Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

California enacted Senate Bill 863 to combat an acute “lien crisis” in its workers’ compensation system. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that SB 863 violates the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the Takings claim because the economic impact of SB 863 and its interference with plaintiffs’ expectations is not sufficiently severe to constitute a taking; the lien activation fee does not burden any substantive due process right to court access; assuming, without deciding, that the lien activation fee is analogous to a tax, its retroactive effect does not violate due process because its retroactivity is justified by a rational legislative purpose; the district court abused its discretion in finding that a “serious question” exists as to the merits of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim; in the absence of a “serious question” going to the merits of this claim, the preliminary injunction must be vacated; the exemption provision is rationally related to the purpose of clearing the lien backlog amounts to a determination that plaintiffs have no chance of success on the merits because, regardless of what facts plaintiffs might prove during the course of litigation, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data;" the presence in the Commission Report of evidence suggesting that non-exempt entities are the biggest contributors to the backlog is sufficient to eliminate any chance of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits; and the court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and reversed. View "Angelotti Chiropractic v. Baker" on Justia Law

Heartland provides laboratory services to long-term healthcare facilities. Watson, an African-American woman, was a route phlebotomist, traveling to several facilities, drawing blood from patients, and returning to the lab to process the samples. As a new employee, Watson was subject to a 90-day probationary period. Watson's route included Plaza Manor, where she was assigned to draw blood from Ramsey. While Watson was attempting to draw Ramsey's blood, he touched Watson’s inside thigh and moved his hand upward. Watson told Ramsey to stop and brushed his hand away. When Ramsey touched her "crotch area," Watson knelt down to draw Ramsey's blood. Ramsey put his hand on her side. After she stopped attempting to draw blood, Ramsey "grabbed the back of [Watson's] neck to try to kiss [her]." Watson left and reported the incident to Heartland, which ensured that she never provided services for Ramsey again, but denied her request for a route change. Watson continued to visit Plaza Manor. Ramsey verbally assaulted Watson, making racial and sexually derogatory remarks. After the seventh incident, Watson missed three days of work. Under Heartland's policy, an employee is considered to have voluntarily abandoned her job after two consecutive days of absence without properly notifying Heartland. Heartland left multiple voicemail messages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting her claims of hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act. View "Watson v. Heartland Health Labs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, 26 N.Y. Exec. Law 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as his defamation claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court except with respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary judgment based on plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff submitted evidence that the principal of the school changed the person who conducted plaintiff's year-end evaluation without providing notice to plaintiff, that the principal relied on the 2008-2009 evaluations at issue in isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews were aberrational. These irregularities, when combined with the principal's alleged remarks, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Tolbert v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County, District Attorney Pat Lykos, and one of her assistants, Rachel Palmer, for causing their termination by the college that had contracted to oversee breath alcohol testing for the Sheriff's Office. Plaintiffs also raised state law claims. The district court dismissed all of the claims. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the County that it ratified Palmer's and Lykos's alleged retaliatory campaign; reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference with a contract claim; reversed the dismissal of tortious interference claims; and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Culbertson v. Lykos" on Justia Law

Demonstrators gathered outside an abortion clinic, planning to display signs containing images of aborted fetuses. Then-Officer Lalowski was finishing an overnight shift when he noticed the demonstrators and stopped his marked police vehicle, telling demonstrators not to impede traffic or to stop anyone from entering the clinic and that he would arrest them if they did not comply. Emmerth claims Lalowski called her a “fat fucking cow.” Others claim that Lalowski used repeated profanities and threats. Lalowski concedes that the confrontation was “adversarial” but denies using profanity. The exchange lasted only minutes. Later, he decided to confront the demonstrators about their signs. Off duty, wearing plain clothes, he returned in his personal vehicle, and spoke to an officer on duty and to Emmerth, making insulting comments about her weight and touching her. Lalowski stayed for approximately 80 minutes. A demonstrator called 911 to request police assistance in dealing with him. An investigation of his conduct resulted in a report that “Lalowski’s conduct … toward the public was harsh, profane, and unruly and caused a huge disturbance.” Lalowski’s disciplinary history included five suspensions and two written reprimands. After hearings, Lalowski was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claim of retaliation for protected speech, 42 U.S.C. 1983, but vacated with respect to his Illinois law administrative review claim. View "Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer, Hamlin, discriminated against her on the basis of race and disability, and that Hamlin interfered with, or retaliated against her for exercising her right to take medical leave. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a default judgment and sua sponte dismissed with prejudice her second amended complaint. The court concluded that the district court evaluated plaintiff’s race- and disability discrimination claims under the wrong standard, but that even under the right standard, her complaint plainly fails to make out a claim of disability discrimination; and the district court improperly dismissed the interference portion of her Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., claim without giving her notice and an opportunity to respond, though it properly dismissed the retaliation portion of this claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against FISD, alleging that FISD discriminated against him because of his race and retaliated against him for reporting the discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), Tex. Labor Code 21.051, 21.055. The court concluded that FISD's collateral-estoppel claim fails because plaintiff did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate his pending discrimination and retaliation claims before the hearing examiner; FISD is not entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff's discrimination claim because FISD conceded at oral argument that there is a genuine dispute for pretext and a genuine dispute of material fact exists for whether the allegedly discriminatory animus is imputed to FISD; and FISD is not entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff's retaliation claim where there is a genuine dispute of material fact for why plaintiff's contract was nonrenewed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board, alleging that it violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff was involved in an incident with a student at the high school where he was employed as an assistant principal. Plaintiff subsequently filed for medical leaves due to his post-traumatic stress disorder which was related to the CPS investigation that occurred after the incident. Plaintiff was also transferred to a different school. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the Board did not interfere with plaintiff's FMLA rights and did not retaliate against plaintiff for exercising such rights. The court also rejected plaintiff's ADA claim, concluding that evidence demonstrated that the Board did not discriminate nor retaliate against him based on his disability. Further, the Board did not fail to accommodate plaintiff's condition. View "Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is blind, filed suit against the County, alleging violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, or Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. Plaintiff was employed by the County when the County opened a new call center using software that was inaccessible to blind employees. The County did not transfer plaintiff to the new call center along with her sighted coworkers and the County also did not hire her for a vacant position there. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on the Section 504 claim, finding that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether plaintiff could perform the essential job functions of a call center employee; whether the County reasonably accommodated her; and if the County did not, whether its failure to do so may be excused because of undue hardship. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on the Title II claim where public employees cannot use Title II to bring employment discrimination claims against their employers. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty, MD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, police officers for the Town of Mocksville, filed suit alleging that the Town and others violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights when plaintiffs were terminated for speaking out about corruption and misconduct at the Mocksville Police Department. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs acted as private citizens on a matter of undisputed public concern by privately reaching out to the Governor's Office about suspected corruption and misconduct. Such actions cannot be considered as part of plaintiffs' daily professional activities. Further, it was clearly established law at the time that speech about serious misconduct in a law enforcement agency is protected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Defendants Cook and Bralley. View "Hunter v. Mocksville, NC" on Justia Law