Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Associated Underwriters after she was terminated, alleging claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court dismissed both claims. The court concluded that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that there was a direct correlation between employee age and the termination decision - that it was the but-for cause of plaintiff's termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the ADEA claim. The court concluded, however, that the district court properly dismissed the ADA claim where there is no evidence that Associated Underwriters terminated her employment on the basis of disability. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this claim.View "Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff retired from his employment with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) he filed an administrative claim for employment discrimination, alleging that he was constructively discharged on the basis of his age or national origin. Plaintiff’s claim was denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action claiming liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and Puerto Rico law. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding the action time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint asserted an FTCA claim, it must be dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff did not present an FTCA claim in his administrative complaint; and (2) Plaintiff’s remaining claims were time-barred.View "Acevedo-Perez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, the police department, the police union, and five police supervisors, alleging violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and other federal and state laws. On appeal, the supervisors challenged the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the employment discrimination claims. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Defendant Carlone on Plaintiff Raspardo's hostile work environment claim where Carlone's behavior was sufficient to permit a jury to find a hostile work environment, and where Carlone's conduct was clearly established as unlawful sexual harassment at the time of the events in question and that objectively reasonably officers would not disagree that Carlone's conduct constituted sexual harassment. The court concluded that the five individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.View "Raspardo v. Carlone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pathologist, filed suit against Avera, alleging that Avera violated federal and state laws for terminating a Services Agreement. Plaintiff filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.; the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2617 et seq.; and the South Dakota Human Relations Act (SDHRA), S.D. Codified Laws 20-13-1 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff was an independent contractor of St. Luke's Hospital under his Services Agreement and not an employee.View "Alexander v. Avera St. Luke's Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, ODU, alleging, inter alia, a claim for retaliation based on the denial of her application for tenure. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for ODU, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the retaliation claim that grew out of and was reasonably related to an untimely filed charge of discrimination. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's related tenure retaliation claim where it had subject matter jurisdiction over her administratively exhausted but untimely filed non-retaliation claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Hentosh v. Old Dominion University" on Justia Law

Kimberly Kulig and Laura Baatz worked for the Berryhill Baja Grill & Cantina on Montrose Street in Houston, a franchise-location. During their employment, the owner and operator of the restaurant sexually harassed them on numerous occasions. In this appeal, Kulig and Baatz challenged the district court's dismissal of their Title VII lawsuit against Berryhill Hot Tamales Corporation for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that parties represented by counsel may too invoke the exceptions of the named-party requirement. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Kulig and Baatz, as represented parties, could not rely on the exceptions to the named-party requirement, the district court did not determine whether they could fit within either the Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co. or Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 exceptions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd." on Justia Law

McKelvey served in Iraq. In 2004, he attempted to defuse a roadside bomb, and it exploded. He lost his right hand, among other injuries. McKelvey moved back to Michigan and accepted a civilian position with the Army as an operations specialist. At the new job, he received only menial assignments and was constantly taunted by colleagues, often about his war-related injuries. He eventually reached the breaking point and resigned in 2007. McKelvey sued the Army for disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The Army offered to reinstate him in a new position at a new location that was otherwise equivalent to his old job and later offered $300,000 to settle the whole dispute. He rejected both offers. His claims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge, went to trial. The jury ruled in his favor, awarding him nearly $4.4 million in front pay. The district court vacated that award, however, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, precluding front pay and holding that reinstatement was the proper remedy under the statute. A year after the remand, McKelvey and the Army settled. The district court awarded attorney’s fees to McKelvey as a prevailing party. View "McKelvey v. Sec'y of U.S. Army" on Justia Law

Appellants, employees of Puerto Rico’s Department of Transportation and Public Works and members of Puerto Rico’s Popular Democratic Party, were relieved of their job responsibilities and lost supervisory authority upon the change in political administration to the New Progressive Party in Puerto Rico (NPP). Appellants filed suit against Appellees, members of the NPP, claiming that Appellees discriminated on the basis of political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed Appellants’ First Amendment claims against the appellees who received Appellants’ cease and dismiss letters, concluding that Appellants’ letters did not identify Appellants’ political affiliation or refer to discriminatory conduct based on political animus, and therefore, Appellants did not adequately allege all elements of a First Amendment political discrimination claim. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ First Amendment claims, holding that each appellant stated a plausible First Amendment claim against the appellees who received that appellant’s letter.View "Medina-Velazquez v. Hernandez-Gregorat" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth after she was terminated from her position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on her retaliation, breach of contract, and estoppel claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether she did not hold a policymaking or confidential position; properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim where it was undisputed that plaintiff held her position by virtue of appointment rather than by contract; and properly granted summary judgment on the estoppel claim where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether government officials engaged in any affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence as required for equitable estoppel, and where she failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the Commonwealth gained an advantage by asserting one position and then later sought an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent position as required by judicial estoppel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court denied the Commonwealth's request for sanctions.View "Peter-Palican v. CNMI" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as Director of the University's art galleries after he told a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that he believed Rep. Gohmert was a "fear monger," plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University and others, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for the exercise of protected speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded that defendants should have known that plaintiff's speech was protected as the speech of a citizen and that their decision to terminate plaintiff on the basis of that citizen speech would violate plaintiff's First Amendment right. The court held that the law of this circuit clearly established what a reasonable investigation was such that a reasonable official would have known that defendants' investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that every reasonable official in defendants' positions would have known based on precedent that an informal, hastily concluded investigation would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the law was "clearly established" at the time.View "Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., et al." on Justia Law