Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Washington, an African-American, began working for American Airlines in 2002, when American acquired the company for which Washington had worked since 1974. Washington applied for the position of Machinist in 2007, but was not promoted after the company’s examiner concluded that Washington failed to complete satisfactorily complete a qualifying test. Four other applicants, all Caucasian, tested with a different examiner before Washington; all were successful. The sixth applicant, also Caucasian, was tested by Washington’s examiner after Washington’s examination and failed. Washington was tested for more than four hours, but the examiner terminated the examination when he concluded that Washington removed the bushing he was machining from a lathe before he had finished. Washington claims that employees laughed and made disparaging comments. The company’s Manual provides that an employee “may have a witness of his choice present” during the exam. Washington had requested a union witness. A subject matter expert witnessed Washington’s exam, but no union witness was present. Washington exhausted administrative remedies and sued. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of American. Washington had not demonstrated that American was motivated by race (42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) or that race was a “contributing factor” under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.010. View "Washington v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Tammy Bryant filed suit against her employer, the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, and supervisor, Kim Littleton, in her individual capacity, claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the bases of sovereign and qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion in full. After review of the trial court record, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Department was entitled to sovereign immunity on Bryant’s self-care claims and that Littleton was entitled to qualified immunity on Bryant’s interference claims. View "Bryant v. Texas Dept of Aging & Disab." on Justia Law

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifies that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” 42 U.S.C 2000e(k), and that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Young, a UPS driver, became pregnant; her doctor advised that she should not lift more than 20 pounds. UPS required drivers to lift up to 70 pounds. UPS told Young that she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young filed a disparate-treatment claim of discrimination, identifying UPS policies that accommodated workers who were injured on the job, were covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or had lost Department of Transportation certifications. UPS argued that, since Young did not fall within those categories, it had not discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, but had treated her as it treated all “other” relevant “persons.” The district court granted UPS summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. Disparate treatment law normally allows an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class if the employer has a nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason. A pregnant worker can make a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that she sought and was denied accommodation and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then try to establish “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons, other than that it is more expensive or less convenient to accommodate pregnant women. If the employer offers a reason, the plaintiff may show that it is pretextual. The plaintiff may survive a motion for summary judgment by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to “significant burden” with evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. View "Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act alleging that Defendant, her employer, had engaged in sexual harassment and disability discrimination and had unlawfully terminated her on the basis of her national origin, religion, and race. The trial court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of Defendant. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment in the workplace and affirmed in all other respects, holding that Plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex. Remanded. View "Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc." on Justia Law

Hutchens is a black woman. A large-scale layoff in the Chicago public schools system’s Professional Development Unit, where she worked, required the unit to decide whether to retain her or a white woman, Glowacki, who Hutchens argues was less qualified. She claimed that the unit’s director, Rivera, preferred whites to blacks. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that their justification for the replacement that was not merely a “pretext.” The Seventh Circuit reversed as to racial discrimination (42 U.S.C. 1983) and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. A reasonable jury could credit Hutchens’ evidence while rejecting that of the defendants, and impressed by Hutchens’ credentials, her seniority over Glowacki, her earlier receipt of National Board Certification, her other credentials superior to Glowacki’s, her writing skills, and her toughness in teaching inmates of Cook County Jail year after year, could conclude that she was better qualified for the job than Glowacki. That reasonable jury might nevertheless deem Hutchens a victim not of racism but of error, ineptitude, carelessness, or personal like or dislike, unrelated to race. View "Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Lyons, a part-time lecturer at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, gave a student athlete a grade of “F” in the Fall 2010 semester. The student appealed. Lyons’s supervisor determined the student should be allowed to submit a second paper. Lyons complained to Dean Vaught, who referred the appeal to the Academic Standards Committee, which also determined the student should be allowed to write a second paper. Vaught upheld the ruling. The student submitted a second paper. An appointed committee gave it a 75% grade; Vaught instructed the registrar to change the student’s course grade to D. Lyons then met with Chancellor Morton, claiming preferential academic treatment for student athletes. Morton did not take action. Lyons continued to pursue the matter. He received no advance notice that his course would be eliminated for the Spring 2012 semester. Lyons sued for First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendant-administrators unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, alleging that Lyons failed to state a claim and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lyons failed to allege plausibly that his only constitutionally protected speech could have been a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ alleged adverse employment action. View "Lyons v. Vaught" on Justia Law

Robinson worked for Concentra as a medical assistant from 2003 until she was terminated in 2010. Robinson applied for Social Security disability benefits four days after being terminated, claiming that she had multiple sclerosis that rendered her unable to work. The initial application was denied. An ALJ reversed, summarizing Robinson’s statements that: she must use a cane to walk because of leg numbness; she has poor vision; her hands frequently cramp and she has difficulty holding objects; and she needs help with all household chores. Robinson then filed suit against Concentra under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, claiming that she had been terminated on the basis of her race and color and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC and taking FMLA leave and that Concentra had interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave. The court entered summary judgment, finding that Robinson was estopped from showing that she was qualified for her position when she was terminated in September 2010, because she received disability benefits based on her statement that she was fully disabled as of June 2010. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that Robinson failed to “proffer a sufficient explanation” for the contradictory statements. View "Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs.,Inc." on Justia Law

Jorge L. Vaello-Carmona worked for Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. from 1991 until his dismissal in 2009. In 2011, Vaello-Carmona filed a complaint against Siemens alleging disability discrimination and unlawful termination in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Puerto Rico’s general employment discrimination and employment disability discrimination statutes. Vaello-Carmona died one month after filing his complaint. Appellants subsequently moved to substitute themselves as plaintiffs in this case. The district court denied the motion and dismissed Vaello-Carmona’s complaint, concluding that Vaello-Carmona’s employment discrimination claims were not inheritable. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that Vaello-Carmona’s claims were inheritable under Puerto Rico law. View "Vaello-Carmona v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

Rattigan is a black male of Jamaican descent who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the FBI’s primary liaison to the Saudi intelligence service. In 2001, he accused supervisors in the FBI’s Office of International Operations, of discriminating against him on the basis of race and national origin and pursued charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office. One of those supervisors later sent Special Agent Leighton on a short assignment to Riyadh, where he evidently grew suspicious about Rattigan. The FBI Security Division conducted an investigation and concluded that the alleged security risks were “unfounded.” Rattigan filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the FBI because the memo on which Rattigan based his claim had been prepared not by one of the accused supervisors, but by Special Agent Donovan Leighton, who was not charged with discrimination and had no apparent reason to retaliate against him. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rattigan v. Holder" on Justia Law