Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review.View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a custodian for the school district, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against the district after plaintiff's wife spoke at a public school board meeting. Plaintiff's wife was speaking as a member of the public, suggesting that the school board should consider sharing a superintendent and eliminating a principal. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the evidence did not establish any genuine dispute of material fact or sufficient evidence to show that plaintiff's association with his wife was a substantial or motivating factor in his alleged constructive discharge; the district's proffered reasons for plaintiff's reassignment was pretext; or the requisite personal motive necessary for a tortious interference with a contract.View "Skalsky v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 743" on Justia Law

Taylor-Novotny sued her former employer, Health Alliance Medical Plans under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. She contended that Health Alliance failed to accommodate her multiple sclerosis as the ADA required, discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability, interfered with her FMLA rights, and discriminated against her based on her race. She also asserted a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Health Alliance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Taylor-Novotny did not establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and did not meeting Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations for punctuality and accountability. Her failure to meet Health Alliance’s legitimate expectations also foreclosed her race discrimination claim. With respect to her ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, she did not establish that the additional accommodation that she sought was reasonable. The evidence was insufficient to form a convincing mosaic suggesting that Health Alliance retaliated against her because she sought accommodations for her multiple sclerosis. Health Alliance never denied Taylor-Novotny FMLA leave.View "Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc." on Justia Law

Mike Ward was an employee of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. Ward once held a supervisory position; but during a department reorganization in 2005, he was demoted and given only technical duties. When the department began a second reorganization in 2008, Ward asked for a position with his old supervisory responsibilities. But those responsibilities were then being handled by another employee. Without a vacancy, Ward had to remain in his nonsupervisory job. In 2010, Ward applied for a managerial position in Provo, Utah. The application process included interviews with a panel and the person who would ultimately make the hiring decision. After interviewing with the panel and the decision-maker, however, Ward did not get the job. He blamed his employer (the Department of Interior), invoking Title VII and claiming retaliation for the refusal (1) to reinstate him in his old job and (2) to promote him to the Provo managerial position. The Tenth Circuit concluded no reasonable fact-finder could infer retaliation; thus, the Court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the Department of Interior.View "Ward v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Caucasian male, filed suit after being terminated from the AHTD, alleging race and gender discrimination and violations of various statutory and constitutional rights. Because plaintiff has not provided analysis or development of his briefs, he has waived some of his claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend because amendment would be futile; plaintiff failed to present direct evidence of discrimination where, at most, plaintiff's evidence showed discord with his female subordinates, not that any discriminatory animus motivated his termination by the decisionmakers; and, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, plaintiff's claims of race and gender discrimination fail where, even if plaintiff made a prima facie showing, AHTD offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for his termination - his violation of the sexual harassment policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Moody v. Vozel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three ex-fire chiefs, appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on their procedural due process claims challenging their terminations. The court concluded that plaintiffs, at-will employees pursuant to Missouri law, were terminable at the will of their employer and they had not property interest in their continued employment under the Fourth Amendment; there was no stigma sufficient to deprive plaintiffs of a liberty interest; and plaintiffs' individual capacity claims allege no constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Crews v. Monarch Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee.View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a commercial driver’s license and drives school buses, but wanted to drive vehicles that ferry equipment and people involved in movie and television productions. In Chicago such drivers belong to the Movie/Trade Show Division of Teamsters Local 727 and are paid twice what plaintiff earns as a bus driver. The Division has about 300 members, but in 70 years, has never referred a female driver to any production company. Because of agreements with those companies, the union effectively determines who is hired. In 2010 plaintiff applied, paid the union’s initiation fee, and began making dues payments. Months later, having received no referrals, she called the business agent, who told her to stop calling him. She received a similar response from a Transportation Coordinator. She claims that her résumé was never included with those of other applicants for referral. Referrals are not based on seniority and there is no shortage of work. She obtained an EEOC right to sue letter. The district court dismissed on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit reversed and directed assignment to a different judge, noting “the abruptness and irregularity” of the handling of the case and “tone of derision that pervades his opinion.”View "Stuart v. Local 727, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Catholic nuns volunteered with the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency for an extended time, but did not receive compensation or benefits, complete employment-related tax documentation, restrict their schedules, or submit to the control of either organization by other incidents of an agency relationship. They were not promoted by the Red Cross and were terminated as Agency volunteers. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission rejected their complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the EEOC does not provide a Right to Sue Letter following a jurisdictional dismissal. The nuns sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Finding that the Sisters had not sufficiently alleged state action, the district court dismissed the section 1983 claims, then held that, because they were not employees of either organization, the Sisters could not maintain a claim against them under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A volunteer relationship does not fairly approximate employment and is not covered by Title VII, nor were constitutional rights violated.View "Sister Michael Marie v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law