Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Randy Jenkins, a 51-year-old African-American man, served in the San Antonio Fire Department since 1986. The Fire Department was headed by the Fire Chief, Charles Hood, who managed a deputy chief, assistant chiefs, district chiefs, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and firefighters. In 2008, Jenkins was appointed as one of two district chiefs of Fire Prevention, reporting directly to Assistant Chief Earl Crayton. In this capacity, Jenkins was responsible for oversight of Community Safety & Education ("CS&E"). When the other district chief in the Fire Prevention Division left, Jenkins temporarily assumed his responsibilities. Eventually, a new district chief was assigned to the Fire Prevention Division and given responsibility for CS&E while Jenkins retained oversight of Special Events, Inspections, and Administration. After the recently appointed district chief left in 2009, Captain Christopher Monestier was hired as his replacement and assigned oversight of CS&E and Special Events. In 2011, Assistant Chief Crayton "realigned" Jenkins and Monestier’s duties. Jenkins did not suffer a reduction in rank or benefits but perceived the realignment as discrimination based on his race, color, or age as well as retaliation for giving a statement supporting an EEOC charge against Crayton. Jenkins filed an EEOC charge to this effect, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on May 16, 2012. Several other actions would lead Jenkins to amend his EEOC complaint to include several other "realignments." He ultimately sued, taking his right-to-sue letter to district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fire Department. It held that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the 2011 reassignment of duties were not timely filed. Even assuming his suit was timely, the district court found that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from both the 2011 reassignment and Jenkins’s non-selection as District Chief of Inspections in 2012 failed because he was unable to establish a prima facie case. Jenkins timely appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept" on Justia Law

Prior to his termination, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, a tin plate manufacturer, as a technician operator. After his termination, Petitioner and his wife (Petitioners) filed this action seeking damages for retaliatory discharge and loss of consortium, alleging that Petitioner was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and making complaints to Respondent about those permit violations. Respondents removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity. The federal district court then certified a question to the West Virginia supreme Court, which answered the question as follows: An employee who alleges that he was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under authority of the WPCA and making complaints to his employer about those permit violations has established the predicate substantial public policy required to prima facie prove that the employer’s motivation for the discharge was the contravention of public policy. View "Frohnapfel v. Arcelormittal USA LLC" on Justia Law

Here a panel of the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion filed on February 25, 2015 and replaced it with this amended opinion. The panel reversed the district’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sears, Roebuck and Co. in a suit filed by Plaintiff, a former employee of Sears. Plaintiff alleged three disability discrimination claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The panel concluded that Plaintiff presented triable claims under FEHA that deserved trial. The panel additionally noted (1) it was beside the point that some of Plaintiff’s evidence was self-serving because such testimony was admissible, though absent corroboration, it may have limited weight; and (2) a district court could disregard a self-serving declaration that stated only conclusions and not facts that would be admissible evidence. Remanded. View "Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a physician, filed an employment discrimination action against the California Emergency Physicians Medical Group (CEP) in state court. CEP removed the suit to federal court. Prior to trial, the parties agreed in writing to settle the case. The settlement agreement included a provision that Plaintiff waive his rights to employment with CEP or at any facility that CEP may own or with which it may contract in the future. Plaintiff refused to execute the written agreement and attempted to have it set aside. The district court ultimately ordered that the settlement be enforced and dismissed the case, concluding that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 16600, which provides that a contract is void if it restrains anyone from engaging in a lawful profession, did not apply because the no-employment provision in the settlement agreement did not constitute a covenant not to compete. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the parties’ dispute regarding whether the no-employment provision voided the settlement agreement was ripe for review under the traditional ripeness standard; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the settlement agreement from the ambit of 16600 solely on the ground that it did not constitute a covenant not to compete. Remanded. View "Golden v. Cal. Emergency Physicians Med. Group" on Justia Law

Nurse Dalton was terminated from her supervisory position at the ManorCare skilled nursing facility. Dalton alleged interference with her statutory rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, and discrimination based on her Chronic Kidney Disease disability in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Ch. 216, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. ManorCare claimed that nurses that Dalton supervised had complained about her job performance and that Dalton had received a Third/Final Written Warning for violating Major/Type B Work Rules, citing inappropriate negative comments about her work at the nurses’ station, where patients could overhear; failure to notify staff members she had cancelled a meeting; and taking an extended lunch break and failing to attend patient care conferences. There were also problems with attendance and late reports. Dalton understood that any further performance-related issue could result in termination. The district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Dalton’s termination was the end of an on-going, unrelated disciplinary process. View "Dalton v. Manor Care of West Des Moines, LLC" on Justia Law

In this appeal of the grant of summary judgment dismissing a complaint in a Title VII race-discrimination case, plaintiff Lieutenant Gayle McMullin, presented evidence, which, if believed by a jury, would have shown "a fumbling, bumbling case of determined efforts" to deny a promotion to McMullin. Lieutenant McMullin alleged that the Mississippi Department of Public Safety failed to promote her to the position of Training Director and instead promoted a less-qualified officer of lower rank to fill the position, based on race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, finding that Lieutenant McMullin failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination. Because the district court erred in granting summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for trial or other proceedings. View "McMullin v. MS Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and previous employees of the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation (SIFC), filed two similar lawsuits alleging that Defendants, the SIFC and its administrators, selectively enforced Puerto Rico’s merit principle against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district courts granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to identify similarly situated individuals treated differently by Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed on the same basis, holding that Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs failed to identify employees of a similar category that were similarly situated but who were treated differently by Defendants. View "Aponte-Ramos v. Alvarez-Rubio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, her former employer, alleging harassment, emotional stress, personal injury, loss of income, and age discrimination. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s discrimination and harassment claims where she not only failed to allege timely satisfaction of the statutory jurisdictional conditions precedent but failed to timely comply with the jurisdictional conditions precedent; and (2) the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s state law tort claims. View "Apodaca v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Superior Court of Nevada County (SCNC) appealed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and former employee Emily Gallup. Gallup brought this action alleging, in part, that SCNC retaliated against her in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) for engaging in protected activity when she complained to her supervisor, other court management, and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) that the Family Court Services Department (FCS) was not providing services in compliance with the law, rules, regulations, and policies. SCNC demurred to this cause of action on the ground Gallup had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under section 98.7. The trial court overruled the demurrer. The case was tried before the jury on the section 1102.5, subdivision (b) cause of action alone, as all Gallup’s other causes of action were disposed of by demurrer or summary judgment. The jury found in Gallup’s favor, awarding her past economic loss in the amount of $168,206, future economic loss in the amount of $105,000, and past noneconomic loss in the amount of $40,000, for a total of $313,206. SCNC appealed, raising as the only issue the trial court order overruling the demurrer. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that "Campbell v. Regents of University of California," (35 Cal.4th 311 (2005)), and not the precedent relied upon by SCNC, was the controlling authority, and reversed for consideration under the correct caselaw standard. View "Gallup v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law