Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a lawyer for the PBGC, filed suit claiming that, in retaliation for her Title VII activities, the PBGC made her work environment a hostile one. Both of plaintiff's complaints have been consolidated on appeal. The court concluded that the incidents the PBGC failed to remediate would not themselves constitute a retaliatory hostile work environment, and that several instances of rude emails, name-calling, lost tempers and unprofessional behavior do not amount to a retaliatory hostile work environment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of her two complaints. View "Baird v. Gotbaum" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

First National sought a successor for Senior Vice President of Operations Downing. Cox, a woman, began at First National in 2008 as Vice President of Loan Operations, reporting to Downing. She had 21 years of experience, plus a graduate degree. Her 2009 and 2011 performance appraisals rated her “Meets Expectations.” Doyle, a man, began at First National in 2000 and became Vice President of Payment Operations, reporting to Downing. He had more than 10 years’ previous experience. He was rated “Meets Expectations” in 2011 and “Exceeds Expectations” in 2009. Anticipating retirement, Downing created a matrix, rating potential candidates. Doyle rated higher in: “Leadership,” “Peer Respect,” and “Managerial Acceptance.” President O’Neill made the decision. O’Neill did not interview the candidates, did not review their resumes or appraisals, but studied Downing’s matrix. One of 15 executive officers was female, one member of the 12-member Board of Directors, and one of 18 employees reporting directly to O’Neill. O’Neill promoted Doyle. Cox remained in the same position; O’Neill gave her a raise and increased responsibility. Cox sued for gender discrimination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Taken as a whole, Cox did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact that O’Neill’s reasons for promoting Doyle are “unworthy of credence.” Only the lack of female executives supported pretext. View "Cox v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Sellers, a Deere employee for more than 30 years, sued Deere and his supervisor, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act; disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act), 42 U.S.C. 12101; retaliation under the ADEA, ICRA, and ADA; and harassment because of his age and disability. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Sellers did not suffer an adverse employment action when his title and duties changed during a company-wide personnel reorganization. Incidents identified by Sellers may have been “rude or unpleasant,” but they were not “severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.” View "Sellers v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, a company providing optometric care, as a clinical technician. Defendant terminated Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff consistently failed to meet performance expectations over her five years of employment. Plaintiff filed suit, claiming unlawful discrimination based upon a perceived disability. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not proper where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment based upon Defendant’s perception that Defendant had a disability. Remanded. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialities, P.C." on Justia Law

Burciaga began working at Ravago in 2007. Howe, a customer service manager, was her supervisor. Burciaga utilized Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave in 2008 and 2010-2011, for the births of her children. Burciaga received raises after each leave. After Burciaga returned to work in 2011, she had several performance-related issues. Howe warned that if the errors continued, she could be terminated. Burciaga requested FMLA paperwork in 2012, for intermittent leave to care for her son. Ravago’s human resources department approved her leave. According to Burciaga, Howe provided her time off for appointments when she requested it and was flexible with scheduling so she could attend appointments. Burciaga thereafter took FMLA leave for half a day on August 8, September 5, and September 6. After Burciaga returned from leave on September 6, she committed several shipping errors over the following three weeks. On the 28th, Burciaga’s employment was terminated. Howe indicated the termination was due to Burciaga’s shipping errors. Howe also could not provide Burciaga with the specific monetary amount her errors cost Ravago. Neither Howe nor Kramer referenced Burciaga’s absences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ravago on her FMLA claim. View "Burciaga v. Ravago Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American flight attendant, filed suit alleging that United Airlines failed to adequately respond to a racist death threat left in her company mailbox. The district court concluded that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, but granted summary judgment to the airline after deciding that it was not liable for the offensive conduct. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could properly construe the notes at issue as racially-tinged death threats so severe that it does not matter they were not pervasive. The court concluded that the anonymous nature of severe threats or acts of harassment may, in fact, heighten what is required of an employer, particularly in circumstances where the harassment occurs inside a secure space accessible to only company-authorized individuals. In this case, the conduct at issue is some of the most serious imaginable in the workplace – an unmistakable threat of deadly violence against an individual based on her race, occurring in the particularly sensitive space of an airport. Given the severity of the threat, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was neither prompt nor reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was instead reluctant and reactive, intended to minimize any disruption to day-to-day operations instead of identifying a perpetrator and deterring future harassment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007-2012, Stewart was supervisor of a branch office for Rise, a welfare-services non-profit entity that obtained funding from a Minnesota welfare program, "Pathways." Stewart supervised counselors who directly assisted clients. Stewart's performance was measured in part by the relative workforce participation rate for her office's clients compared to clients of other Pathways organizations. During Stewart's tenure, other offices closed, a state government shut-down occurred, and workloads from different offices were consolidated, without a commensurate increase in staffing. When Stewart began working at Rise, the workforce participation rate was at a generally acceptable level. By the time she was terminated, her office’s performance had deteriorated. Stewart's predecessor and successor were, like Stewart, American-born African-American women. Stewart claimed that male, Somali-born subordinates created a hostile work environment through sexist, racist, and nationalist comments and through physical violence and intimidation, and that her supervisors ignored her complaints, denied her the authority to terminate the offending employees, allowed the hostile environment to persist, and eventually terminated her employment as an act of discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for Rise. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remand as to the hostile work environment claim but otherwise affirmed. View "Stewart v. Rise, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joyce Rock was terminated from her position as principal of a school in the Central Consolidated School District (the District) after she spoke at a public meeting in opposition to a proposal by the District’s administration to close her school. Rock brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against defendants the District’s Board of Education and Superintendent Don Levinski, alleging that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against her for her speech. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not violate Rock’s First Amendment rights and that Levinksi was entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rock’s interest in publicly expressing her policy views did not overcome Defendants’ concern that those holding high-ranking policy positions speak publicly with a single voice on policy matters. View "Rock v. Levinski" on Justia Law