Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed an action against her former employer, The Children Place (TCP) and the TCP district manager (collectively, Appellees), alleging that she was fired, harassed, and not rehired on the basis of race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied three of Appellant’s discovery-related motions; and (2) the district court did not err by granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to (i) Appellant’s claims of race discrimination where Appellant was unable to rebut Appellees’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for her termination with evidence of pretext and discriminatory motive, and (ii) Appellant’s retaliation claim in light of her failure to establish a prima facie case. View "Pina v. Children's Place" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Altarum, alleging that Altarum discriminated against him by wrongfully discharging him on account of disability and that Altarum failed to accommodate his disability. Plaintiff was terminated after he injured his legs on a subway platform and was on short-term disability benefits. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his wrongful-discharge claim. The court concluded that, under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and its implementing regulations, an impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply because it is temporary. In this instance, the impairment alleged by plaintiff fell comfortably within the amended Acts' expanded definition of disability. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp." on Justia Law

The Aurora School District fired Green from his position as a teacher. His union refused his requests to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and to represent him in a suit under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act. Green sued, won, and was reinstated, then sued, claiming that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c). Green, who is black, claims that the union has represented comparable white employees in grievance proceedings and litigation under the Tenure Act and that the union retaliated against him because he had opposed earlier discrimination. The district judge called Green’s evidence “conclusory;” concluded that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to employees of state or local government, so the union did not have a duty of fair representation; and stated that Illinois law does not require teachers’ unions to represent teachers by filing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement or suits under the Tenure Act. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that neither 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c) nor 2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. View "Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604" on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims. View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven Smothers sued his former employer Solvay Chemical, Inc. for alleged discrimination against him on the basis of his medical disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. He worked eighteen years until Solvay fired him, allegedly because of a safety violation and dispute with a co-worker. Plaintiff maintained the company's true motivation was retaliation for his taking medical leave. The district court granted Solvay summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA and ADA claims and on his state law claim for breach of implied contract. It dismissed the remaining state law claims as moot based on its resolution of plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the FMLA and ADA claims, and affirmed on the state law breach of contract claim. View "Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals Inc." on Justia Law

Deleon, a 53-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for 28 years. Beginning in 1995, he was an “Area Superintendent” and generally received positive reviews. Deleon alleges a pervasive atmosphere of racial insensitivity and derogatory comments. In 2008, a vacancy arose for an “Equipment and Facilities Superintendent,” described as being in a garage with exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes. After an interview, Deleon did not receive the position. His computer skills were insufficient. In 2009, Deleon was involuntarily transferred to the position. Deleon objected, claiming that, in applying for the position, he demanded a raise because of the “hazard posed by diesel fumes and poor ventilation.” He did not receive a raise. Deleon claims that he developed bronchitis, a cough, and sinus headaches, and would blow black soot from his nostrils. Deleon’s first evaluation indicated that his performance was “acceptable in most critical areas but [was] not sufficiently above minimum satisfactory level in all areas.” Days after a fractious meeting with his supervisor, Deleon was hospitalized for five days. He claimed a work-induced mental breakdown and took eight months’ FMLA leave. Deleon’s psychiatrist cleared him to return to work, but the Commission had terminated him. Finding that Deleon did not suffer an “adverse employment action,” the district court dismissed his claims of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence of conditions that would support discrimination claims and that the fact that Deleon applied for the position did not disqualify him from showing that the employment action was “adverse.”View "Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Arkansas state law, alleging various claims against her former employers. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employers on her claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. The court concluded that plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action and that she received different treatment because of her sex; considering the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff failed to establish that an incident related to a workplace disagreement permeated the workplace and thus had not established a prima facie case of hostile work environment; plaintiff failed to establish a case of constructive discharge where, inter alia, the record reflected that the employers sought to retain her as an employee; and plaintiff failed to establish a case of retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employers on plaintiff's claims. View "Rester v. Media, et al." on Justia Law

Alexander and Rogers, African‐American women who formerly worked as cocktail waitresses for Casino Queen, claimed race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Their allegations were based on reassignments to less-lucrative floor areas; discipline with respect to absences, tardies, breaks, and eating at work; and requests for days off. The district court granted Casino Queen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the hostile work environment claim, but reversed as to the race discrimination and retaliation claims. The plaintiffs presented adequate evidence that the floor assignments constituted an adverse employment action. View "Alexander v. Casino Queen Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner was hired as a production supervisor for Holcim Inc.’s cement manufacturing plant. In 2008, Petitioner was diagnosed with angina. After Petitioner left Holcim, Petitioner filed a claim under the Montana Human Rights Acts for discrimination. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry dismissed Petitioner’s complaint, concluding that Holcim did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of disability. The Montana Human Rights Commission upheld the dismissal, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the hearing officer’s determination that Petitioner did not prove that he belonged to a protected class, as Petitioner failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. View "Estate of Welch v. Holcim, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging, inter alia, unlawful discrimination and hostile work environment. The court concluded, inter alia, that the jury was precluded from finding that plaintiff had not actually engaged in the conduct charged against him in the section 75 of the New York State Civil Service Law hearing. Inasmuch as the district court did not expressly instruct the jury that its fact-findings were cabined in this regard, the jury charge was in error. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court with respect to the state law claims and its award of backpay to plaintiff; affirmed the judgment as to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the ECWA and the concomitant award of punitive damages against the ECWA; reversed the judgment imposing liability against the individual defendants on plaintiff's section 1983 claims against them, and therefore also reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages against the individual defendants; and affirmed the district court's attorney's fee award. View "Matusick v. Erie Cnty Water Auth., et al." on Justia Law