Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a massage therapist at a spa, filed an employment action against her employer, alleging that she was subjected to harassing and discriminatory conduct by two customers. She alleged: sex discrimination, sexual harassment, racial harassment, retaliation, failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment and discrimination based on sex, and failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent harassment based on race (California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code 12900). The court of appeal reversed an award in favor of plaintiff. There cannot be a valid claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment if, as here, the jury finds that the sexual harassment that occurred was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to result in liability. A claim for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment cannot prevail when the necessary element of sexual harassment is not established. Similarly, the jury’s finding that defendant was not liable on plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because there was no adverse employment action precluded defendant’s liability for failure to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent sex discrimination. View "Dickson v. Burke Williams, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Werkheiser was elected to the three-member Pocono Township Board of Supervisors. Supervisor Hess was elected in 2009; Bengel was elected in 2011. Supervisors are permitted to be employed by the Township. Werkheiser was appointed Township Roadmaster by the Board. Hess, as Chairman of the Board, Secretary, and Treasurer, received $36,000 per year in salary and benefits. In 2012, Hess took 10-days leave. Froio was selected to assume Hess’s administrative duties. Over Werkheiser’s objection, Bengel and Hess voted to hire Froio as Township Administrator, with compensation of $70,000. As Froio’s position developed, Hess’s responsibilities and workload decreased. Hess continued to be paid. Werkheiser objected to creation of a new position with greater expense and to paying Hess when his duties were being performed by Froio. Hess and Bengel began private deliberations to deny Werkheiser reappointment and to replace him with Bengel. In 2013, Werkheiser was formally denied reappointment. Werkheiser sued, asserting First Amendment retaliation and state law violations. The district court reasoned that there were important differences between public employees and elected officials; found that Werkheiser had established a constitutional violation; and denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; the contours of the First Amendment right at issue were not clearly established. View "Werkheiser v. Pocono Township" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

CVS hired Jain, a woman of East Asian descent, as a pharmacist in 2006. She claims that coworkers and supervisors discriminated against her, calling her the "little Indian lady," and her Indian clothing “unprofessional.” Referring to her "bossy" attitude, the manager remarked that "she was from India but might as well be from Germany." Jain became "pharmacist-in-charge" (PIC) at another store, with permission to work a three day schedule. Supervisor Deaner later learned that the store was struggling in numerous performance metrics; that Jain had not been following company policies; and that multiple complaints had been filed. Deaner issued a performance action plan and began holding weekly meetings to help Jain. Problems continued. Jain was issued another warning. After inspections revealed additional problems, Jain was terminated. Jain sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.055, 213.070. Jain opposed a summary judgment motion with a declaration from her husband, stating that an "arithmetic comparison" of scores showed that the pharmacy had improved in every performance metric after Jain became PIC. The court struck the declaration because Mr. Jain "never worked for [CVS] and did not claim to have industry experience” and granted CVS summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

