Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the city, alleging claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701; and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code 16-123-107. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job for which he interviewed and that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support an inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the FMLA retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's ACRA disability-discrimination claim where plaintiff introduced no evidence to demonstrate that the city knew about his conditions when he sought to be rehired; affirmed the district court's vacatur of the jury's award for emotional-distress where the ACRA claim submitted to the jury did not provide a basis for the jury's award of emotional-distress damages; and reversed the denial of liquidated damages because the city cited no evidence in support of the district court's finding that it acted in good faith in refusing to rehire plaintiff and the court could find none. View "Jackson v. City of Hot Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were former officers and a former cadet of the Boston Police Department (Department) who were fired after testing positive for cocaine, a current officer who tested positive and underwent rehabilitation as an alternative to termination, and a former applicant whose contingent job offer was revoked after a positive test. Each Plaintiff was black. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Department, alleging, inter alia, that the Department’s drug testing program, which used hair samples to test for illegal drug use, caused a disparate impact on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim and reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether they had proved a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, holding that Plaintiffs proved beyond reasonable dispute a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Unified School District 500 (USD 500) considered a recommendation to terminate plaintiff-appellant Charles Davis' employment when he was found lying naked on his stomach, sunbathing on the roof of the elementary school where he worked. Plaintiff had worked in the district as a custodian since 1991. Instead, the Board decided upon a suspension without pay for thirty days and demoted him from his position as head custodian. From 2008 to 2012, Davis applied for head custodian positions at seven different schools within USD 500, but was not hired for any of them. In 2008, 2010, and 2011, he filed claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial discrimination and later both discrimination and retaliation for filing EEOC claims. In 2012, plaintiff sued USD 500 and Stephen Vaughn, the Director of Human Resources for the district, claiming: (1) retaliation by Vaughn in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) retaliation by USD 500 in violation of Title VII and section 1981; and (3) delayed payment of overtime compensation by USD 500 in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of USD 500 and Vaughn. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, refusing to make the inference, as plaintiff suggested, that based on the numerous denials he received, there was a common purpose to retaliate against him. View "Davis v. Unified School District 500, et al" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hnin, from the country of Myanmar, began working at TOA’s metal stamping plant. All TOA associates, including Hnin, receive a handbook with a statement that TOA normally employs progressive discipline and attempts to provide notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to improve, but that some infractions warrant probation or dismissal without prior warning, including violations of TOA’s sexual harassment policy. In 2010, Brock began working at TOA, about 22 feet from Hnin’s work station. A month later Brock reported that Hnin had been harassing her for some time, that she had asked Hnin to stop several times, and that the harassment involved a co-worker, Miller. Hnin made body gestures and kissing noises, suggesting that Miller and Brock were together. Brock also stated that Hnin instructed co-workers to slow down so they could work more overtime and acted in an intimidating manner. She identified several witnesses. During an explanation of the investigation, Hnin became aggravated and spoke in an elevated tone. He denied any wrongdoing and asked that the witnesses be brought in so he could confront them. He was told that this request was not in line with TOA’s procedures. TOA terminated his employment. Hnin filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and state law. The district court granted TOA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting national origin discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. View "Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC" on Justia Law

After losing her job as an appraiser for St. Joseph County, Trayling filed a grievance with her union and a discrimination charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Department. The union refused to pursue the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement’s election-of-remedies clause prohibits use of the internal grievance process and an external process simultaneously. Trayling sued the county for age and disability discrimination, and sued the union and the county for implementing an allegedly unlawful election-of-remedies rule. The district court held that the election-of-remedies rule violated federal law. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not amount to a final decision; it did not even fully resolve the election-of-remedies claim (damages remain undecided), much less the whole case. An exception to the finality requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), does not apply because the order did not involve an injunction. View "Trayling v. St. Joseph Cnty. Emp'rs Chapter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fifty-five years old when he was hired to work as an assistant manager at Walgreens. In 2011, Walgreens terminated Plaintiff’s employment after Plaintiff failed to provide what Walgreens considered to be adequate customer service. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that his employment was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1B). The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff (1) did not raise any genuine issue as to whether Walgreens believed the truth of its stated reason for terminating him; (2) did not demonstrate pretext through a showing that Walgreens violated its policy to uniformly enforce the rules; and (3) did not demonstrate that Walgreens’ proffered reason for terminating him was pretext designed to disguise age discrimination. View "Adamson v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Dal-Tile, alleging claims of racial and sexual hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and common law obstruction of justice. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dal-Tile. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims and remanded for further consideration because a reasonable fact-finder could find that there was an objectively hostile work environment based on both race and sex and that Dal-Tile knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to adequately respond. The court affirmed, however, the grant of summary judgment on the claims of constructive discharge and common law obstruction of justice. View "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp." on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Banks sued her former employer, the Board of Education, and her former supervisor, Gonzales, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and related violations of federal and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims; 29 after the district court entered judgment, Banks filed “a motion to alter the entry of summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),” which the district court denied six days later. Banks then filed a notice of appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Because Banks missed that deadline, her motion was not effective as a Rule 59(e) motion that could have tolled the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment. Treating her post‐judgment motion as a Rule 60(b) motion that did not toll the time to appeal the summary judgment, her notice of appeal was timely only as to the district court’s denial of her post‐judgment motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying that motion. View " Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Pierson, a Plant Facilities Manager at QG with 39 years of experience in printing and seven years with QG, was terminated after the CEO announced a comprehensive company-wide cost-cutting initiative. Pierson, then 62 years old, had never received a negative performance evaluation and was never disciplined, reprimanded, or warned about performance deficiencies. After he was fired, his job duties were assumed by a 47-year-old employee engaged in energy-procurement and capital projects management functions at another facility. The district court entered summary judgment for QG. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the record established a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Pierson’s position was eliminated or whether he was simply replaced by a younger individual. View "Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp." on Justia Law