Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Sears, alleging three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12940(a). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Sears terminated plaintiff because of his disability; that Sears declined to accommodate his disability; and that Sears did not engage in an interactive process to determine possible accommodation for his disability. In this case, plaintiff presented several state law claims that deserved trial and it should not take a whole lot of evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact in a disability discrimination case, at least where the fact issue on discrimination is genuine and the disability would not preclude gainful employment of a person working with accommodation. Moreover, it is entirely besides the point that some of plaintiff's evidence was self-serving, as it will often be the case in a discrimination case that an employee has something to say about what company representatives said to him or her. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor, filed suit against WCC, alleging violations of her state and federal constitutional rights when WCC terminated her employment for purportedly making offensive comments in class. On appeal, WCC challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that WCC is not an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that a finding of sovereign immunity for WCC would not serve the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment because immunity would not further the state's interest in preserving its treasury, nor would it protect the integrity of the state. View "Leitner v. Westchester Community College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for a position with CDM Media, USA, Inc. Plaintiff was not hired for the position. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that CDM had decided not to hire her because of her age, and therefore, she had been subjected to employment discrimination. The circuit court granted summary judgment for CDM, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that CDM’s reasons for not hiring her were pretextual. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as CDM did not satisfy its burden to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Plaintiff. View "Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Long, the elected head prosecutor for the first judicial district of Arkansas, supervises deputy prosecutors in six counties. In 2006, Long hired Austin, an African-American, as a deputy prosecutor for Phillips County. The prosecutor previously hired for that position was African-American, as was the prosecutor hired to replace Austin. Austin failed to follow the instructions of Murray, the senior deputy prosecutor, conerning allocation of county funds. Long asserts that Murray and other court personnel had trouble contacting Austin during business hours, that Austin deviated from policy on felony bond reduction orders and expungement orders and incurred extraordinary expenses without approval. A judge reportedly contacted Long to ask why Austin had failed to appear in court. Austin contends that Long never provided him with a formal evaluation and never explained why he was fired. Austin filed an employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that Long treated him more harshly than similarly situated white prosecutors, who had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and sanctioned for an ethical violation. The district court denied Long's motion asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record gave rise to disputes of material fact over whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial discrimination. View "Austin v. Long" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former head chef at the Villa Cofresi Hotel, was at least forty years old at the time he was suspended and then fired. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the Hotel and its general manager under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Puerto Rico employment law, alleging that he was fired because of his age and in retaliation for his efforts to assert his rights against this discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on both the federal age discrimination and retaliation claims. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding (1) Plaintiff put forth a sufficient prima facie case of age discrimination to survive summary judgment; (2) there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants’ stated grounds for firing Plaintiff were in fact a pretext for age discrimination; (3) in regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the record gives rise to competing plausible inferences from which a rational jury could find for Plaintiff; and (4) the dismissal of Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims must also be vacated. Remanded. View "Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc." on Justia Law

