Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2002 Brown began working for Diversified. She was promoted and received excellent reviews. In 2009 Brown became an account executive. Brown struggled in the position, repeatedly making serious record-keeping errors. Brown took 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, after receiving a breast cancer diagnosis. Diversified provided Brown with additional training after she returned, and her 2011 reviews noted improvement, but still identified needed improvement. Diversified was purchased by a new owner, who told Brown’s new manager to rank employees and discharge the lowest performers. After determining that Brown was underperforming, management decided to move Brown to a different position. Diversified accommodated Brown’s high risk pregnancy and did not immediately change her job, but then lost a major account. Diversified accommodated Brown’s request to work from home for several weeks. Brown was fired five days after complaining about her reassignment .The district court granted Diversified summary judgment on all FMLA and state law claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part: where an employer has known its stated reason for taking adverse action against an employee for an extended period of time, but only acts after the employee engages in protected activity, the employer's earlier inaction supports an inference of pretext. View "Brown v. Diversified Distrib. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Ralph Bailets was employed by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission from 1998 to 2008. Appellant achieved “outstanding” and “commendable” performance ratings while employed as the Commission’s manager of financial reporting and systems. During this time, appellant frequently complained that he observed improprieties and wasteful practices regarding various matters, including a Commission computer systems contract with Ciber, Inc., EZPass discounts, politically motivated personnel actions, and the use of multiple, unnecessary external investment managers. Appellant’s job title and responsibilities were changed in June, 2008, he was removed from an additional position as assistant secretary-treasurer around the same time, and his employment by the Commission was ultimately terminated in November, 2008. Believing these actions were retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing and waste at the Commission, appellant filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging a single claim under the Whistleblower Law, against the Commission, Anthony Q. Maun, the Commission’s director of accounting; and Nikolaus H. Grieshaber, the Commission’s chief financial officer (collectively, appellees). In an unreported, single-judge opinion, Senior Judge Friedman held the decision to terminate appellant was “a management discretionary action, motivated by legitimate employer objectives.” The court concluded there were legitimate reasons for firing appellant, and there was nothing in the record establishing the decision makers who terminated his position were even aware of appellant’s reports of alleged wrongdoing and waste; the evidence instead showed 15 positions were eliminated in November, 2008, because of “a poor economy, declining traffic, and necessary expense reductions across the Commission.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court. The Court found sufficient evidence that appellant made prima face evidence of violations of the Whistleblower law, "which at the very least created issues of material fact to preclude the grant of summary judgment." View "Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Commission" on Justia Law

In 1986, Packer, a Ph.D. in physiology, began work as a post-doctoral fellow at Indiana University’s School of Medicine. She was appointed to the tenure-track position of assistant professor in 1994. Packer’s 1999 application for tenure on the faculty was denied, but Packer successfully grieved the denial, and in 2001, was awarded tenure. Faculty members are evaluated based on teaching, research, and service. A faculty member’s overall performance is deemed satisfactory if she meets the minimum requirements in all three areas or if she is rated excellent in either teaching or research. The University represents that Packer, in the years leading up to her termination, repeatedly failed to meet expectations with respect to publication and external funding. Packer contends that her research performance is better than the University claims; that any deficiency was because the department chairman assigned her insufficient and inappropriate lab spaces and interfered with her efforts to obtain grant money; and that male faculty members whose research performance also fell short of expectations suffered no adverse consequences. In her suit, alleging sex discrimination, the University moved for summary judgment. Packer’s counsel did not properly support the elements of her claims with specific citations to admissible record evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University. View "Packer v. Trs .of Ind. Univ." on Justia Law

