Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer alleging the employer violated both federal law and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA) in terminating her employment. Specifically, she alleged her employer discriminated against her on the basis of her age and gender. Anticipating employer's defense that section 1350 of the OADA limited damages for discrimination claims, plaintiff alleged the damage limitations in the OADA were unconstitutional under Oklahoma's prohibition against special laws. Citing the lack of Oklahoma precedent on this issue, the district court certified the question of whether the damage provisions in section 1350 of the OADA are unconstitutional under Article V, sections 46 and 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the high court held that the damage provisions in section 1350 were not unconstitutional. View "MacDonald v. Corporate Integris Health" on Justia Law

Camille Kramer sued her former employer the Wasatch County Sheriff’s Department for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Wasatch County on all claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to the 1983 claim but reversed on the Title VII claim. View "Kramer v. Wasatch Co. Sheriff's Office, et al" on Justia Law

Chaib, born in France in 1957, married an American, immigrated, and became a citizen in 1991. In 2008, Chaib began work at a maximum security prison. During her probationary period, Chaib alleged, training officer Van Dine made sexually offensive remarks. Van Dine admitted to making remarks to another co-worker while Chaib was present, but denied making comments to her. Chaib completed her probation and was granted permanent status. Van Dine claims Chaib was regularly sent back to him for retraining because she had trouble with supervisors. After Van Dine yelled at Chaib to do her job and pointed his finger in her face, Chaib filed an internal personnel complaint. Human resources found no evidence of harassment, but noted evidence that both had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. Both received reprimands. Van Dine ceased all harassing behavior. During two-and-a-half years of employment, Chaib had several encounters with other coworkers that she identified as discriminatory. Her evaluations were not satisfactory. Chaib complained to the EEOC, which resulted in a conclusion that her “appraisal was properly administered” and that its result was proper. Chaib was subsequently denied a transfer and, after an incident involving an inmate, requested time off based on stress, anxiety, and depression. While on FMLA leave, Chaib resigned, filed a second EEOC complaint, and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, reasserting previous complaints and alleging retaliation. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Chaib v. Indiana" on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff applied unsuccessfully to be a firefighter in the Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“the Corps”) Plaintiff sued the Commonwealth, claiming that the Corps refused to hire her because of her gender. The parties eventually signed a settlement agreement pursuant to which the Corps agreed to employ Plaintiff as a transitory firefighter until the next training academy was held and to hire Plaintiff as a firefighter if she graduated from the academy. Thereafter, Plaintiff again sued the Corps, alleging that, during her transitory employment, the Corps subjected her to abuse in retaliation for her earlier suit. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claim for unlawful retaliation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a plausible claim of unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Remanded. View "Rodriguez-Vives v. P.R. Firefighters Corps" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nurse formerly employed by the Department of Health and Human Services, filed an action against Defendant, a supervisor who terminated her employment, alleging violations of her due process, free speech, and equal protection rights, among other claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that, as a state employee, she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege a viable violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on that claim; and (2) because Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment claim necessitated resolving a fact-related dispute, Defendant’s appeal on this issue was not immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, and the appeal must be dismissed at to this issue. View "Carney v. Miller" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an employment discrimination suit filed by appellant against the Navy. The Navy subsequently offered a stipulation of Settlement (the "Agreement"). After concluding that specific performance of the Agreement was no longer practicable, appellant sought nearly a million dollars in damages and attorney's fees. The court held that a settlement agreement embodied in a consent decree was a contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing the motion to enforce and remanded with instructions to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. View "Franklin-Mason v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Andrews, a white woman, started working at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in 1999. In 2002 she filed a discrimination claim, which settled. Stewart, a black man, then an associate manager, told Andrews that if he became manager, he would fire her. After Stewart became general manager in 2006, he said he was going to make the restaurant the first all-black Cracker Barrel. He also made daily comments about Andrews’s age, calling her “old woman” and “grandma.” Andrews complained to an associate manager and attempted to complain to the district manager, but the person responsible for scheduling an appointment never did so. In 2007 Andrews complained to an Employee Relations Specialist, who determined that no action needed to be taken. Eventually Andrews asked Stewart to initiate her transfer to another restaurant. She claims he told her that the transfer went through, but he denies doing so. She never made contact with the other restaurant and, after three weeks during which she did not work, the company’s system listed her as having quit. In the meantime, Stewart was fired for violating an asset-protection policy. The district court rejected claims that Stewart fired Andrews because of her sex, age, and race and that he retaliated for her prior Title VII suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Andrews did not suffer an adverse employment action, but quit in anticipation of a transfer that never occurred. View "Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer and supervisors, alleging that he suffered discriminatory conduct while employed as a car salesman. Plaintiff asserted claims for state harassment and retaliation, federal harassment and retaliation, unlawful termination as against public policy, and breach of his employment contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and one of Defendant’s supervisors on the state harassment and retaliation claims and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the federal harassment and retaliation claims and the public policy claim, and (2) otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the ICA’s judgment on the state harassment and retaliation claims with respect to Plaintiff’s supervisor, holding that individual employees are not liable as employers under Haw. Rev. Stat. 378-2(1)(A) and 378-2(2); and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co." on Justia Law