Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former employee, sued on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, claiming that St. Luke’s violated the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime provisions by failing to fully compensate employees for work performed. She also brought an unjust-enrichment claim under state law. The district court certified two classes with different lookback periods: (1) an FLSA collective comprised of employees who worked for St. Luke’s between September 2016 and September 2018, 1 and (2) an unjust-enrichment class comprised of all employees who worked for St. Luke’s in Missouri between April 2012 and September 2018. Houston also asserted individual claims, one under the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, and one for breach of her employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment to St. Luke’s on all claims.   The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy does not average out over time. The court explained that no matter how one slices the data, most employees and the employees as a whole fared worse under the rounding policy than had they been paid according to their exact time worked. Here, the rounding policy did both. It resulted in lost time for nearly two-thirds of employees, and those employees lost more time than was gained by their coworkers who benefited from rounding. The court concluded that the employees have raised a genuine dispute that the rounding policy, as applied, did not average out over time. The district court, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment on the FLSA and Missouri wage claims. View "Torri Houston v. St. Luke's Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Title VII action against her employer, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or the “Bureau”) for allegedly taking retaliatory actions against her after she reported discrimination to the Bureau’s Equal Employment Office (“EEO”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI on several of Ramos’s allegations, finding that the FBI’s actions were not materially adverse in violation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. The district court also denied Plaintiff’s  motion for leave to amend her complaint to add new allegations of retaliation.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to the 2011 rescission of the offer to transfer to Unit 1B, but affirmed on all other grounds. The court explained that the Bureau provided a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the Unit Chief’s decision to make Plaintiff Backup Program Manager: concern for her well-being when she returned to work following medical leave and was still recovering from injuries. The Chief noted that the motive in looking to bring someone in was to give Plaintiff “a break” while she was on medical leave so that he would not “keep harassing her while she was on leave with work.” Then, when the Chief announced the reassignment after Plaintiff had returned from medical leave, he explained that he did not want to burden Plaintiff with a heavy workload as she was recovering from her injuries. As such, the court concluded that Plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that her reassignments were retaliatory. View "Laura Ramos v. Merrick Garland (PUBLIC OPINION)" on Justia Law

Singmuongthong describes himself as a tan-colored, Asian man of Laotian national origin. He worked as a correctional officer at Sheridan from 1998-2013, when he became a lieutenant at Sheridan. In 2016, he was promoted and became assistant warden of operations at a new facility, Kewanee. Singmuongthong received a five percent increase in his salary. Kewanee’s warden, Williams, was investigated in 2018 for inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature with subordinate staff and was terminated. That investigation also concluded that Singmuongthong had difficulty making good administrative decisions, had failed to report inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature, and spent too much time at bars with subordinate staff. Singmuongthong informed the regional deputy chief, Funk, that he was interested in the warden position. He was not chosen for the position because of his relationship with Williams and concerns about his judgment. Following a subsequent investigation of a separate allegation of sexual harassment, Singmuongthong was terminated from employment.Singmuongthong alleged discrimination based on his race, color, and national origin, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Singmuongthong appealed only his pay disparity and failure to promote claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. View "Singmuongthong v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a physician who provided medical care to Arkansas correctional facility inmates through her employer, Wellpath, LLC. Wellpath terminated Plaintiff’s employment, and she sued, claiming it unlawfully terminated her employment because she reported suspected alterations to her electronic patient medical records. The district court granted Wellpath’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas law regarding what constitutes legally protected conduct under the public policy exception to at-will employment and improperly determined at the summary judgment stage that Plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between her tampering reports and her termination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Arkansas’s employment-at-will doctrine, employers may generally discharge employees whose employment is for an indefinite term “for good cause, no cause, or even a morally wrong cause.” Further, Arkansas recognizes a limited exception to this doctrine providing a cause of action to an at-will employee “for wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the State.” The court explained that Plaintiff failed to show anything beyond mere speculation or her own conclusory allegations that call into question the legitimacy of Wellpath’s stated cause for her termination. The court wrote that reasonable minds could not believe an employer would see into the future and begin preemptively generating evidence to support an impermissible basis for terminating a whistleblower-to-be. Simply because Plaintiff reported suspected suspicious electronic activity while Wellpath administrators labored to resolve ongoing employment disputes does not abrogate Wellpath’s broad right to terminate her at-will employment. View "Melanie Jones v. WellPath, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Tug Hill Operating, LLC, for approximately a year and a half at rig sites in West Virginia. He commenced an action against Tug Hill under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that while Tug Hill formally classified him as an independent contractor, he actually qualified as an employee for purposes of the FLSA based on the degree of control that Tug Hill exercised over his work. He, therefore, claimed that Tug Hill was required to pay him overtime for those weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. Tug Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s action on the ground that Plaintiff was contractually required to arbitrate his claim against it. In addition, RigUp itself filed a motion to intervene in order to seek the action’s dismissal in favor of arbitration. The district court granted both motions.   The Fourth Circuit reversed both rulings and remanded. The court explained that the numerous provisions in the Agreement preclude any conclusion that the Agreement was entered into solely or directly for the benefit of Tug Hill, such that Tug Hill could enforce it as a third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Tug Hill’s motion to dismiss and compelling Plaintiff, under the arbitration agreement between him and RigUp, to proceed to arbitration with respect to his FLSA claim against Tug Hill. Moreover, the court explained that because RigUp’s agreement with Plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in any litigation, Plaintiff might have with a company in Tug Hill’s position RigUp cannot now opportunistically claim that intervention is necessary. View "Lastephen Rogers v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

