Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Sara Debord filed suit against her employer, Mercy Health Services of Kansas, for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Petitioner claimed Mercy knew or should have known that her supervisor created a hostile workplace through unwanted touching and offensive sexual remarks. She also claimed that Mercy did not do enough to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, and that, when she finally reported the harassment, Mercy retaliated by firing her. After reviewing the evidence at summary judgment, the district court concluded there was no triable issue of material fact. The Tenth Circuit, after its review of the matter, agreed with the district court: the record did not disclose that Mercy knew or should have known about petitioner's allegations of a hostile workplace, and she did not provide a reasonable explanation for the nearly five years she waited to first report the harassment. Nor was there a genuine dispute about whether Mercy honestly held legitimate reasons for terminating Debord based on its conclusion that she was dishonest and disruptive during Mercy's investigation of allegations about her supervisor's conduct and claims she improperly received extra pay. View "Debord v. Mercy Health System of Kansas, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claim, which she claimed resulted from her complaints about sexual harassment. The court held that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the conduct at issue created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, and, if so, whether plaintiff's complaint about that conduct was causally related to her termination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case on her retaliation claim. View "Royal v. CCC& R Tres Arboles, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Riceland, alleging retaliatory discharge after being a witness in an internal investigation into a complaint about a manager. A jury subsequently awarded plaintiff approximately $60,000 in compensatory damages and back pay in regards to his 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim. The court concluded that the district court properly denied Riceland's motion for judgment where the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find retaliation; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim where, even if plaintiff had properly preserved this claim on appeal, the claim was untimely; it was not necessary to address the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claim because the state statute would not entitle plaintiff to any additional relief beyond his section 1981 claim; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial on punitive damages; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's request for reinstatement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sayger v. Riceland Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States and others, alleging violations of her religious rights under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. Plaintiff lost her job by failing to comply with the applicable regulations or to receive an appropriate waiver when she wore a kirpan (a Sikh ceremonial sword) to work. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim where her employer's, the IRS, failure to accommodate plaintiff did not violate Title VII as a matter of law. The court reversed and remanded plaintiff's RFRA claim for further development of evidence concerning the government's compelling interest in enforcing against plaintiff the statutory ban on weapons with blades exceeding 2.5 inches. View "Tagore v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former supervisor and employer, the Department, for statutory and constitutional violations. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the supervisor's appeal where the supervisor challenged the sufficiency of plaintiff's pleadings to state 42 U.S.C. 1983, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., interference and retaliation claims. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to state a section 1983 claim for gender discrimination where her conclusory assertion that she was discharged under circumstances similarly situated men were not imported legal language couched as factual allegations and failed to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying the supervisor's motion to dismiss the claim. Further, the district court erred in denying the supervisor's motion to dismiss the FMLA entitlement claim and the FMLA discrimination claim. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether to allow plaintiff to amend her pleadings. Finally, the court, declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction, did not have jurisdiction to hear the Department's appeal. View "Hager v. Arkansas Dept. of Health, et al." on Justia Law

Five City employees were disciplined by the City for accessing pornography on their government computers. The local newspaper requested access to documents detailing the investigation of the misconduct and the employees' punishment. The City disclosed some documents, refused to release the disciplinary corrective action forms, and redacted all information that could be used to identify the disciplined employees or uninvolved third parties. The newspaper filed a petition for declaratory relief and writ of mandamus. The district court ordered that the City release copies of the investigative documents and disciplinary forms without redactions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by ordering that identifying information for the five City employees be released to the newspaper, as the employees' reasonable expectation of privacy in their identities with regards to internal disciplinary proceedings clearly outweighed the limited merits of public disclosure. View "Billings Gazette v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PSEG alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and other statutes. The court concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the first special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" - where the jury-instruction definitions of "disability" and "qualified individual" properly conformed to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in submitting the third special verdict question - "Was a Plaintiff a qualified individual with a disability?" Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in either jury interrogatory, there was no need to consider whether an error required reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Neely v. PSEG Texas LP, et al." on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

George Roberts said IBM fired him because of his age. He argued an instant message exchange between two of the company’s human resources managers referencing his "shelf life" played a direct role in his eventual discharge. The Tenth Circuit concluded that after its review of the evidence presented at trial, the term "shelf life" had nothing to do with Roberts’s age and everything to do with his workload. "Once its euphemisms and acronyms are translated into English, the instant message conversation unmistakably suggests that 'shelf life' was nothing worse than an inartful reference to Mr. Roberts’s queue of billable work. And that is more than enough to preclude it from amounting to direct evidence of discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act." View "Roberts v. IBM" on Justia Law