Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a deputy clerk at a courthouse in New Hanover County, North Carolina, was assigned to provide customer service at the courthouse front counter. Plaintiff requested to be assigned to a role with less direct interpersonal interaction, believing that her alleged social anxiety disorder hindered her ability to perform her job. Three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employer terminated her. Plaintiff sued her employer, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the movant and improperly resolved factual issues at the summary judgment stage in contravention of well-settled law. Remanded for trial. View "Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts" on Justia Law

Appellant was associated with Appellee, Raymond James Financial Services, as a securities broker. After Appellee decided to terminate Appellant’s contract, Appellant brought an arbitration proceeding before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, alleging that he had been fired because of his sexual orientation and his status as a recovering alcoholic, in violation of Vermont law. After granting the parties’ request that Florida law be applied to the proceedings, an arbitration panel awarded Appellant $600,000 in back pay on his claim of discrimination based on disability. The district court vacated the award, concluding that the arbitrators lacked authority to grant the remedy because Appellant brought no claims under Florida law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that although the arbitration decision may have been incorrect as a matter of law, the arbitrators’ decision to impose liability on Appellee under Florida law did not willfully flout the governing law or otherwise exceed the bounds of the arbitrators’ authority to resolve the parties’ dispute. Remanded for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk" on Justia Law

Dr. Simpson, an African-American was recruited to apply for a position at BDCH in 2010. BDCH’s CEO offered Simpson employment with the concurrence of BDCH’s COO. Both were aware of Simpson’s race. BDCH paid the recruiter $12,000. BDCH’s Physician Employment Agreement stated that Simpson “must apply for, obtain and maintain” active medical staff membership and clinical privileges. BDCH was to pay Simpson a $20,000 signing bonus “within five (5) days after first day of employment,” contingent on Simpson’s obtaining medical staff privileges and fulfilling other conditions of the employment agreement. Simpson applied for medical staff privileges at BDCH, stating that he was certified with the American Board of Family Physicians and held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana and Illinois. He also indicated that he was a defendant in two medical malpractice cases involving wrongful death, but did not disclose that these claims were not covered by malpractice insurance. Simpson noted that he had been placed on academic probation during his first year of residency. The Committee denied his application for staff privileges. Simpson sued under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of BDCH. Simpson failed to show that the Committee’s concerns were untrue, unreasonable, or pretexts for discrimination. View "Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps." on Justia Law

Marvalyn DeCambre, M.D., a physician specializing in pediatric urology, filed an action against Rady Children's Hospital-San Diego (RCHSD), Children's Specialist San Diego (CSSD) and the Regents of the University of California, alleging retaliation, harassment, racial discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and wrongful termination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). DeCambre also brought claims against all defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), defamation, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the Cartwright Act. DeCambre contended that throughout her tenure at RCHSD, defendants discriminated against her because of her race and gender. Each defendant filed a special motion to strike DeCambre's complaint. The trial court granted the motions in full on the ground that all of DeCambre's causes of action arose from RCHSD's decision not to renew its contract for DeCambre's services, which was the culmination of a peer review process that was protected as an official proceeding. The court also sustained defendants' demurrers to DeCambre's claims for IIED, defamation, unfair competition and violation of the Cartwright Act and denied DeCambre's request for leave to amend. On appeal, DeCambre argued the trial court erred in granting the special motions to strike because the defendants' peer review process was not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute and even it was, her claims did not arise from that process. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' anti-SLAPP motions as to DeCambre's claims for harassment and IIED. These claims did not arise from protected activity, and the Court rejected "defendants' attempt to cloak them in the protections afforded to peer review proceedings under the anti-SLAPP statute." Because the Court reversed this portion of the anti-SLAPP ruling, it also reversed and remanded the attorney fee awards. In addition, the Court remanded with directions that the court determine whether DeCambre should be afforded leave to amend her claim for defamation. View "DeCambre v. Rady Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

