Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff's whistleblower complaint did not qualify as a "mixed case" complaint capable of triggering the savings clause under 5 U.S.C. 7702(f). Plaintiff argued that even though he presented his Title VII claim in the wrong forum (the MSPB), because he did so along with a timely filed IRA as part of a "mixed case," his formal EEO complaint should be deemed timely with the correct forum (the DOL) under section 7702(f)'s savings clause. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff's formal Title VII claim - filed well after the expiration of the EEO route's 15-day deadline - was untimely where the savings clause excused errors only in the place, not time, of filing. View "Schlottman v. Perez" on Justia Law

Gaines questioned the roadworthiness of two different trucks that his employer of five years (K-Five) assigned him. Management took steps to address his concerns, but the trucks never reached the level of safety sought by Gaines. On his last Friday with the company, he informally discussed an alleged steering problem with a K-Five mechanic. He later misreported what the mechanic said. Gaines claims that he honestly believed he was accurately relaying the information but that he botched the details. Citing the false report and instances of alleged insubordination, K-Five fired Gaines. Gaines claimed that he was fired due to his national origin or because he complained about safety issues and that he was owed unpaid overtime. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of K-Five. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded, finding that Gaines presented a triable issue of fact as to whether he was fired for complaining about safety issues. View "Gaines v. K-Five Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

Marcia Eisenhour sued Weber County, three of its county commissioners, and a state judge. According to Eisenhour, the judge sexually harassed her and the County retaliated against her for reporting the harassment. She claimed violations of Utah's Whistleblower Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. Eisenhour challenged that ruling and the district court’s exclusion of her testimony on disciplinary proceedings involving the judge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: (1) the exclusion of Eisenhour's testimony during the disciplinary proceedings involving Judge Storey; and (2) the award of summary judgment on the claims against the County for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, liability under Title VII, and violation of the Whistleblower Act relating to the refusal to rehire her. However, the Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed on: (1) the claim against the County under the Whistleblower Act and the First Amendment claim based on closing of the Justice Court; and (2) the claims against Judge Storey based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. View "Eisenhour v. Weber County, et al" on Justia Law

The City of Greenwood Village, Colorado fired Police Sergeant Patrick Cillo after an incident involving officers under his command. Sgt. Cillo alleged the City's real motive for firing him was opposition to the union chapter he led. Sgt. Cillo and his union sued the City and three individuals. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Sgt. Cillo survived summary judgment as to the first three "Pickering/Connick" factors and that the individual defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cillo, et al v. City of Greenwood Vilage, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former employee of the standing trustee for the Western district of Louisiana (defendant), filed suit against defendant alleging violation of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (LEDL), Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:301-03, 23:323. Defendant removed the suit to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). The district court determined that removal was proper, and that defendant should be granted summary judgment because he did not qualify as an "employer" under the LEDL. The court concluded that defendant acts under officers of the United States and fell within section 1442(a)(1)'s purview, and defendant has averred a colorable federal defense and was entitled to remove this case under the federal officer removal statute. The court held that summary judgment was proper because defendant did not qualify as an employer under the LEDL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bell v. Thornburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Metro, alleging that her supervisor had sexually harassed her in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Metro. The court concluded that the supervisor's alleged conduct was not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment and, therefore, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff presented genuine issues of fact as to whether the supervisor was motivated by sex and whether he intentionally and proximately caused her termination. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this quid pro quo harassment claim. View "McMiller v. Metro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that it retaliated against her for filing a complaint of workplace harassment based upon her sex and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court granted summary judgment to the Department. The court affirmed, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Department's actions - placing her on an unsuitable detail, changing her employment status to probationary, and terminating her employment - were motivated by retaliation. View "Hernandez v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Manitowoc police brought in a man suspected of stabbing a police officer. The suspect apparently refused to eat, and officers believed he was mentally unstable. Police Chief Kingsbury arranged for the suspect’s mother to bring him a home-cooked meal, but the chief’s wishes were not communicated until after officers, including Swetlik, had already taken the suspect to the county jail for booking. Kingsbury called the jail and spoke with Swetlik. Swetlik told other police officers that Kingsbury had told him to lie to the jailers and had threatened him and reported the same to a deputy chief. The police union later took a vote of no confidence in Kingsbury and compiled a list of grievances, including Swetlik’s complaint. A private firm was engaged to investigate and ultimately recommended that both Swetlik and Kingsbury be terminated, concluding, based on a recording of the call, that Swetlik lied about the incident. The city council voted to bring termination charges against both. Swetlik was placed on paid leave until a hearing officer recommended dismissal of the charge. Swetlik was reinstated, but sued, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by bringing charges against him for his complaints about Kingsbury. The district court rejected the claim, finding that Swetlik’s statements were not protected speech because they did not address a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants were justified in bringing the charge based on the investigation.View "Swetlik v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that a corrections officer at the county jail sexually assaulted her. Officers other than the accused moved for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The court concluded that, in determining whether plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation, the district court made two related errors: it applied an incorrect legal standard and it allowed plaintiff to satisfy the standard it applied with conclusory allegations. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff had failed to plead a constitutional violation and that the officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. View "Franklin v. Curry, et al." on Justia Law

In 2008 the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from a woman who claimed Mach Mining had denied her applications for coal mining jobs because of her gender. After investigation, the agency determined there was reasonable cause to believe Mach had discriminated against a class of female job applicants at its Johnston City site and notified the company of its intention to begin informal conciliation. The parties did not reach agreement. In 2011, the EEOC told Mach that further efforts would be futile and filed a complaint two weeks later. Mach asserted failure to conciliate in good faith. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether an alleged failure to conciliate is subject to judicial review in the form of an implied affirmative defense to an EEOC suit. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with other circuits and responded that it is not. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act directs the agency to try to negotiate an end to an employer’s unlawful employment practices before seeking a judicial remedy, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), but finding the requirement to create an implied failure-to-conciliate defense would add an unwarranted mechanism by which employers could avoid liability for unlawful discrimination. Such a defense would be contrary to the statutory prohibition on using what was said and done during conciliation “as evidence in a subsequent proceeding.” View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Mach Mining, LLC" on Justia Law