Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ledbetter, a black male, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981 against his former employer, Good Samaritan Ministries of Carbondale, Illinois, a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that provides services to needy people. The suit charged retaliation for Ledbetter’s having filed a charge of racial discrimination and of retaliation with the EEOC. Ledbetter had been warned, based on complaints by shelter residents and co-workers about alleged intimidation and threats. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding too many " loose ends" for summary judgment. View "Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries" on Justia Law

Chief of Police Lillis announced his retirement. Lieutenant Hilde, on the force for 29 years, was the second-ranking officer, and had served as acting Chief. A commission that controls hiring had previously promoted internally. They selected finalists, including Hilde and external candidate, Koivunen. Hilde had an Associate’s degree in law enforcement. Detective Koivunen had served another city for 18 years. He had a Bachelor’s degree in criminal law. The hiring protocol involved: weighted years of service, training and employment, and an interview. Hilde had a service score of 65, the highest of the finalists. He received 9 out of 20 on training-and-employment, the lowest of the finalists. The commissioners could not explain that score. Koivunen received a service score of 28 and 15 out of 20 for his training-and-employment, the highest of the finalists. Each commissioner gave Koivunen an unprecedented perfect 100 score for his interview. Hilde’s interview sheets also reported identical scores: 69 points. Hilde and Koivunen each had 143 points after the interview. Two commissioners claimed not to remember changing Hilde’s scores, although the sheets were altered. When Hilde applied, he was 51 years old. Koivunen was 43. An officer is retirement-eligible at 50. Commissioner England said that retirement eligibility “might have” been a factor. Hilde sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), 631(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "Hilde v. City of Eveleth" on Justia Law

The website for InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA states that all employees must annually reaffirm their agreement with IVCF’s Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis. The website includes statements that: Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a)) (Title VII), IVCF has the right to, and does, hire only candidates who agree with IVCF’s Purpose and Doctrinal Basis and that the status of [IVCF] as an Equal Opportunity Employer does not prevent the organization from hiring staff based on their religious beliefs so that all staff share the same religious commitment. Conlon began working at IVCF in Michigan in 1986 as a spiritual director, involved in providing religious counsel and prayer. In 2011, she informed IVCF that she was contemplating divorce. IVCF put her on paid (later unpaid) leave. When her marital situation continued to worsen despite counseling efforts, IVCF terminated her employment. After exhausting administrative remedies, Conlon sued IVCF and her supervisors under Title VII and Michigan law, alleging that male employees were treated differently. IVCF claimed ministerial exception to employment laws. The district court dismissed, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred all of Conlon’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA" on Justia Law

Miller, an African-American male, worked as a cook for Hospitality’s Sparx Restaurant. Miller became assistant kitchen manager and was a satisfactory employee. On October 1, 2010, Miler discovered racially offensive pictures at the kitchen cooler. Miller lodged a complaint. Two employees admitted responsibility. The manager agreed that the posting was a termination-worthy offense, but one offender was given a warning and the other was not disciplined. Soon after Miller’s complaint, supervisors began to criticize Miller’s work performance. Sparx fired Miller on October 23, 2010. The EEOC filed suit on Miller’s behalf under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 3(a). Before trial, Sparx had closed and Hospitality had dissolved. The court concluded that successor corporations could be liable. The jury awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages on the retaliation claim. The EEOC sought additional remedies. The district court denied the front-pay request but awarded Miller $43,300.50 in back pay (and interest) plus $6,495.00 to offset impending taxes on the award; enjoined the companies from discharging employees in retaliation for complaints against racially offensive postings; and required them to adopt policies, investigative processes, and annual training consistent with Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to both successor liability and the equitable remedies. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. N. Star Hospitality, Inc" on Justia Law

