Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., for discriminatory termination based on gender, retaliatory termination, and the creation of a hostile work environment. At issue was the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.Nassar on what Title VII retaliation plaintiffs must show to survive a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the McDonnell Douglas framework, which already incorporates a but for causation analysis, provides the appropriate standard for reviewing plaintiff’s claim. Applying this framework, the court found that summary judgment in favor of the University is not warranted on plaintiff's retaliation claim where a reasonable jury could conclude from plaintiff's evidence that the University's proffered justifications were not its real reasons for firing her and that the University's actual reason for firing her was to retaliate against her complaining about sexual harassment and for her subsequent complaints of ongoing retaliation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's gender-based discrimination claim and hostile work environment claim. View "Foster v. Univ. of Maryland Eastern" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Polish man of Jewish descent, filed suit against his employer, Mangia, and other individuals, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, retaliation, conspiracy, wrongful termination, and violation of various New York State and City laws. A jury found Mangia liable and awarded nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages in the amount of $900,000. After the verdict, plaintiff applied for an award of attorneys' fees and costs and Mangia moved for remittitur of the punitive damages award. The district court vacated the jury's liability verdict, conditionally granted Mangia's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and denied plaintiff's application for fees and costs. The court reversed the district court's ruling insofar as it vacates the liability verdict and award of nominal damages in the amount of $1 where, inter alia, the district court's rejection of the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was subject to a hostile work environment was essentially grounded in the type of evidence weighing and credibility determinations that are not permitted by Rule 50(b). The court affirmed the district court's ruling to the extent it vacated the award of punitive damages where no reasonable jury could conclude that Mangia's conduct was driven by an evil motive or intent, or that it involved a reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. The court remanded to the district court to determine what fees and costs, if any, plaintiff may recover given the highly unusual facts of this case. View "Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc." on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

Castro, Brooks, and Florez sued their former employer, DeVry University, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that DeVry retaliated against them by terminating their employment for complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor three months after plaintiffs complained. After that, he neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in the termination decisions. Evidence concerning their individual circumstances and job performance varies. The district court granted summary judgment to DeVry on all three claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the claims by Castro and Brooks, but reversed as to Florez. Castro was terminated 30 months after the complaint because of poor performance over a sustained period. Brooks was terminated 15 months after the complaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and inconsistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these reasons were pretexts for retaliation. Florez, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact about motive. He was terminated 10 months after the complaint for inconsistent performance and “volatile behavior.” DeVry has conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination. Florez offered evidence that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation was a pretext. View "Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc." on Justia Law

n 2007, Minneapolis Police Department Lieutenant Keefe was made commander of the Violent Offenders Task Force, involving the FBI, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The task force conducted a wiretap investigation of a gang. Keefe learned that gang members had threatened to kill police officers. Keefe told a local police chief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would brief the chief’s department about an ongoing investigation. ATF officials believed that this disclosure was inappropriate because the investigation involved a wiretap and notified Keefe that he was “prohibited from entering ATF office space.” In an unrelated investigation, a suspected gang leader identified six MPD officers as corrupt, triggering a corruption investigation. Keefe doubted the claims and confronted the informant. The FBI told his chief that Keefe was harming the investigation. Keefe was removed from the investigation and, after others voice concerns, was removed from the task force only months after his appointment. Keefe lodged a misconduct complaint (later designated unfounded) against an MPD Sergeant who was involved in his reassignment and made an anonymous telephone call to the chief’s wife. Keefe was disciplined for false allegations and demoted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Keefe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. View "Keefe v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Wheat, an African-American male, began working at the bank in 2001. By 2010, he was a payment processor in the wholesale-lockbox department and functioned as an “auditor” who “double-check[ed] [other] payment processor[s’] work.” In February 2010, Wheat was involved in a verbal altercation with a Caucasian worker, whose work Wheat had checked. Wheat’s employment was terminated because he “violated workplace violence policy … made a threat of physical violence … violated anti-harassment policy and … was in violation of [the bank’s] core values.” The other worker was given only a written disciplinary action, having been deemed a “nonaggressor.” Wheat contacted the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statutes occurred but could not obtain a settlement. The district court rejected Wheat’s claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Stat. 4112.02(A). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Wheat met his less-than-onerous burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination and identified genuine disputes of material fact that preclude a finding that the bank’s stated reasons for firing Wheat were not pretextual. View "Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is white, filed suit alleging state and federal claims of workplace retaliation and discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of the government's motion to exclude certain testimony offered by plaintiff and a police department captain and dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims. The court agreed with the district court that the statements at issue lacked foundation and plaintiff cannot show that all reasonable persons would reject the district court's decision to strike the testimony. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), where plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was treated less favorably because of his race than were other similarly situated employees who were not white, under nearly identical circumstances. Assuming that the district court dismissed plaintiff's race retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), sua sponte and without notice, the court held that the dismissal was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Paske, Jr. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a firefighter, sued Defendant, his employer, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Without making any finding that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, the trial court awarded Defendant its court costs. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Cal. Gov’t Code 12965(b) governs cost awards in FEHA actions, allowing trial courts discretion in awards of both attorney fees and costs to prevailing FEHA parties; and (2) the standard set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC applies to discretionary awards of both attorney fees and costs to prevailing FEHA parties under section 12965(b), but a prevailing defendant should not be awarded fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit. View "Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Respondent, a former employee of San Antonio Water System (SAWS), sued SAWS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA), alleging that SAWS retaliated against her for opposing a discriminatory employment practice. Specifically, Respondent contended that she was terminated because she confronted a male vice president about his repeated lunch invitations to two female employees outside his department. The jury awarded Respondent nearly $1 million in damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claim, holding that no reasonable person could have believed that sexual harassment under the TCHRA occurred, and therefore, Respondent did not engage in a protected activity under the TCHRA when she confronted the vice president. View "San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation action against New Breed Logistics, alleging that Calhoun, a New Breed supervisor, sexually harassed three women and retaliated against the women after they objected to his sexual advances. The EEOC also alleged that Calhoun retaliated against Partee, a male employee, who verbally opposed Calhoun’s sexual harassment and supported the women’s complaints. All four employees had been terminated from New Breed. A jury found New Breed liable under Title VII for Calhoun’s sexual harassment and retaliation and awarded the four employees compensatory and punitive damages totaling more than $1.5 million dollars. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as to liability and punitive damages and to the instructions submitted to the jury concerning employer knowledge with respect to retaliation. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. New Breed Logistics" on Justia Law