Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Before 2010, no disciplinary issues were recorded in the employment history of former BNSF Railway claims representative Ludlow. In 2009, Ludlow discovered his forged signature on documents submitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs certifying that coworker Fernandes was eligible to receive VA training benefits. Ludlow reported the forgery to his supervisor, Wunker, opining that Fernandes may have been responsible. Wunker did not investigate or report to his superiors, contrary to what Ludlow believed BNSF protocol required. In 2010, Ludlow reported the forgery to the BNSF police, notifying Wunker the following day. Wunker expressed concern that the disclosure could cost him his job and began sending complaints regarding Ludlow’s workplace behavior to Human Resources. After his termination, Ludlow sued for wrongful termination in violation of Nebraska public policy and whistleblower retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(3). A jury found BNSF liable on the NFEPA claim and awarded damages. The court awarded $206,514.13 in attorney’s fees and $22,202.16 in nontaxable costs. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions that Ludlow need only prove that his protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the termination and to the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. View "Ludlow v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a probationary Border Patrol agent, filed suit against the Department, alleging that he had been unlawfully terminated because of his race and color. The court concluded that, even assuming that plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, the government has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination, lack of candor. Plaintiff failed to show that the Department's decision was made in bad faith and there is no evidence of disparate treatment. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that he was similarly situated to permanent Border Patrol agents who were present at the Checkpoint at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "Thomas v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Abercrombie refused to hire Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship. The EEOC prevailed in the district court. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision requires Elauf to show that Abercrombie “fail[ed] . . . to hire” her “because of ” “[her] religion” (including a religious practice), 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1). Rather than imposing a knowledge standard, the statute prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge. An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions. Title VII allows failure-to-accommodate challenges to be brought as disparate-treatment claims and gives favored treatment to religious practices, rather than demanding that religious practices be treated no worse than other practices. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Rebouche began working for Deere as a technician in 1977. She claims she was passed over for promotions and asked to train male supervisors. In 1998 she and three others filed a complaint with human resources. As a result a supervisor was sent to sensitivity training. In 2002-2004 Deere engaged a consulting firm and redefined job titles. Rebouche alleges that none of the women in her department received pay grade increases, while men were elevated. Rebouche file a complaint with the EEOC. She was subsequently promoted. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting her claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) and Iowa law. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that allegations concerning events in 1998-2001 were time barred; that Rebouche failed to establish that similarly-situated males were treated differently during the remapping of jobs; and that there was no evidence of retaliation for the EEOC filing. View "Rebouche v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former Chief Deputy in the Sheriff's office, filed suit against the Sheriff, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana whistleblower statutes. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. The court concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because plaintiff's complaints about the recordings at issue were made within the scope of his employment and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that it would have been a waste of judicial resources to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff's state law claims were neither novel nor complex; the court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Sheriff’s Office committed an actual violation of Louisiana law and, therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:967; and La. Rev. Stat. 42: 1169 does not provide a private right of action for plaintiff to sue in either state or federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Tregre" on Justia Law

Employers filed a petition against the City claiming that a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination by all employers violated their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the antidiscrimination ordinance exceeded the City’s home rule authority and remanded. On remand, Employers argued that the City was liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a matter of law for attempting to enforce the antidiscrimination ordinance in violation of Employers’ rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association and their federal constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ordinance did not violate Employers’ federal constitutional rights; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Employers to amend their petition. View "Baker v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

Bonkowski worked for Oberg. He has health conditions, including an aortic bicuspid, diabetes, possible aortic aneurysm, and colon removal. On November 14, Bonkowski met with supervisors to discuss his suspension for allegedly sleeping on the job. According to Bonkowski, he experienced shortness of breath, chest pain, and dizziness, and the supervisors gave him permission to go home. He clocked out at 5:18 p.m. That night, his wife drove him to the hospital. He was admitted shortly after midnight. After testing, he was released in the early evening of November 15, with a doctor’s note. On November 16, Oberg notified Bonkowski that his employment was terminated because he had walked off the job on November 14. The district court rejected his suit under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2611(11)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed, based on a Department of Labor regulation, defining a “serious health condition.” The court held that “an overnight stay” means a stay for a substantial period of time from one calendar day to the next calendar day as measured by the time of admission and time of discharge. Bonkowski was admitted and discharged on the same calendar day. View "Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc" on Justia Law

On December 28, Hudson did not attend work as a Tyson supervisor due to illness. Hudson’s girlfriend (a Tyson employee) told Hudson’s supervisor, Beganovic, that Hudson would be late or absent that day. Hudson claims he texted Beganovic before his shift that he was having health issues and would be out a few days. Tyson’s attendance policy requires managers “to personally call their direct supervisor to report an unplanned absence.” Hudson claims that he often texted with Beganovic, and at least once before (acceptably) notified Beganovic of an absence by text. Hudson missed three work days, saw a doctor, and was diagnosed with back pain and depression. On January 3, Hudson went to Tyson with a doctor’s note and requested leave from December 28 until January 7. He intended to apply for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA ) leave. He signed an application, on which the non-FMLA box was checked. He claims someone else checked it after he signed. On January 4, Tyson granted Hudson non-FMLA leave. Hudson returned to Tyson on January 9 and was terminated for failure to comply with notification policy. Hudson sued under the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Tyson, noting disputes as to whether Tyson enforced its call-in policy. View "Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc." on Justia Law