Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Puerto Rico National Processing Service Center (PR-NPSC), which is now closed, run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that FEMA’s actions in implementing a rotational staffing plan at the PR-NPSC, which reduced the number of work days for each employee, and in eventually closing the facility discriminated against them on the basis of national origin and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims failed because (i) Plaintiffs expressly disavowed any claim of intentional discrimination, and under relevant caselaw, claims of different treatment based on location absent a claim of intentional discrimination do not establish liability under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h), and (ii) the challenged actions were job-related and consistent with business necessity, and Plaintiffs failed to show that there were alternatives available to FEMA that would have had less disparate impact and served FEMA’s legitimate needs; and (2) both retaliation claims failed because Plaintiffs did not show that the allegedly adverse employment actions were causally related to any protected conduct. View "Abril-Rivera v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Puerto Rico National Processing Service Center (PR-NPSC), which is now closed, run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that FEMA’s actions in implementing a rotational staffing plan at the PR-NPSC, which reduced the number of work days for each employee, and in eventually closing the facility discriminated against them on the basis of national origin and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims failed because (i) Plaintiffs expressly disavowed any claim of intentional discrimination, and under relevant caselaw, claims of different treatment based on location absent a claim of intentional discrimination do not establish liability under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h), and (ii) the challenged actions were job-related and consistent with business necessity, and Plaintiffs failed to show that there were alternatives available to FEMA that would have had less disparate impact and served FEMA’s legitimate needs; and (2) both retaliation claims failed because Plaintiffs did not show that the allegedly adverse employment actions were causally related to any protected conduct. View "Abril-Rivera v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Silk began working in 1986 at Moraine Valley Community College as a part-time, non-tenure track, adjunct professor. Silk’s typical teaching load included four courses during fall and spring semesters and two or three summer classes. The College finalized written contracts with adjuncts just before the start of the semester. In March 2010, Silk agreed to teach two sociology courses during the summer term. In April, Silk took a medical leave of absence for heart surgery and did not inform the College of his anticipated return date. During visits to Silk’s classes to arrange for substitute instructors, administrators discovered problems with assignments, syllabi, and attendance. Administrators informed Silk that his summer classes had been reassigned. The dean met with Silk to discuss the issues with his classes. Silk was assigned two courses for the fall 2010 semester. Issues arose during a classroom observation by administrators. The dean instructed human resources to place Silk on the “do-not-hire list” and informed Silk that there would be no more classes for him. Silk’s students filed a complaint regarding Silk’s instruction. After his termination, Silk filed suit, alleging discrimination based on age and disability and retaliation for having filed an EEOC complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the College, except with respect to the fall 2010 semester, and remandedfor determination of whether the College reduced Silk’s course load because of perceived impairment. View "Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Velez-Velez, a Popular Democratic Party (PDP) member, lost her job with the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority after an election returned the opposing political party, the New Progressive Party (NPP), to office. Plaintiff was informed on February 11, 2010 that she would be terminated under the new NPP administration’s ruling that one set of hiring policies under which Plaintiff was hired was unlawful and therefore, those employees hired under the erroneous determinations must be terminated. Plaintiff requested a hearing, and on November 8, 2010 the Examining Officer recommended affirming the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. On December 20, 2011, Plaintiff and her husband filed this complaint, alleging claims for political discrimination, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the discrimination claim was time-barred. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that the clock did not begin to run until she was formally terminated after the hearing. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff was informed on February 11, 2010 of the re-interpretation of policy. View "Velez-Velez v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Sergeant Boulton, working in the county jail, was a union leader. The union initiated mandatory contract arbitration with the Sheriff’s Office, at which Undersheriff Swanson testified regarding Taser, firearm, and CPR training. Boulton testified that Swanson had misrepresented the degree of training. The next day, Boulton was instructed to wear his uniform or business attire to subsequent arbitrations. When he later wore a blazer and golf shirt, he was investigated for failing to follow a direct order. Soon after, there was a short power outage at the jail. Boulton was told that there would be an investigation of his actions during the outage. Boulton was notified that subordinates had brought complaints against him and that the department was starting a new investigation. Boulton was “forbidden to inquire with any witnesses or investigators.” Boulton admits that he asked his subordinates for details about the investigation. Boulton was suspended without pay for several days and demoted for creating a “hostile” and “unprofessional” environment for subordinates and for making derogatory comments to female detainees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. Boulton’s speech at the arbitration was protected by the First Amendment, but he did not show that the demotion and suspension resulted from a policy against criticism, rather than his other “extensive misconduct.” View "Boulton v. Swanson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCC, his former employer, on his claim of discrimination in violation of Oregon disability law. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that an employee whose stress leads to violent threats is not a “qualified individual” under the Oregon statute. In this case, plaintiff had threatened to kill co-workers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law