David Hawkins filed claims against his former employer, Schwan's Home Service, Inc. ("SHS"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Oklahoma law. Hawkins has described his chief responsibilities as "ordering products to be delivered by [SHS's] delivery drivers, scheduling, and loading trucks with products." According to a Mr. Hillaker, who supervised truck operations as part of his leadership duties, fleet management often included driving company trucks to service appointments or otherwise "[s]huttling trucks to salespeople" to ensure product delivery. Hillaker's observation that the facility-supervisor position involved driving was bolstered by the "Qualifications" section of SHS's facility-supervisor job description, which indicates that an "excellent driving record" was required. The job description further specified that "meet[ing] the Federal Department of Transportation eligibility requirements, including appropriate driver's license and corresponding medical certification," was a "condition of employment for this position" Hawkins suffered from several health conditions that came to a head in 2010: he was "in and out of the hospital . . . with heart problems and fainting spells and very high blood pressure." Hawkins experienced a minor stroke in June of 2010, but he resumed working soon afterward. On June 14, 2010, Hawkins emailed a human-resources manager that Hillaker wanted him "to drive trucks back and [forth] to" Enid and Woodward. Hawkins explained that these requests had taken place in May and June of 2010 just as his health issues were escalating, and that Hillaker was "telling everyone in Enid" that Hawkins was "a liability." He further suggested Hillaker had begun asking him to drive the trucks to Enid and Woodward in order to "force[ ] [him] to quit." Another co-worker offered similar testimony, maintaining that Hillaker expressed that Hillaker was "very upset about [Hawkins] being in the hospital . . . [and] wanted him gone." On June 21, 2010, Hawkins failed a routine DOT medical evaluation. The next day, SHS gave Hawkins a letter notifying him that he had been placed on a 30 day company requested unpaid leave, and that he had thirty days to obtain certification or "to find a non-DOT position." Hawkins testified that he perused job listings on SHS's public website. However, he "did not apply for any jobs." On June 23, 2010, Hawkins signed a termination form. Despite the language on the form indicating that his resignation was voluntary, Hawkins wrote on the form that the reason for his action was: "Force[d] to quit for medical reason." Before his separation from SHS, Mr. Hawkins began the process of seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The SSA denied Hawkins's claim after reconsideration. An administrative law judge determined at a 2011 hearing that Hawkins was not disabled. Hawkins filed his ADA and Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act ("OADA") claims. The district court ruled in SHS's favor on May 28, 2013, and Hawkins appealed. After careful consideration, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's "principled analysis" of the district court record, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of SHS. View "Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Service" on Justia Law

Horne filed an employment discrimination action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of District Council 16, reasoning that Horne was unable to establish that he was qualified for the union organizer position he sought and had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12900). The trial court relied on after-acquired evidence of a prior conviction so that, at the time of the employment decision in 2010, federal law prohibited Horne from serving as a union organizer; the 13-year disability period established by that federal statute had not been shortened. The California Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of its 2014 opinion in Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. The court of appeal then reversed. Other than with respect to certain post-discovery period remedies, FEHA is not preempted by Section 504(a) of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act; although the trial court correctly concluded that Horne’s citizenship rights had not been fully restored for purposes of Section 504(a), its grant of summary judgment in reliance on after-acquired evidence was inappropriate during the liability phase of this FEHA litigation. View "Horne v. Dist. Council 16, Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades" on Justia Law

Several firefighter plaintiffs sued the City of Buffalo, alleging that the City engaged in reverse, disparate treatment racial discrimination as to civil service lists for Buffalo firefighters. The City moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 due to Plaintiffs’ undisputed failure to file a N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 50-i notice of claim. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that dismissal was not warranted based on Plaintiffs’ failure to file a notice of claim and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano. This case was returned to Supreme Court, which granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the City had failed to meet the strong basis in evidence standard set forth in Ricci. The Court of Appeals remitted this case for further proceedings, holding (1) a notice of claim need not be filed for a Human Rights Law claim against a municipality; and (2) Plaintiffs should not have been granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. View "Margerum v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law

In 1999, Allstate reorganized its business and terminated the at-will employment contracts of about 6,200 sales agents, offering them conversion to independent contractor status; $5,000 and an economic interest in their accounts, to be sold to buyers approved by Allstate; severance pay equal to one year’s salary; or severance pay of 13 weeks’ pay. Employees who chose independent contractor status received a bonus of at least $5,000, were not required to repay any office-expense advances, and acquired transferable interests in their business two years after converting. All employees who chose not to convert and left the company were bound by noncompetition covenants in their original contracts. As a condition of becoming independent contractors, agents were required to sign a release waiving existing legal claims against Allstate. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued, claiming that the company violated federal anti-retaliation laws. The district court reversed. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the settled rule that employers can exchange consideration for releases of claims and that EEOC established neither protected activity nor an adverse action. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Allstate Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law