Karen Nosal-Tabor was a registered nurse who previously worked in the cardiology department at Sharp Chula Vista Medical Center (Sharp). In 2011, Sharp implemented "nurse-led" cardiac stress testing in which a physician is not physically present during the tests. Nosal-Tabor repeatedly refused to perform nurse-led stress tests and made numerous complaints concerning the testing to Sharp's management. Among Nosal-Tabor's complaints was that stress testing constituted the practice of medicine and that Sharp had not adopted legally adequate standardized procedures to permit its nurses to perform such tests. Sharp's management told Nosal-Tabor that Sharp had adopted legally sufficient standardized procedures, and that these procedures permitted nurses such as Nosal-Tabor to conduct nurse-led stress testing. After Nosal-Tabor continued to refuse to perform nurse-led stress testing and to complain about its implementation, Sharp disciplined her and eventually terminated her employment. Nosal-Tabor sued Sharp, alleging wrongful termination and two causes of action premised on claims of improper workplace retaliation. Sharp moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted the motion, ruling that Nosal-Tabor presented "no credible evidence that the Standardized Procedures in place at the time of her termination were insufficient." On appeal, Nosal-Tabor claims that the trial court erred in granting Sharp's motion for summary judgment. Her primary contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find that Sharp had failed to adopt standardized procedures that comply with the Guidelines. Nosal-Tabor contended that this error caused the court to improperly conclude that she would be unable to establish any of her causes of action. The Court of Appeal agreed: the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Sharp. The documents that Sharp held out as its standardized procedures did not contain several elements that are required by the Guidelines. In light of these deficiencies, a reasonable juror could find that Sharp improperly retaliated against, and wrongfully terminated, Nosal-Tabor when she complained about, and refused to perform, nurse-led stress testing pursuant to Sharp's legally deficient procedures. View "Nosal-Tabor v. Sharp Chula Vista Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CSU, his former employer, alleging that CSU discriminated against him based on his national origin when it denied his application for a tenured faculty position and consequently terminated him. CSU moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the gravamen of the complaint arises from protected activity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims. View "Park v. Bd. of Trustees of CA State Univ." on Justia Law

In 2012, Harden, a Caucasian, sued the Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000. He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African-American police officers in a race discrimination investigation. The Department claimed that he was terminated for taking money from a detainee’s wallet. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. Harden now appeals that decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the evidence of harassment after Harden’s testimony says something about the context in which the theft investigation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an inference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory. No reasonable jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation into the theft was pretextual. View "Harden v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an associate at a Boston law firm (Defendant) when he was informed that his Defendant would not advance him for further consideration as a partner. Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to Title VII in federal district court, contending that Defendant’s decision was the result of racial discrimination and that Defendant retaliated against him after he filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the discrimination claim. After a trial, the jury concluded that Defendant had not unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in instructing the jury in connection with Plaintiff’s retaliation claims; and (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s discrimination claim. View "Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kelly Osborne applied to work as a plasma center technician (PCT) at BioLife Plasma Services. After two interviews, Osborne (who is deaf) was conditionally offered the PCT position pending final tests and paperwork. When BioLife’s human resources department received Osborne’s medical information, it determined Osborne could not safely monitor the donor area of the facility because she could not hear the alarms on the plasmapheresis machines, which audibly sound when something goes wrong or requires attention. When Osborne reported to the facility for her first day of work, Joe Elder, the manager, informed her BioLife had rescinded her offer of employment. Osborne filed a lawsuit alleging that BioLife’s revocation of her job offer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court determined Osborne failed to identify accommodations that would allow her to perform essential functions of the PCT position, and granted summary judgment to BioLife and instructed each party to bear its own costs. Both parties appealed: Osborne, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BioLife; BioLife, seeking reversal of the district court’s determination that each party should bear its own costs. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Osborne identified a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her ability to perform essential functions of the PCT position with reasonable accommodation, making summary judgment premature. BioLife’s cross-appeal for costs was deemed moot. View "Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Preddie worked as a fifth-grade teacher in the Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation during the 2010–2011 school year. After Preddie was absent 23 times, the BCSC did not renew his contract. Preddie, an African-American, is diabetic, and his son suffers from sickle cell anemia. Preddie filed suit, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and 1991. The case district court granted summary judgment in favor of the BCSC on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except as to Preddie’s FMLA claims. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Municipality of Carolina in the federal district court of Puerto Rico alleging gender-based employment discrimination and retaliation. Before trial, Carolina extended to Plaintiff what it labeled as an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Later that day, Carolina informed the district court that no settlement had been reached. One half of an hour later, Plaintiff informed the court that she was accepting Carolina’s offer of judgment. The district court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Carolina appealed, arguing that because Plaintiff had rejected the offer of judgment prior to informing the court of her acceptance, the district court erred in entering judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because even an express rejection of a Rule 68 offer of judgment does not terminate a Rule 68 offeree’s power to accept the offer within the fourteen-day period, the district court did not err in entering judgment for Plaintiff. View "Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina" on Justia Law