Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for the City of Alexandria from 2008 until 2011, when the City terminated his employment. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the City unlawfully retaliated and discriminated against him by terminating his employment in response to complaints he made about a director of the department in which Plaintiff worked. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $104,096 in back pay. The circuit court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to include liquidated damages to the back pay award, which doubled the award. Plaintiff then filed a motion for additional relief, including reinstatement or, in the alternative, an award of front-pay, and an award for his loss of pension benefits. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of an award of reinstatement, front pay, or pension compensation, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff was made whole through his other awards against the City and that Plaintiff’s claim for pension compensation was “subject to too much speculation.” View "Lewis v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant, her former employer, alleging that Defendant took adverse employment actions against her after she revealed that she was pregnant. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit for failure to state a cause of action. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Florida law does not prohibit pregnancy discrimination in employment practices. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal’s decision and remanded with directions that the trial court reinstate Plaintiff’s complaint, holding that the provision in the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate based on an individual’s sex includes discrimination based on pregnancy, which is “a natural condition and primary characteristic unique to the female sex.” View "Delva v. Continental Group, Inc. " on Justia Law

In 2011, the then-Governor of Puerto Rico appointed Plaintiff to the position of Advocate for Persons with Disabilities. In 2013, new legislation established an Office of the Ombudsman for Personal with Disabilities. Plaintiff was subsequently informed that an Ombudsman had been appointed and that his position had been abolished by legislative act. Plaintiff sued the Governor and other officials for attempting to oust him from his job as Advocate, claiming that it was unconstitutional for Puerto Rico to abolish the Advocate position without an individualized hearing. The district court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, concluding that the court erred in finding that Plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where there was no viable claim that the abolition of the Advocate Office independently violated some constitutional proscription. View "Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Board employee, filed suit claiming that her supervisors engendered a hostile work environment, discriminating against her on the basis of her race and sex. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Board, concluding that, while the supervisors' actions may have been unprofessional, uncivil, and somewhat boorish, they did not constitute an adequate factual basis for the Title VII claims presented here. View "Brooks v. Grundmann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment with Employer was terminated due to what Plaintiff alleged was disability discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint against Employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) but did not file a civil action against Employer within ninety days after he received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff filed a new administrative charge against Employer two months after the first right-to-sue letter issued adding a second charge for retaliation. Less than a month after the transmittal of the second right-to-sue letter, Plaintiff sued Employer and other defendants in federal district court for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed both federal claims on the grounds that they were time barred, as (1) the discrimination claim was not brought within ninety days of Plaintiff’s receipt of the first right-to-sue letter, and (2) the retaliation claim had been filed too late with the EEOC. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing both charges due to Plaintiff’s failure to meet applicable time limits. View "Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Health Plans of P.R." on Justia Law

Aurora hired Gosey as a chef’s assistant in 2008. In September 2009 she applied for an open position as food-services manager at the hospital. The job posting stated a preference for someone with “five to seven years of progressively responsible experience in managing a food service operation,” including experience in managing “staff, budgets and multiple human resources functions.” There were more than 150 applicants. Aurora interviewed Gosey, but ultimately hired a white woman. Gosey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, alleging that she had been denied the promotion, was assigned extra duties, and disciplined for sham infractions because of her race. She accused Aurora’s managers of trying to manufacture an excuse to fire her by altering her attendance records. Two months later, Aurora fired her. Gosey sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The district court granted Aurora summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to claims of harassment and failure to promote, but concluded that further proceedings are necessary on claims that Aurora fired Gosey because of race and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.View "Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Some of Kaplan’s students obtain financial aid through the U.S. Department of Education. Some Kaplan employees have access to those students’ financial information. About 10 years ago, Kaplan discovered that some financial-aid officers had stolen students’ payments and that some of its executives had engaged in self-dealing, using relatives as vendors. Kaplan implemented measures to prevent abuses, including credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions and positions with access to company financials, cash, or access to student financial-aid information. Reports include whether: an applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy, is delinquent on child-support, has any garnishments, has outstanding judgments exceeding $2,000, or has a social-security number inconsistent with what the credit bureau has on file. The report does not note the applicant’s race. When the EEOC sued Kaplan, alleging disparate impact on African-Americans, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (k), EEOC relied on statistical data compiled by Murphy, who holds a doctorate in industrial and organizational psychology. The district court excluded Murphy’s testimony as unreliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the EEOC uses the same criteria for hiring. EEOC presented no evidence that Murphy’s methodology, which involved Murphy looking at copies of drivers’ licenses to determine race, satisfied any of the factors that courts consider in determining reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Murphy himself admitted his sample was not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Cleco, alleging race discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cleco. Plaintiff claimed that he was issued a Disciplinary Warning in retaliation for his reporting of a coworker's racially hostile statements. Cleco asserted that the warning was issued because plaintiff sent a mass email disclosing that his coworker's son overdosed on pills. The court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the Disciplinary Warning where plaintiff had demonstrated that there was a genuine dispute of material fact that Cleco's stated reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim arising from the Disciplinary Warning and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the remaining retaliation and discrimination claims. View "Willis v. Cleco Corp." on Justia Law

Since 1994, Harper has served as Fulton County Treasurer, an elected position with a four-year term. The 21-member County Board sets salaries for elected officials. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and County Clerk were paid the same salary. When Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his retirement, the board increased his salary in order to allow him to receive greater retirement benefits. From 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were paid the same salary from 2007–2010. In the meantime, disputes between Harper and the Board apparently prompted the Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the County Treasurer’s salary in 2010. The Board adopted the recommendation, 10–8, but voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk annual pay raises. Harper filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging sex discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harper failed to show that the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her reports were merely excuses covering sex discrimination. View "Harper v. Fulton Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law