Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, fourteen African-Americans, brought a class action suit against the State, including thirty-seven different executive branch departments, under the Federal Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the State unlawfully discriminates against African Americans in employment. The district court entered judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of establishing that the underlying documents did not provide sufficient information to allow employment practices to be separated for meaningful statistical analysis, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to summary judgment under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.View "Pippen v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, CSG, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging claims of gender discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that, assuming without deciding, that plaintiff established a prima facie case of gender discrimination, CSG offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for terminating her employment where CSG identified substantial performance-related problems; plaintiff failed to prove there was pretext for the gender discrimination; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. Likewise, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that CSG's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was pretextual. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim as well. View "Fiero v. CSG Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Jewel Foods employed Reeves as a bagger from 1997 until his dismissal in 2005. Reeves has Down syndrome and received vocational tutoring from Jewel; a social service agency sent a job coach to work with Reeves. Jewel’s Service Manager provided individual training. Jewel instituted supervision policies that applied only to Reeves. Reeves, unlike the other baggers, was exempted from collecting shopping carts from the parking lot after he was found directing customers how to park their cars. Reeves sometimes had trouble complying with workplace rules. He cursed at a manager when the table at which he usually ate lunch was used for a tasting; he once cursed within earshot of a customer about another customer. In 2005, Reeves took an American flag pin from a store shelf without paying for it, apparently not realizing the pins were for sale. Despite its usual policy, Jewel decided not to fire him. Reeves’s parents asked if Jewel could bring back a job coach. Reeves’s supervisor deemed the extra instruction unnecessary. Reeves was later terminated for cursing at another employee within earshot of a customer and other employees. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe both that Jewel discriminated against Reeves because of his disability and that Jewel engaged in a pattern and practice of denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. The district court dismissed his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, failure‐to‐accommodate claim, citing numerous accommodations Jewel had made and the fact that Jewel did not explicitly reject the Reeves’s job coach suggestion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his employer, the U.S. Army, alleging that his direct supervisor harassed and discriminated against him on account of his disability. The Army dismissed the complaint as untimely, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the district court, asserting discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. The district court construed these claims as claims brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The district court found that Plaintiff’s administrative complaint was untimely filed and ordered that Plaintiff’s claimed be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and did not qualify for equitable tolling. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, holding that the district court correctly found that Plaintiff’s administrative filing was untimely and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s request for equitable tolling on the insufficiently supported basis of mental illness. View "Vazquez-Rivera v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that he was terminated from his position as a special education teacher because of an email he sent to the chancellor, which contained one sentence that constituted speech protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff was using the email as an internal channel through which he could, in his capacity as a teacher, report interference with his job responsibilities. Therefore, under Winder v. Erste, plaintiff's email constituted employee speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Further, it was not unreasonable for defendants to believe that it was not unlawful to fire plaintiff based on preexisting law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's First Amendment claim. View "Mpoy v. Rhee, et al." on Justia Law

Lisa Knitter worked as a "handyman" for Lewis General Contracting, Inc. (LGC) from March to October 2010. During this time, LGC's sole client was Picerne Military Housing, LLC (Picerne), now known as Corvias Military Living, LLC. Knitter performed handyman services exclusively on Picerne properties. She sued Picerne under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging: (1) she was paid lower wages than her male counterparts; (2) Picerne effectively fired her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment and wage discrimination; and (3) after she was fired, Picerne denied her application for vendor status in retaliation for her prior complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Picerne, dismissing Knitter's Title VII action because Picerne was not her employer. The district court also dismissed her claim for retaliatory denial of vendor status because Knitter did not apply for employment with Picerne when she applied to be a vendor. Knitter appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Knitter v. Picerne Military Housing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DPS under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against DPS. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim regarding plaintiff's Casino Unit transfer and the jury's verdict in favor of DPS as to the Title VII retaliation claim; vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment of the Title VII race discrimination claims where, balancing the McDonnell Douglas factors, the court concluded that it was simply too close to call and should be a question for a jury; vacated the corresponding race discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abrams v. Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Tank, who was born in India, worked for T-Mobile as a vice president. After two investigations relating to his treatment of colleagues, he was fired. Tank filed suit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and disparate pay. The district court entered summary judgment for T-Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the circumstantial evidence Tank provided, no reasonable jury could conclude that T-Mobile fired Tank because of his national origin or race or that the human resources director harbored discriminatory animus or was deliberately indifferent to Tank’s claim. The employees to whom Tank compared himself were not valid comparators.View "Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Hutt worked for Solvay Pharmaceuticals as a sales representative, 2001-2007. Her supervisor, who had recruited her to Solvay from a different company, gave her satisfactory ratings in most categories, but repeatedly informed Hutt that she needed to improve her punctuality and consistency in submitting internal reports. When her supervisor retired, Lozen was appointed the new Indianapolis sales district manager by Westfall, himself a newly‐appointed regional manager. Hutt worked under Lozen and Westfall 2008-2011 and had several conflicts with them, which resulted in several disciplinary actions. She was ineligible for bonus pay while on warning status for seven quarters. In 2009, Hutt filed a complaint with the EEOC, followed by a lawsuit, alleging age discrimination and retaliation and violation of the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hutt established no causal connection between the filing of the EEOC charge and adverse employment actions. A claim that Hutt and another were singled out for worse treatment based on their age was only asserted with “reliance on speculation.” View "Hutt v. Solvay Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law