation were tried; a jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to jury instructions. The district court failed to comply with FRCP 51(b), which requires the court to decide the content of final jury instructions and give the parties an opportunity to object before instructions and final arguments are delivered; the procedural error was ultimately harmless. View "Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church" on Justia Law