Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Elaine Dees sued Guyoungtech USA, Inc., alleging retaliatory discharge. A jury awarded Dees $1 million in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied Guyoungtech's post-trial motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") or, alternatively, for a new trial but remitted the awards to $300,000 in compensatory damages and $900,000 in punitive damages, which Dees accepted. Guyoungtech appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Guyoungtech is entitled to a new trial, it did not address the denial of its motion for a JML. View "Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees " on Justia Law

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an electrician position at Navistar’s plant. Navistar hired 16 electricians while Whitfield’s application was pending. The written job description required that an applicant have either eight years of experience or a journeyman card. Whitfield allegedly had nine years of experience, with four years in the U.S. Navy. A foreman interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required experience. The Union was allegedly unable to verify his experience through numerous employers, but did not consider Whitfield’s experience in the Navy. Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to provide additional references. In 1998, Whitfield obtained an IBEW card, so there was no doubt that he met the requirements. The Union cleared him for hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to the foreman, who opened his folder and saw that the word “black” written on the cover sheet. While the resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired five white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in 1999 the foreman told him that Navistar would not allow him to hire Whitfield. At trial Navistar asserted errors in his resume and lack of PLC experience, an allegedly unstated qualification. In 2001 Whitfield and 26 others sued Navistar under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court certified the other plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the case for discovery, but separated his claim for trial. The hostile work environment action settled during trial. During joint discovery there was extensive evidence showing extreme racial hostility at the plant. At Whitfield’s 2012 trial, the court rejected his submission regarding evidence from the class trial and concluded that his evidence was insufficient to prove discrimination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting an updated EEOC chart as clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired. View "Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002, Freeze was hired by the Decherd Police Department. He became Chief of Police in 2007. Colvin, Freeze’s brother-in-law, was hired as a patrolman in 2007. The Board of Aldermen is responsible for hiring and firing. During a February 2009 meeting, the Aldermen told Freeze that they “might need to just let [him] resign as the Chief and put [him] in as a sergeant at $15 an hour.” Freeze stated that “if it’s going to keep my job, yes, I will take a demotion.” After several confrontations during a March meeting, the Board terminated the employment of Colvin and Freeze. The city did not provide notice that terminations would be considered at the meeting, but claims that it provided oral notice that “general job performance may be discussed.” Neither officer was allowed to present witnesses or evidence. The separation notice regarding Freeze reads: “No reason given.” The city’s 1999 Personnel Resolution designates every city worker as an at-will employee with no property right in employment, but a 2000 Police Resolution states that “discipline shall be for cause and shall follow the basic concepts of due process.” The district court dismissed, finding that the officers possessed no property interest in continued employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the unequivocal language of the Police Resolution. View "Freeze v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that the termination of his employment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff introduced evidence of two statements made by the person who effected his termination, both of which were indicative of a discriminatory motive. The court reversed and remanded because those statements, if proven to have been made, would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that age-based discrimination led to plaintiff's termination. View "Wilson v. Cox, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Grace Hwang signed a written one-year contract to teach classes over three academic terms at Kansas State University. But before the fall term began, plaintiff received news that she had cancer and needed treatment. She sought and the University gave her a six-month (paid) leave of absence. As that period drew to a close and the spring term approached plaintiff's doctor advised her to seek more time off. She asked the University to extend her leave through the end of spring semester, promising to return in time for the summer term. But according to plaintiff's complaint, the University refused, explaining that it had an inflexible policy allowing no more than six months' sick leave. The University did arrange for long-term disability benefits, but plaintiff alleged it effectively terminated her employment. In response, she filed suit contending that by denying her more than six months' sick leave the University violated the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed her complaint. Subsequently, plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit. "When it comes to satisfying her elemental obligations, Ms. Hwang's complaint fails early on. . . . there’s also no question she wasn’t able to perform the essential functions of her job even with a reasonable accommodation. . . .It perhaps goes without saying that an employee who isn't capable of working for so long isn't an employee capable of performing a job's essential functions - and that requiring an employer to keep a job open for so long doesn't qualify as a reasonable accommodation. After all, reasonable accommodations . . . are all about enabling employees to work, not to not work." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Hwang v. Kansas State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Verizon, alleging that Verizon discharged her in retaliation for complaining of discrimination and harassment pursuant to Texas law. Verizon moved to federal court based on diversity. The court held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is only a condition precedent. When the court considered the appeal on the merits, the court found no merit based on the absence of causation between plaintiff's complaints and her discharge; the decisionmaker had no knowledge of the alleged protected activity claimed by plaintiff; and although the Verizon executive terminating her had no knowledge of her complaint, she did not have knowledge of a complex commission-generating scheme in which plaintiff was implicated and from which she profited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants. View "Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Texas, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Averhart, formerly a guard at the Cook County Jail, was suspended without pay in 2001 and fired in 2003. She had filed an EEOC charge of discrimination in 2000 and was investigated for smuggling drugs and contraband to prisoners. She had been arrested for shoplifting. She claimed retaliation for her corroboration of a coworker’s claims of sexual harassment and filed her first of four federal lawsuits in 2001. She has lost them all, along with two state suits. The district court dismissed the fourth suit as barred by the earlier decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit frivolous. The court noted that she was never an employee of the Merit Board, which approved her firing; that a claim against the Sheriff’s Department was filed almost a decade beyond the statute of limitations; and that new theories of race and sex discrimination do not avoid preclusion, which requires all legal theories that concern the same events to be brought in a single suit. The court gave Averhart 14 days to show cause why it should not impose sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, possibly including a financial penalty and an order revoking her privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. View "Averhart v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was discharged by the Department of Corrections, he filed suit against the District and two officials, alleging violations of his rights under the District's whistleblower statute, D.C. Code 1-615.53, and of his liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the claims under the whistleblower act where plaintiff was terminated for the misconduct that occurred in March 2005, not January 2006, where he struck a handcuffed inmate. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the Fifth Amendment claim where any deprivation of liberty by stigmatizing was not without due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McCormick, Jr. v. D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, G4S, on his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Count I of the complaint alleged that G4S discriminated against plaintiff based on his national origin and Count III alleged that G4S discriminated against him because of his race. Counts II and IV alleged that G4S terminated plaintiff's employment because he filed a complaint of discrimination with its Human Resources department. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on Counts II and IV but vacated its judgment on Counts I and III. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether Counts I and III presented claims sufficient to withstand summary judgment where the district court should bear in mind that those counts asserted the "status-based" category of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Barthelus v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against his former employer, DDR Corp., after his employment was terminated. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that DDR discriminated against him on the basis of sex by terminating him after his co-worker, whose sexual advances he refused, maligned his job performance. The district court granted summary judgment to DDR. The First Circuit (1) vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on his sex discrimination claim, holding (i) a reasonable jury could find that the jilted co-worker’s discriminatory efforts were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s termination, and (ii) although the co-worker was not Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, DDR could nonetheless be found liable for negligently allowing the co-worker’s discriminatory acts to cause Plaintiff’s firing; and (2) otherwise affirmed the judgment of the district court. Remanded. View "Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty" on Justia Law