Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CRI, claiming discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.10. Congress made significant changes to the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The court concluded that, in light of these recent amendments to the ADA, plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence on his ADA and FCRA disability claims to make out a prima facie case; the district court erroneously applied the prima facie standard created for reduction-in-force cases to plaintiff's age discrimination claims; and, therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRI, remanding for further proceedings. View "Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, UTHSC, on her sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to include a specific sex discrimination claim on her EEOC intake sheet and consequently did not exhaust her administrative remedies on that claim; plaintiff's subsequent claim regarding sex discrimination not based upon harassment fell outside the scope of the EEOC investigation and could not reasonably be expected to grow out of her initial charge of sexual harassment; the incidents described by plaintiff were insufficient to demonstrate pervasive hostility toward her as a matter of law, and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment for UTHSC on plaintiff's sexual harassment claim; and a jury could reasonably conclude that UTHSC's reasons for not renewing plaintiff's contract was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hague v. UT Health and Science Center" on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit alleging that an employee retirement benefit plan maintained by the County discriminated against employees in the protected age group of 40 years of age and older, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, by requiring them to pay high contribution rates than those paid by younger employees. In this interlocutory appeal, the court held that the district court correctly determined that the County's plan violated the ADEA, because the plan's employee contribution rates were determined by age, rather than by a permissible factor. The court also concluded that the ADEA's "safe harbor provision" applicable to early retirement benefit plans did not shield the County from liability for the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment on the issue of liability and remanded for consideration of damages. View "EEOC v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a charge of gender discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the Municipality of Carolina discriminated against her because of her gender by refusing to hire her as a firefighter. The EEOC concluded that Carolina had discriminated against Plaintiff in its hiring process. Carolina subsequently hired Plaintiff as a firefighter. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued the Municipality and Mayor of Carolina, asserting claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as pendent state law claims, based on Defendants’ pre- and post-hire conduct. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her right to the review of her claims against the Mayor and her post-hire discrimination claims; and (2) the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s pre-hire discrimination claims and post-hire retaliation claims against Carolina, as the claims asserted met the plausibility standard. View "Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant, New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), where he was eventually promoted to health facilities planner. In 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, an occupational lung disease. In 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, among other claims, that HHC had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the City Human Rights Law (City HRL). Supreme Court granted summary judgment for HHC, concluding that Plaintiff could not, even with a reasonable accommodation, perform the essential functions of his job. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that HHC was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s State HRL and City HRL claims, as (1) both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee’s request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasibility of that accommodation; and (2) under the facts of this case, Plaintiff presented colorable claims of disability discrimination under the City HRL and State HRL. View "Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after she was terminated by the law school of Hamline University. Plaintiff alleged that the university, the dean, and the president of the St. Paul Police Federation (SPPF) conspired with the St. Paul Police Department to deny her constitutional right to freedom of speech. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts that a police officer was acting under color of state law; plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts about the University or the Dean to demonstrate that they participated in a concerted action to terminate plaintiff; concerning leave to amend, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a meeting of the minds between the Department, the SPPF, and the University; and the district court properly ruled that adding the SPPF would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx on his disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq. When plaintiff failed his Department of Transportation (DOT) medical examination due to his diabetes, FedEx withdrew plaintiff's job offer since he did not qualify for a Technician position. FedEx claimed that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) required it to do so. Plaintiff argued that by imposing a requirement that he must obtain a DOT medical card even though he would be a mechanic and not a commercial truck driver, FedEx violated the ADA and the FCRA, which prohibited an employer from using qualification standards that screen out people with disabilities. The court concluded that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether test-driving FedEx trucks was an essential function of the Technician position. The court also concluded that, the occasional test-driving of empty FedEx trucks in the Fort Myers area did not constitute transporting property or passengers in interstate commerce. Therefore, the FMCRs did not oblige FedEx to require plaintiff to obtain DOT medical certification to be "qualified" for the Technician position. The FMCRs did not afford FedEx a defense to plaintiff's disability discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Samson v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court concluded on remand that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on any ground. Determining that the court had jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant's decisions were motivated by racial animus; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendant made stigmatizing comments about Plaintiff Jones that deprived Jones of his liberty interest to earn a living in his profession as a substance abuse counselor; and, therefore, the court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on the sections 1981 and 1983 claims. The court reversed the judgment of the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Jones, et al. v. McNeese" on Justia Law

Bass worked as a custodian. In 2002, she was assigned to work at a single-story elementary school. In 2003 a second story was added. A male was responsible for cleaning the second floor. In 2008–09, the District commissioned a study of custodial duties at 11 schools, which revealed that second floor took tasks more time than one shift permitted, while the first floor could be finished in less than one shift. While Bass was on leave, the District had the substitute custodian try a new arrangement. She was able to finish during her shift. The District reassigned second‐floor restrooms to Bass. The study also resulted in seven male custodians being assigned additional duties. Bass then had two suspensions without pay. She did not contest the suspensions; she had failed to complete her duties. Her work improved significantly. Before 2010, Bass had taken two leaves that exceeded the leave to which she was entitled under the collective bargaining agreement. Bass injured her back in August 2010 and again took leave. The District told Bass that she would have no more available leave as of November 3, and would be fired if she failed to return to work. Bass returned to work on November 4. She injured her back again 12 days later and was out for 2.5 days. The District issued a reprimand. On January 3, Bass again did not report to work. She provided a doctor’s note, but exceeded available leave time. When asked when she would be able to return without restrictions, Bass did not reply. She was fired on February 2, for job abandonment. Three male custodians lost their jobs between 2008 and 2011 on the same ground. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on her sex discrimination claims. The district court dismissed her sit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims against the Bank under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., as well as state and local laws. At issue was whether an employee's inability to sit for a prolonged time may constitute a disability under the ADA. The court held that impairments that limit the ability to sit for long periods of time do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the ADA. The court vacated the district court's judgment relating to plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA and leave for the district court to determine in the first instance on remand if the record reflected a genuine dispute of fact as to whether plaintiff's inability to sit for a prolonged period of time constituted a substantial limitation of a major life activity, and to address remaining arguments advanced by the Bank in its summary judgment motion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., as well as her claim of retaliation under the ADA. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA and her claims under state law, remanding for further proceedings. View "Parada v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A." on Justia Law