Love, who is African-American, was dismissed from the Milwaukee city hall renovation site, where he worked as a foreman, after a physical altercation with another worker. Cullen was the general contractor; Cullen’s subcontractor (Matthews) employed Union Contracting, which employed Love. Love brought a Title VII action against Cullen, alleging that his dismissal was racially motivated. Union, which had no contractual relationship with Cullen, paid Love’s salary and provided all other benefits, set Love’s hours, and passed Cullen’s instructions on to Love. Cullen only gave specific directions if it reviewed a finished product and found it unsatisfactory. In the event of “serious incidents” involving threats to workplace safety or productivity, Cullen retained the right to investigate its subcontractors’ employees, discipline them, and permanently remove them from the job site. According to Love, there was another physical altercation between two Caucasian workers at the site that resulted in no significant disciplinary action. The district court concluded that Love failed to demonstrate an “indirect” employment relationship and granted Cullen summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Cullen’s involvement in Love’s dismissal was relevant to their relationship, it was not enough to overcome other factors. Cullen, in the aggregate, exercised very little control over Love. View "Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Minnihan worked for Mediacom for 30 years. As an Ames, Iowa technical operations supervisor (TOS), His duties included observing service calls, being on call 24/7 to respond to outages; accident investigations; unannounced safety checks; and delivering equipment to the field. Mediacom provided a vehicle. At least half of his working hours were spent outside of the office. In 2009, Minnihan had a seizure and was prohibited, by Iowa law, from driving for six months. Mediacom reallocated his driving responsibilities. After another seizure, Mediacom asked Minnihan to apply for positions that did not require driving. Minnihan inquired about Family Medical Leave or having his position restructured. Mediacom accommodated him until October 2010, when Minnihan resumed his regular duties. In April, 2011, Minnihan had a third seizure. Mediacom transferred him to the Des Moines office in a non-driving position with the same pay and benefits as a TOS. Minnihan did not report to the position, although Mediacom provided transportation options, including another employee with whom Minnihan could ride to Des Moines. Mediacom terminated Minnihan's employment. After receiving right-to-sue letters from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minnihan sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Minnihan was not a qualified individual under disability law because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. View "Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Walz worked for Ameriprise, 1996-2012 and received mostly positive reviews. Walz suffers from bipolar affective disorder, which, beginning in 2012, caused her to interrupt meetings, disturb her coworkers, and disrespect her supervisor, Radel. Radel approached Walz several times to discuss her behavioral problems and to offer help, before issuing a formal warning. Walz applied for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, which was granted by a third-party administrator. Walz never disclosed the reason for her FMLA leave to Ameriprise. Upon returning from leave, Walz gave Radel a doctor’s note, clearing her to return to work and stating, “[s]he has been stabilizing on her medication.” Walz signed an Individual Treatment Policy, which explained Ameriprise’s policy against disability discrimination and the process for requesting accommodations. Months after returning to work, Walz’s erratic and disruptive behavior returned. Radel warned Walz, but Walz repeated her erratic and intimidating behavior in meetings. Ameriprise fired Walz because of her repeated misconduct. Walz never informed Ameriprise that she suffered from bipolar disorder or requested any accommodation. Walz sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, noting that Walz failed to establish that her termination was based on her disability and never requested an accommodation. View "Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated suit in federal district court against Defendant, their former employer, alleging employment discrimination. Plaintiff’s complaint included claims that Defendant had violated Iowa Code 216.6A, Iowa’s equal pay law. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims under section 216.6A should be dismissed to the extent that they arose before the effective date of that provision. After hearing oral arguments, the district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court to clarify Iowa law with respect to wage discrimination claims. The Supreme Court answered (1) section 216.6A applies on a prospective basis only to conduct occurring after its effective date; and (2) plaintiffs may recover damages for wage discrimination under the preexisting law, Iowa Code 216.6, and recoverable damages for loss of income are based on discriminatory wage payments that occurred within 300 days before the plaintiff filed a complaint with the civil rights commission. View "Dindinger v. AllSteel, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), filed a civil action in the district court pursuant to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, alleging several claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the VA dismissing all but one of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, concluding that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims were untimely and, in regards to another, Plaintiff failed to show a prima facie case of retaliation. Plaintiff then requested voluntary dismissal with prejudice of her remaining claim. The district court granted the request and dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and, thus, her claims were time-barred. View "Ayala v. Shinseki" on Justia Law