For 13 years Sklyarsky worked as a custodian at a Chicago office building, through different employers. In 2010, new supervisors began disciplining Sklyarsky. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Department of Human Rights that the company was treating him unfairly because of his Ukrainian national origin. Sklyarsky was fired in 2013, and after exhausting administrative remedies, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2000e-2, e-3, e-5(f).1 During discovery Sklyarsky, an experienced pro se litigant, concluded that the building’s management company had been involved in the discrimination and sought leave to join it as a defendant. Judge Kocoras denied that motion, telling Sklyarsky that Means-Knaus had “nothing to do with the employment contract” and that, if he wanted to sue MeansKnaus, he would have to file a separate action. Sklyarsky did that. Judge Gottschall, assigned to the new suit against Means-Knaus, screened Sklyarsky’s pro se complaint and dismissed it sua sponte, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that the doctrine of claim preclusion foreclosed a separate suit. Judge Kocoras refused to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any procedural missteps were harmless. View "Sklyarsky v. Harvard Maint., Inc." on Justia Law

The federal district court certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Behrooz Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North Charleston. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be empty but now had items in it. Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to dismiss, the federal district court certified this question: under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where: (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the employer's premises; (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement; and (3) the employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question: no. View "Taghivand v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

Yeager filed a complaint alleging that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, by refusing to hire him or by terminating his employment because he failed to provide a social security number. Yeager alleged that he had no social security number because he had disclaimed and disavowed it on account of his sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under either Title VII or Chapter 4112 Yeager was required to prove that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; he has informed the employer about the conflicts; and he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. If Yeager established his prima facie case, his employer has the burden to show that it could not “reasonably accommodate” his religious beliefs without “undue hardship.” An employer is not liable when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal law. View "Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathy Riser brought suit in federal district court alleging that Defendant-Appellee QEP Energy Company (QEP) discriminated against her on the basis of gender and age in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to QEP on all claims. After review of Riser's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court could not "say that QEP has 'prove[n] at least one affirmative defense so clearly that no rational jury could find to the contrary.'" The Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's EPA claim. The Court also found that Riser established a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The Court again reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to QEP on Riser's Title VII and ADEA pay discrimination claims. The district court dismissed Riser's discriminatory discharge claims on the grounds that she had not established a prima facie case, and that even if she had, QEP had supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge that Riser did not show to be pretextual. The Tenth Circuit found that in her opening brief, Riser did not argue that she satisfied her prima facie case, but simply asserted a prima facie case existed and proceeded to argue that QEP's reasons for discharging her were pretextual. "Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived;" the district court was affirmed with regard to summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII and the ADEA. View "Riser v. QEP Energy" on Justia Law

A woman of Sudanese extraction, the plaintiff worked in Jeffboat’s shipyard in Jeffersonville, Indiana as a welder from 2006 until she was laid off in 2011. She had been u a welder first class, doing the most difficult and dangerous jobs, such as overhead welding and welding in confined spaces. In a two-week period in June 2011, the plaintiff, who had on 12 previous occasions sought first aid for work-related injuries, experienced two more such incidents, becoming dizzy and nauseous while welding in confined spaces. Jeffboat demoted her to welder third class, reducing her pay from $21.10 per hour to $15.69 per hour. The plaintiff claimed that the company demoted her in retaliation for her having complained to the EEOC the previous February that the company was discriminating against her because of her sex and national origin. She was subsequently laid off, but the layoff was part of a general reduction in force based on seniority and a few months later she was notified that she was being recalled. She failed to reply within the deadline and never returned to work. Her discrimination claims were rejected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff's lack of evidence View "Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fired from his place of employment after his employer (Defendant) learned that Plaintiff had consistently falsified his time cards over the course of several years, costing the company “1.25 hours of labor per week.” Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that Defendant had terminated him in retaliation for taking family leave in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff did not offer evidence of retaliatory animus sufficient to raise a disputed question of fact or to defeat Defendant’s right to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that Defendant’s stated reason for his termination was a pretext. View "Ameen v. Amphenol Printed Circuits, Inc." on Justia Law