Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ripberger, born in 1951, began working for IDOC as a substance abuse counselor in 1991. She lost her job in 2010, when IDOC contracted out its counseling program to Corizon. Ripberger alleges that Corizon’s decision not to hire her stemmed from previous events in 2009, when Orton-Bell and Ripberger complained that their desks were being used after hours. According to Ripberger, they were told it was “just” staff members, not inmates, using their desks for sex, and that they could simply wash down their desks. It came to light that Orton-Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody. Orton-Bell and the Major were terminated, but the Major quickly received unemployment benefits, kept his benefits, and began working again at the prison on a contract basis. Orton-Bell filed suit. Ripberger supported Orton-Bell’s sex discrimination complaint. Ripberger sued Corizon, claiming sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Corizon summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Ripberger was the unfortunate victim of a reduced workforce.View "Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, Plaintiff's employer and manager, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her physical disability and/or her perceived disability, among other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the disability discrimination claim to the extent that it alleged a cause of action based on a perceived physical disability, concluding that a cause of action based on a perceived disability is not a legally recognized action in Connecticut. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act not only protects individuals who have a physical disability, but also individuals who are regarded by their employers as having a physical disability.View "Desrosiers v. Diageo N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Musolf was a J.C. Penney loss prevention specialist. Store manager Child had concerns Musolf did not display respect for her team. Child conducted sessions with Musolf to improve teamwork. In 2010, Musolf alleged sexual harassment by her co-worker, Pekarna. Child met with Pekarna. Pekarna never touched Musolf again. Musolf acknowledges that Child repeatedly stated that the situation was resolved. In March 2010, Musolf received a certificate commending her outstanding performance. In May, she earned a merit raise. By August, Child had received complaints about Musolf from several employees, including Pekarna. Child met with Musolf three times. Musolf admits she refused to fully answer questions. Child believed Musolf had downloaded documents in violation of her confidentiality agreement and had involved another employee in an attempt to sneak into Child's office. Child recommended terminating Musolf. Musolf communicated to the district manager that she believed Pekarna had not been properly disciplined. J.C. Penney terminated Musolf for failure to cooperate in the investigation, taking confidential information, and attempting to involve another in a plan to sneak into the manager's office and take documents. The district court rejected her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.View "Musolf v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Noel accepted a new position at SBC that involved frequent travel, which aggravated his diabetes. Two years later, Noel was hospitalized after collapsing at an airport, and the next year, SBC gave him a temporary assignment that did not involve travel. After Noel performed poorly in both his new position and the temporary assignment, SBC put him on a performance-improvement plan. Two weeks later, Noel was hospitalized again, after suffering a breakdown. He never returned to SBC. After six months of disability leave, Noel resigned. The district court rejected his claims that SBC violated the Missouri Human Rights Act by constructively discharging him because of his diabetes, a disability. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. SBC expected Noel only to continue his job as it had been; his work was made intolerable not by SBC but by his own worsening health.View "Noel v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any pretext for discrimination based on his hearing impairment and his EEOC complaint where plaintiff presented no evidence that the City's reliance on past threats was actually pretext for discrimination and, even if the fit-for-duty evaluation somehow undermined the credibility of the City's stated concern about plaintiff's threats, the City put forward other reasons for terminating him: nonperformance of duties, conducting personal business at work, and making disparaging remarks about his supervisors and the City. Likewise, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he cannot show pretext. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City.View "Curley v. City of North Las Vegas" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was discharged from his position of Chief of Police for the City of Red Bank, he filed suit in the Chancery Court against the City, alleging statutory retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and age discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The Chancery Court (1) granted the City’s request to transfer the case to the Circuit Court; (2) granted the City’s request to proceed without a jury on the TPPA claim, citing Young v. Davis, which held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) controls TPPA claims against governmental entities, and such claims must be tried without a jury in the manner prescribed by the GTLA; but (3) upheld Plaintiff’s request for a jury on his THRA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the GLTA applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the THRA, and therefore, Plaintiff’s THRA claim was required to be tried without the intervention of a jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the GTLA did not govern Plaintiff’s THRA claim and that the Legislature has afforded a statutory right to trial by jury on THRA claims filed against governmental entities in chancery court.View "Sneed v. City of Red Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against his employer after he retired. The court concluded that plaintiff's age-based hostile work environment claim failed because the supervisor's age-related comments were not so severe as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of his employment; without more than plaintiff's speculation, a reasonable juror could not find the supervisor's actions - although contemptible - amounted to harassment based on sex; plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to infer a hostile work environment and he cannot prove constructive discharge; and plaintiff has not suffered an adverse employment action and cannot establish a claim for either disparate treatment or retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer.View "Rickard v. Swedish Match North America" on Justia Law

Ferrick, a former employee of Santa Clara University (SCU), a private institution, charged Travis, allegedly SCU’s “Director of Real Estate” and Ferrick’s immediate supervisor, with extensive wrongdoing and inappropriate behavior. Only some of the claimed conduct was allegedly reported by Ferrick to SCU’s management. The complaint’s sole cause of action was for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, also known as a Tameny claim. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend, finding that the complaint failed to allege that her discharge violated any fundamental public policy. The court of appeal reversed. The allegations, liberally construed, indicate that Travis accepted a payment, not in trust for SCU, in return for using his position as an SCU employee to place SCU tenants with a private landlord; the complaint adequately pleads that Ferrick had a reasonable basis to suspect commercial bribery and disclosed her “reasonably based suspicions” to SCU. The complaint states a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.View "Ferrick v. Santa Clara Univ." on Justia Law

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred.View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review.View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law