For more than 30 years, Wagner worked at the Merrick County sheriff’s office, as chief dispatcher and office manager. Campbell was appointed as sheriff in 2011 and told Wagner he wanted her to train another employee to perform her duties in her absence.” Campbell later expressed concerns that the training was taking too long and informed Wagner that he had received a complaint from a judge about delays in depositing bond money with the court. Campbell wanted to change policy to have bond money taken directly to court, rather than deposited in the sheriff’s office account. Wagner disagreed. Campbell gave Wagner a reprimand, stating that she failed to follow directives. Wagner refused to sign the reprimand, claiming it contained false information, told Campbell she was leaving, and walked home. Wagner never returned to work; she filed a grievance, which the Board of Supervisors denied. Wagner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-148, alleging she suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected speech on a matter of public concern. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Campbell. When a reprimand does not affect the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Wagner v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Hughes, Arkansas school district hired Ray Nassar as superintendent in 2008. Nassar hired Gena Smith as a business manager. Both are white. The school district renewed Nassar’s contract until June 30, 2013. After the racial composition of the school board shifted to an African-American majority, Nassar’s already-poor relationship with two African-American board members deteriorated. One member, Jackson, referred to Smith as Nassar’s “girlfriend,” at a public meeting (both are married to others) and to Nassar’s “lie[s].” A profanity-laced exchange followed; soon after, the district fired Nassar without a hearing. Months later, the school district fired Smith, without a hearing. Nassar and Smith sued, alleging violations of due process, unlawful racial discrimination, breach of contract, and defamation. A jury found for Nassar and Smith on all claims, awarded Nassar $340,000 on his due-process claim (more than he would have earned through the end of his contract), $1.00 on his discrimination claim, and $1.00 on his contract claim. The court granted Nassar and Smith attorney’s fees at a rate of $375 per hour. The Eighth Circuit vacated the due process award and remanded with instructions to offer remittitur. View "Nassar v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Two security guards employed by SSA Security, Inc. and four of their confederates carried out a conspiracy to set fire to several homes. The resulting fires destroyed ten homes and damaged twelve others. Appellants asserted various civil claims against SSA and the five convicted arsonists, contending that the Maryland Security Guards Act (“Act”) section 19-501 established a basis for SSA’s strict liability for its employees’ intentional torts and civil rights violations. A federal district judge granted summary judgment in SSA’s favor as to the negligence claims and the claims premised on strict liability under section 19-501, concluding (1) section 19-501 was merely a codification of the common law and did not expand the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (2) any intentional acts of SSA’s employees were outside the scope of employment. Appellants appealed, arguing that the Act extends the vicarious liability of security guard agencies beyond the state common law doctrine of respondent superior. The federal appellate court certified a question of law to the Court of Appeals regarding the meaning of section 19-501. The Court answered that section 19-501 has the same meaning as Maryland’s common law doctrine of respondent superior. View "Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a customer service employee at a Bank. When Plaintiff could no longer endure disparate treatment due to her bisexuality she received at the Bank, she stopped reporting to work. The Bank then terminated her for job abandonment. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued the Bank for employment discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and for defamation under Maine common law. The case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment to the Bank. The First Circuit (1) vacated summary judgment as to the wrongful termination and hostile work environment portions of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, holding holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that (i) the Bank’s explanation for firing Plaintiff was pretextual and that she was actually fired because of her sexual orientation, and (ii) Plaintiff had endured sufficiently pervasive harassment to alter the conditions of her employment; and (2) affirmed as to the balance of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim as well as on her defamation claims, holding that, in regards to these claims, the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Flood v. Bank of Am. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Max Seifert sued defendants Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas (the Unified Government), Wyandotte County Sheriff Donald Ash, and Wyandotte County Undersheriff Larry Roland under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, and brought and state-law retaliation claims against defendants too. Plaintiff, a former reserve deputy for the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department (WCSD), alleged that defendants removed him from investigations and revoked his reserve commission because of his testimony supporting allegations by a former criminal defendant of mistreatment by federal law-enforcement officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was not legally protected speech, that defendants' actions were not unconstitutionally motivated, and that defendants would have taken the same actions regardless of his testimony. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state-law claims because federal law provided an adequate alternative remedy; and the Court affirmed the qualified-immunity dismissal of the 1983 claims against Sheriff Ash and Undersheriff Roland because at the time of the alleged retaliatory actions the law was not clearly established that the First Amendment protected Plaintiff's testimony. In all other respects the Court reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiff's testimony was constitutionally protected and a jury could have reasonably found that the explanations defendants gave for their actions were pretextual. View "Seifert v. Unified Government" on Justia Law

Officer Matthews sued, alleging that the City of New York retaliated against him for speaking to his commanding officers about an arrest quota policy at his precinct. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Matthews spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and that his speech was, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit vacated, reasoning that because Matthews’s comments on precinct policy did not fall within his official duties and because he elected a channel with a civilian analogue to pursue his complaint, he spoke as a citizen. View "Matthews v. City of New York" on Justia Law