Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Wagner worked for Gallup for 12 years before his 2011 termination at age 50. Wagner co-authored two books for Gallup. The first became a New York Times bestseller. Gallup still sells both books. Wagner received positive verbal feedback from individuals in management. Gallup presented him with many awards during his employment. In 2011, Bogart became Wagner's supervisor. Bogart was 35, but had worked for Gallup longer than Wagner. Wagner stated that he and Bogart only interacted twice while Bogart was his supervisor. Bogart called Wagner and discussed the ongoing transitional situation of Wagner’s position and Bogart's difficulty finding a place for Wagner on a team given the perception that Wagner was too "self-referential." During a second call, Bogart terminated Wagner, informing Wagner that his position had been eliminated. Wagner sued, alleging age discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and invasion of privacy based on appropriation of his name or likeness. Wagner submitted declarations from two former Gallup employees who had worked with Wagner. Both stated that Gallup had initiated a "youthful movement" and targeted older employees for termination. The district court granted judgment in favor of Gallup. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wagner was unable to establish a question of fact as to Gallup's motives for his termination and did not establish intentionality with respect to his privacy clam. View "Wagner v. Gallup, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City retaliated against him for engaging in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that the statements he made to his supervisors regarding the alleged unlawful hiring and use of temporary exempt employees, such as himself, in contravention of the San Francisco Charter were related to a matter of public concern and protected under the First Amendment. The district court concluded that defendant failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint, while potentially significant in their implications, arose primarily out of concerns for his own professional advancement and his dissatisfaction with his status as a temporary employee; the form and context of plaintiff's speech weighs strongly against finding that First Amendment protection is warranted; and, in this case, plaintiff voiced his grievances internally - at union meetings, to his supervisor, and to Human Resources - and they were specifically related to the conditions of his employment. Because plaintiff did not engage in protected speech, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. View "Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law

Respondents brought an action against their employer and its CEO (collectively, Petitioners) alleging gender discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. After a jury trial, Respondents were awarded $250,000 each for emotional distress as compensatory damages and $250,000 each in punitive damages. Petitioners filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial and requested a review of the punitive damages award. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of the circuit court to the extent that it denied Petitioners’ motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial on Respondents’ award of compensatory damages for their hostile work environment claims, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support their claims for sexual harassment based on hostile work environment; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s order to the extent that it denied Petitioners’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on Respondents’ award of punitive damages, holding that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the standards for the imposition of punitive damages. View "Constellium Rolled Prods. Ravenswood v. Griffith" on Justia Law

In the Democratic primary preceding the 2010 election, the candidates for Sheriff were Miller, a St. Joseph County Police Department sergeant, and Grzegorek. Grzegorek won the general election. Miller sought to be appointed either Assistant Chief or Warden of the county jail. Grzegorek appointed as Assistant Chief a man who had been Sheriff from 1985 to 1998 and retained the current Warden. The head of the Detective Bureau, an appointee of the new Sheriff, stated that Miller should take charge of the Property Room. The Department had accumulated about 1000 guns, which needed to be sorted. Miller took the position, which involved no change in compensation or rank, but months later, expressed dissatisfaction. He was offered a position in the Family Violence Unit. He declined, and continued in the Property Room until the sorting was complete, then returned to the Detective Bureau. Miller claims that his assignment to the Property Room was degrading and that he was not asked about his interest in other vacant positions that would have been promotions. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence of racial hostility. Miller’s qualifications were less impressive than those of the persons appointed to the positions he wanted. View "Miller v. St. Joseph County" on Justia Law