Kinney worked as the hospital's director of imaging services. Her employer approved her 2018 request for intermittent medical leave due to anxiety. Kinney began working remotely in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. When safety protocols were developed, her coworkers returned to work in person. Kinney kept working remotely without asking permission. She asserts that she could not wear a mask in compliance with the hospital’s COVID-19 protocol because face coverings exacerbate her anxiety. When her absences led to complaints, hospital management told Kinney that she had to work on-site several days each week. Management denied her request for accommodations.Kinney resigned and sued the under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (alleging a hostile workplace, discrimination based on her sex in failing to select her for promotions, and constructive discharge), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 (retaliation). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the hospital. No reasonable juror could find that Kinney could perform certain essential functions of her job without being present in the department that she oversaw; Kinney was not a qualified individual for the job under the ADA and her accommodation request was not reasonable. Her resignation was not a constructive discharge. Kinney did not raise a genuine factual issue as to whether she was similarly or better qualified for the position than the chosen male candidate. View "Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims of age, race, and gender discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to her retaliation claim and that it erroneously concluded that she had failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ race-neutral explanations for not selecting her for two internal promotions were pretextual.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants’ explanations for her non-promotions were pretextual. Second, the court held that although the district court applied an incorrect standard to her retaliatory hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation and did not demonstrate that her employer’s non-retaliatory explanations were pretextual. The court explained that Defendant’s evidence supporting summary judgment established that Plaintiff received negative performance evaluations because she was not adequately or timely completing her duties and had become increasingly challenging to work with. The court wrote that Plaintiff has not rebutted this showing with evidence demonstrating that the reasons the NYCTA provided for the poor performance reviews were pretextual. Instead, she argues that the performance reviews must have been retaliatory due to their temporal proximity to her complaints. But she offers nothing more to establish causation. View "Carr v. New York City Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his position as Fire Chief for the City of Stockton based on his religion and, specifically, his attendance at a religious leadership event.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The panel held that, in analyzing employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California FEHA, the court may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, under which plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Finally, the burden returns to Plaintiff to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Alternatively, Plaintiff may prevail on summary judgment by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.   The court explained that Plaintiff was required to show that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” with respect to his FEHA claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in Defendants’ statements and the City’s notice of intent to remove him from City service. And Plaintiff also failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by Defendants. View "RONALD HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are twenty-six former employees of International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) who signed separation agreements requiring them to arbitrate any claims arising from their termination by IBM. The agreements set a deadline for initiating arbitration and included a confidentiality requirement. Plaintiffs missed the deadline but nonetheless tried to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). Their arbitrations were dismissed as untimely. They then sued IBM in district court, seeking a declaration that the deadline is unenforceable because it does not incorporate the “piggybacking rule,” a judge-made exception to the ADEA’s administrative exhaustion requirements. Shortly after filing suit, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and attached various documents obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel in other confidential arbitration proceedings. IBM moved to seal the confidential documents. The district court granted IBM’s motions to dismiss and seal the documents. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that (1) the filing deadline in their separation agreements is unenforceable and (2) the district court abused its discretion by granting IBM’s motion to seal.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that the piggybacking rule does not apply to arbitration and, in any event, it is not a substantive right under the ADEA. Second, the court held that the presumption of public access to judicial documents is outweighed here by the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitral confidentiality provisions and the impropriety of counsel’s attempt to evade the agreement by attaching confidential documents to a premature motion for summary judgment. View "In re IBM Arb. Agreement Litig." on Justia Law

Four employee benefit funds and their Boards of Trustees, as well as two labor unions (collectively, “Boards”), sued B.F.W. Contracting, LLC and B.F.W. Contractors, LLC (collectively, “Contractors”) to compel an audit and recover money damages pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed onto by Contractors. The district court granted summary judgment for the Boards and found damages in the amount of $48,568.76.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Boards argued that the Contractors forfeited the argument about supplemental dues because they failed to raise it before the district court. The court concluded that the Boards are incorrect. The Contractors made this argument in their Response to the Statement of Material Facts by Plaintiff, as well as in their Supplemental Reply Memorandum. The court found that this was enough to avoid forfeiture and allowed the court to consider the issue on appeal.   Additionally, the Boards argue that failure to pay the supplemental dues resulted in a breach of the CBA provision, which authorized the dues under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186(c)(2). However, as the plain language of the CBA makes clear, there is no violation of that provision if the Contractors never received the employee authorization cards as required by both the CBA and 29 -6- U.S.C. Section 186(c)(4). Without a breach of this subsection of the CBA, these statutory provisions are inapplicable. View "Greater St. Louis Const. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law