Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) supervisor Outlaw suspended Jones with full pay after he discovered apparent fraud in her timesheets. Jones complained to SEPTA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office that Outlaw had “sexually harassed” and “retaliated against” her. Outlaw referred the timesheet matter to SEPTA’s Office of Inspector General, which concluded that Jones collected pay for days she hadn’t worked by submitting fraudulent timesheets. SEPTA terminated her. Jones filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. SEPTA ended its internal investigation, concluding that Outlaw had engaged in inappropriate behavior by once asking Jones to step on his back to relieve spinal pain. This was noted in Outlaw’s performance evaluation, and he was required to attend training regarding SEPTA’s sexual harassment policy. Jones filed suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; common law wrongful termination; and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court rejected all claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. Jones’s suspension with pay did not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. Any adverse actions Jones did suffer were not sufficiently linked to any alleged misconduct to support a claim of discrimination or retaliation. View "Jones v. SE Pa. Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Town of Camden for thirty-one years prior to being laid off. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police union and the Town provided for recall of qualified employees based on seniority. During the twelve-month period after Plaintiff was laid off, vacancies opened in the Camden Police Department, but the Town did not recall Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Town had deprived Plaintiff, without due process of law, of his property interest in his right to be recalled. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the CBA contained a condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to submit his address and phone number to the Town after his layoff in order to assert his recall rights and that Plaintiff did not submit such information post-layoff. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the CBA recall provision did not unambiguously create a condition precedent, and therefore, further fact-finding was necessary. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Freescale and Manpower under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, alleging discriminatory termination and a claim under the Texas Labor Code alleging retaliatory termination based on her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of pretext, and therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's ADA claim. However, the court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because Freescale did not provide plaintiff's workers' compensation coverage and because there is no evidence that Manpower acted with a retaliatory motive. View "Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Carilion, alleging wrongful termination for engaging in protected activity, including opposing an unlawful employment practice, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that no individual activity in which plaintiff engaged by itself constituted protected oppositional conduct and that the so called “manager rule,” in any event, prevented an employee whose job responsibilities included reporting discrimination claims from seeking protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. The court held, however, that the proper test for analyzing oppositional conduct requires consideration of the employee’s course of conduct as a whole and that the “manager rule” has no place in Title VII jurisprudence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

In 2008, Wages began working as a caretaker for StuartCo, a property management firm, responsible for vacuuming, cleaning, mopping, washing windows, dusting, and snow removal. Wages worked 30 hours per week. Her employee record was unblemished. In 2009, Wages learned she was pregnant. The doctor considered her pregnancy to be high risk. Wages experienced abdominal pain in October. Her doctor directed her not to vacuum or mop and provided her a note for her employer. StuartCo redistributed those duties to other employees and contacted the doctor to verify no other job duties were restricted. In November, Wages’s doctor prohibited snow removal. Wages missed three days of work, in November due to abdominal pain. Her doctor limited her to working no more than 20 hours per week. StuartCo terminated her employment, stating that it was “unable to accommodate the work restrictions provided by your physician.” Wages sued, alleging violations of her rights under the FMLA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wages on her FMLA entitlement claim and her FMLA retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded for a jury trial on damages. View "Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a white Foreign Service Officer, filed suit alleging that the State Department's hiring plan aimed to increase racial diversity among the officers corps in the Foreign Service violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court agreed with the district court's reliance on two Supreme Court decisions, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, to grant summary judgment in favor of the State Department. Johnson and Weber both upheld employers' affirmative action plans against Title VII challenges. In this case, the Department has introduced evidence that the plan worked to target manifest imbalances in senior-level positions in the Foreign Service and that those imbalances resulted from past discrimination. The Department has also introduced evidence that the plan refrained from unnecessarily trammeling the rights of non-minority candidates. Further, plaintiff failed to prove that the Department's justification is pretextual and that the plan is invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Shea v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Sweatt , an African-American male, worked for Union Pacific, performing manual labor jobs. After a few years, Sweatt experience pain in his shoulder and hands. It progressed to the point that Sweatt could no longer do his job. Sweatt sought a less strenuous position— Security Officer—through Union Pacific’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Sweatt did not get the job. Sweatt sued, alleging violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Seventh circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific. Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue before November 30, 2009, outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them time-barred. Regarding the failure to hire, the court noted that Sweatt was not forthcoming about an arrest incident during his interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount. View "Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Hector Luis Roman-Oliveras (Roman) was dismissed from his job after working for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) for over twenty years. Roman, along with his wife and mother, brought suit against PREPA and two individual supervisors, alleging that Defendants unlawfully targeted Roman due to his medical disability and his union activities. In 2012, the parties held settlement negotiations, which took place in the district judge’s chambers. The judge memorialized an account of the discussions in a minute entry recounting that the parties had reached a binding oral settlement agreement. The parties, however, did not submit a final written agreement. Another district judge later dismissed the case with prejudice on the basis of the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that “an agreement had never been reached,” and, assuming such a settlement had been reached, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the talks conducted in 2012 produced a binding oral settlement agreement that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce. View "Roman-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a border patrol agent, filed suit against DHS, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), because the agency did not promote him based on his age. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's rebuttable presumption approach and held that an average age difference of ten years or more between the plaintiff and the replacements will be presumptively substantial, whereas an age difference of less than ten years will be presumptively insubstantial. The court concluded that, in this case, the average age difference between plaintiff and the selected Assistant Chief Patrol Agent is eight years, which is presumptively insubstantial. However, the court concluded that, although less than ten years older than his replacements, plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that the agency considered age in general to be significant in making its promotion decisions, and that the Tucson Chief Patrol Agent considered plaintiff’s age specifically to be pertinent in considering plaintiff’s promotion. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting plaintiff where plaintiff did not meet the leadership and judgment required for the GS-15 positions. The court concluded, however, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Chief influenced or was involved in the hiring decisions of the GS-15 positions, despite that he was not the final decisionmaker. Further, the district court erred in concluding that the Chief had a limited role in the hiring decision and did not consider the Chief's repeated retirement discussions with plaintiff in assessing whether the Chief's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment and the court reversed and remanded. View "France v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and three supervisors at ACS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on race, and retaliated against because of complaints about such discrimination. Plaintiff also alleged that she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court vacated the district court's judgment granting defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII; plaintiff's disparate treatment claim against Defendant Baker under sections 1981 and 1983 where only Baker was involved in the decision to demote plaintiff; and plaintiff's retaliation claim against Baker under section 1981 where she alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court affirmed as to the other claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Littlejohn v. City of New York" on Justia Law