Locke, a parolee, sued Haessig, a state official, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, based on how Haessig responded to Locke’s complaint that her subordinate, a parole officer, was sexually harassing Locke. Locke provided evidence that Haessig was told of the harassment, failed to intervene or investigate, and then threatened to retaliate against Locke for complaining. The district court denied Haessig’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Haessig’s claim that she lacked the required intent to discriminate. Accepting Locke’s version of the facts, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Locke. Haessig was told of Locke’s complaints, but never met with him to discuss the allegations or tried to protect him from further harassment. According to Locke, after hearing of his complaint, Haessig expressed anger toward Locke and said he would never get off of his electronic ankle monitor until he was discharged from parole. A reasonable jury could infer intent to discriminate. That was clearly established law in 2008 when the events took place. Haessig had reasonable notice that her alleged actions were unlawful and so is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Locke v. Haessig" on Justia Law

Mintz started at Caterpillar in 2005. In 2007, Mintz was promoted to manufacturing engineer: an intermediary between the design department and the production floor, supervised by Turpen. Mintz moved to a different assembly line and, in 2011, began reporting to Rumler. Mintz’s duties included managing “grief” and engineering change orders; grief refers to discrepancy between what was ordered and what employees are scheduled to build. Mintz’s 2010 evaluation, prepared by Turpen, included an overall rating of “3B-Valued Performance.” The section that involved grief and change orders stated “does not meet.” His first review of 2011 resulted in a lower “3C” rating. Mintz, the only African American engineer working in the area at Caterpillar, believed that his rating was based on race. For the third quarter, Mintz received a “4-Needs Improvement,” indicating potential termination. Rumler assigned others to assist Mintz in resolving deficiencies. He allowed Mintz to work overtime and during a shutdown. Mintz’s 2011 year-end evaluation was “4”with a “does not meet” assessment of grief and change orders. His performance had worsened, causing tear down hours and assembly line down time. Mintz claimed racial discrimination. The year-end evaluation resulted in a $9,500 difference in his bonus payment. Mintz had no evidence of any race-related comments or jokes. He did not identify any Caterpillar employee that he believes was treated better than him. In 2012, Mintz transferred to another department where he remains employed. In his suit, claiming violation of Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Caterpillar. Mintz was not meeting legitimate expectations and had no evidence that his complaint of race discrimination caused his evaluation. View "Mintz v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

Stern worked at St. Anthony’s Health Center (SAHC) as Chief Psychologist, with supervisory, administrative, and clinical responsibilities. In 2010, Stern received an annual performance evaluation that assigned an overall score of 2.54/4, citing concerns over administrative responsibilities. Weeks later, a subordinate resigned and, during her exit interview, said Stern had “cognitive issues.” There had been patient complaints. Other coworkers expressed similar concerns about “possible dementia.” SAHC required Stern to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation and placed him on a paid leave of absence. SAHC agreed to Stern’s choice of the Chief of Clinical Neuropsychology at Washington University Medical School, for the evaluation. The final report indicated short-term memory deficiencies, with a level of memory functioning below expectation and stated “Stern is not believed to be fit for duty in his current position.” Stating that it could not provide a position with reduced responsibilities, SAHC terminated Stern. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted SAHC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stated that it was troubled that SAHC failed to engage in an interactive process to find reasonable accommodations to permit Stern to continue his employment, but that Stern failed to create an issue of fact as to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Before 2010, no disciplinary issues were recorded in the employment history of former BNSF Railway claims representative Ludlow. In 2009, Ludlow discovered his forged signature on documents submitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs certifying that coworker Fernandes was eligible to receive VA training benefits. Ludlow reported the forgery to his supervisor, Wunker, opining that Fernandes may have been responsible. Wunker did not investigate or report to his superiors, contrary to what Ludlow believed BNSF protocol required. In 2010, Ludlow reported the forgery to the BNSF police, notifying Wunker the following day. Wunker expressed concern that the disclosure could cost him his job and began sending complaints regarding Ludlow’s workplace behavior to Human Resources. After his termination, Ludlow sued for wrongful termination in violation of Nebraska public policy and whistleblower retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(3). A jury found BNSF liable on the NFEPA claim and awarded damages. The court awarded $206,514.13 in attorney’s fees and $22,202.16 in nontaxable costs. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions that Ludlow need only prove that his protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the termination and to the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. View "Ludlow v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law