Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Fort Bend hired Davis in 2007 as a Desktop Support Supervisor for 15 information technology technicians. Cook was the IT Director, and in 2009, hired his friend and fellow church member, Ford, as Davis’s supervisor. In 2010, Davis complained to human resources that Cook subjected her to constant sexual harassment and assaults. Fort Bend placed Davis on Family Medical Leave Act leave during its investigation, which substantiated the allegations and led to Cook’s resignation. According to Davis, Ford immediately began retaliating when she returned to work. She alleged that Ford “effectively” demoted her by reducing the number of her direct reports to four; removed her from projects she had previously managed; superseded her authority; removed her administrative rights from the computer server; and assigned her tasks that similarly situated employees were not required to perform. When a special installation was scheduled for the weekend of July 4, 2011, all employees were required to be present. On June 28, Davis informed Ford that she would not be available on the morning of Sunday July 3, “due to a previous religious commitment.” Davis claimed that she had arranged for a replacement. After Davis attended her church event and did not report to work, Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis filed suit, alleging retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim, but not as to the religious discrimination claim. View "Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2008, Budhun was hired by BHP. About 60 percent of her job was typing. She had received a final warning for tardiness, making her ineligible for transfer within the organization. Budhun took four weeks of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2691, leave early in 2010. Budhun broke a bone in her hand in July 2010, unrelated to her job. Budhun returned some FMLA paperwork 10 days later, attaching a doctor's note, dated August 10, and stating that she could return to work on August 16, “No restrictions in splint.” Budhun returned to work, submitted the leave form, and stated that certification would arrive from the doctor in several days. There was a dispute about whether she could return to work if she could not type at full speed; the doctor’s statement was unclear. BHP extended FMLA leave until September 23, when her FMLA leave was exhausted, and approved non-FMLA leave through November 9. When she did not return after FMLA leave, BHP offered her position to another. Budhun was not eligible to transfer to another position. She was on leave, with benefits, through November 9, when BHP considered her to have voluntarily resigned. Budhun sued, alleging FMLA interference and retaliation. The court entered summary judgment for BHP, stating that Budhun suffered no adverse employment action because she was medically unable to return to work after her FMLA leave, and that Budhun could not establish any nexus between her termination and her FMLA leave, having been terminated months later. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the adverse employment action occurred when Budhun was replaced. View "Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a corrections officer, filed suit against the County, acting through its Sheriff, alleging that plaintiff was terminated from his employment in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that plaintiff's statements to the news reporter was ordinarily within the scope of plaintiff's duties and did not merely concern those duties. Therefore, plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes and his communications were not constitutionally insulated from employer discipline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the County. View "Hurst v. Lee County" on Justia Law

After his employment with the town was terminated, the plaintiff sought benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act. The town opposed his claim, arguing that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he had constructively resigned “without good cause” by failing to obtain a commercial driver’s license within one year of starting work, a condition of his employment. The department agreed with the town. The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed. He then sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was fired in violation of his rights to due process of law and freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the claim as barred by collateral estoppel. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the Illinois statute, 820 ILCS 405/1900(B), denies collateral estoppel effect to rulings in unemployment insurance proceedings. View "Council v. Village of Dolton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit under Labor Code section 1102.5(b) against the County. The County subsequently appealed from a judgment entered after a substantial jury verdict in plaintiff's favor and plaintiff appealed from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The court initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to plaintiff. Both the County and the plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. The court granted the petitions and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating plaintiff where the record contained affirmative indications that the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate plaintiff was not relevant and was prejudicial. The court also concluded that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's award of economic damages. Accordingly, the court reversed in that respect but affirmed in all other respects. The court also affirmed the order denying plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. View "Hager v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her union appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their First Amendment retaliation claims. Defendants cross-appealed a later order denying them attorneys' fees. The court remanded so that the district court could evaluate on a more detailed basis the incidents that it dismissed collectively as "petty workplace gripes" where there was evidence suggesting that some of these actions were taken as part of a more general campaign and hence might in context have greater materiality than when viewed in isolation. The court concluded that plaintiffs carried their burden of production sufficient to survive summary judgment as to the three involuntary transfers at issue. Plaintiffs presented a genuine factual dispute as to whether an internal investigation was retaliatory. Further, the district court erred in determining that defendant County was not subject to Monell liability. Defendants' cross-appeal is moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Thomas v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Graber worked at the Milwaukee County jail and was vice president of the union. A child was killed when a concrete slab fell from a county park structure. Captain Meverden was the incident commander on the scene; he immediately assigned deputy sheriffs at the jail the task of securing the perimeter. The deputies were informed to stay for mandatory overtime even if their usual shifts were over. Meverden ordered Sergeant Mascari to ask for volunteers to comply with the collective bargaining agreement. Graber arrived for his shift as Intake Booking Sergeant; he was not sent to the park and did not have any staffing responsibilities. A fellow deputy who had been assigned to secure the park approached Graber and complained about the mandatory overtime. Graber took the position that the mandatory overtime violated the collective bargaining agreement. Meverden stated that the mandatory overtime was necessary because volunteers could not be mobilized quickly enough. Following a series of subsequent events, Graber received a seven-day suspension, purportedly unrelated to the staffing issue. The suspension was overturned by an arbitrator. Graber sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights to free speech and association and the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Graber failed to establish a causal connection between his constitutionally protected speech and an adverse employment action.View "Graber v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, the Department of Agriculture, after it denied her request for a flexible work schedule based on her depression. Plaintiff sought substantial flexibility in her working hours ("maxiflex" schedule) under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., as an accommodation for her disability. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, concluding that the maxiflex work schedule is an unreasonable request. The court also rejected defendant's retaliation claims. The court concluded, however, that nothing in the Rehabilitation Act establishes, as a matter of law, that a maxiflex work schedule is unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the entry of summary judgment on the accommodation claim; reversed the entry of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that revoking her permission to work late was in retaliation for requesting accommodations; and remanded those claims for further proceedings. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's decision. View "Solomon v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit after he was terminated following severe interpersonal problems between him and other police officers. Plaintiff contended that these interpersonal problems resulted from his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that the police department discharged him based on his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, finding that he was disabled and that the City had discharged him because of his disability. The court reversed, holding that, based on the evidence presented, the jury could not have found plaintiff disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff's ADHD did not substantially limit plaintiff's ability to work or to interact with others. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Weaving v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A et seq., alleging that the County discriminated her based on her sex and her age when they terminated her employment. Plaintiff also claimed that the County retaliated against her after she took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on her MHRA discrimination claims. The court concluded that the County offered a non-discriminatory, legitimate justification for its conduct - plaintiff was terminated based on her repeated record-keeping errors - and plaintiff failed to show that the County's reasons for firing her was pretextual. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's sex discrimination claim. Further, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to her sex-plus age discrimination claim where her two male co-workers of comparable age did not engage in sufficiently similar misconduct or have a similar disciplinary history. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doucette v. Morrison County, Minnesota" on Justia Law